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ABSTRACT 
THE SOLDIER AND THE CIGARETTE 1918–1986 
by Joel Richard Bius 
May 2015 
The military-industrial complex has been the topic of intense conversation among 
historians since President Dwight Eisenhower first gave the phrase life in January 1961. 
The term typically conjures up images of massive weapons procurement programs, but it 
also ironically involved one of the world’s most highly-engineered consumer products, 
the manufactured cigarette. “The Soldier and the Cigarette: 1918–1986” describes the 
unique, often comfortable, yet sometimes controversial relationships among the military, 
the cigarette industry, and tobaccoland politicians. The dissertation argues that the federal 
government’s first cigarette warning in 1964 changed a relationship between soldiers and 
cigarettes that the Army had fostered for almost half a century.  Thereafter, the Army 
faced formidable political, cultural, economic, and internal challenges as it sought to 
unhinge a soldier-cigarette bond that it helped to entrench.  
“The Soldier and the Cigarette” is also a study in modern American 
corporatocracy. Through a lens of corporatocracy, the dissertation reveals an American 
political economy that can only be described as paradoxical, involving a host of 
characters possessing vested and varied interests in the cigarette enterprise. Whether 
bureaucrats, soldiers, lobbyists, government executives, legislators, litigators, or anti-
smoking activists, all struggled over far-reaching policy issues involving the cigarette. 
Under the visible hand of modern economic arrangements, these groups attempted to 
balance issues of conscience, commerce, and personal freedom, as well as the needs of 
iii 
 
big business, taxpayers, and the military-industrial complex. This study is important 
because the soldier-cigarette relationship established by the Army in WWI, renewed time 
and again thereafter, and then broken apart in 1986, underpinned one of the most prolific 
social, cultural, economic, and health care related developments in American history: the 
rise and proliferation of the American manufactured-cigarette smoker and the lucrative 
industry supporting them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COPYRIGHT BY 
JOEL RICHARD BIUS 
2015 
   
 
 
 
The University of Southern Mississippi 
 
 
THE SOLDIER AND THE CIGARETTE: 1918–1986 
 
 
by 
 
Joel Richard Bius 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Submitted to the Graduate School 
of The University of Southern Mississippi 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Approved: 
 
__________________________________________ 
Dr. Louis M. Kyriakoudes, Committee Chair 
Professor, History 
 
__________________________________________ 
Dr. Andrew P. Haley, Committee Member 
Associate Professor, History 
 
__________________________________________ 
Dr. Kyle F. Zelner, Committee Member 
Associate Professor, History 
 
_________________________________________ 
Dr. Chester M. Morgan, Committee Member 
Professor, History 
 
_________________________________________ 
Dr. Andrew A.Wiest, Committee Member 
Professor, History 
 
_________________________________________ 
Dr. Karen S. Coats 
Dean of the Graduate School 
 
 
 
May 2015 
   
 
iv 
 
DEDICATION 
I dedicate this dissertation to my beautiful, lovely, and faithful wife, Leigh Bius, 
two solid young sons, Jake and Brooks Bius, and the precious little girl, Mary Jewel Bius, 
who was born to all of us the day before this dissertation was presented for defense. I also 
dedicate this work to the memory of my father, H. Wayne Bius, my mother, Billi Fae 
Bius, and close family members Jewel Brannan, Larry Brannan, and Carol Lewis Bailey, 
who all passed away during the time I was writing. In the midst of such a cycle of life, 
death, joy, pain, and creation, it is with great sincerity and true humility that I call this a 
work of inspiration grounded in Christian faith, enduring hope, and everlasting joy. 
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Special thanks go to my committee director, Dr. Louis Kyriakoudes, and my other 
committee members, Dr. Kyle Zelner, Dr. “Bo” Morgan, Dr. Andrew Haley, and Dr. 
Andrew Wiest, for their advice and support throughout the duration of research and 
writing.  
I would like to thank my wife, Leigh, and my mother-in-law, Deana Brannan, for 
hours spent reading and editing everything that follows. I could not have completed this 
work without them. I give special thanks to Nadine, Dee, and all the Interlibrary Loan 
Staff at the University of Southern Mississippi Cook Library for their professionalism, 
friendship, and support. Finally, I would like to thank the United States Air Force for 
valuing professional military education enough to send me away for three years to 
complete my PhD; I look forward to giving back to the mission - fly, fight, and win.
   
 
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ ii 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................v 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................... vii 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................1 
II. THE RISE OF THE SOLDIER AND THE CIGARETTE ........................21 
III. THE DAMN Y, THE SOLDIER, AND THE CIGARETTE IN WORLD 
WAR I ........................................................................................................48 
 
IV. GENERAL PEYTON MARCH, THE SOLDIER, AND THE 
CIGARETTE .............................................................................................80 
 
V. SMOKE ‘EM IF YOU GOT ‘EM: THE GREATEST GENERATION 
GOES TO WAR ......................................................................................104 
 
VI. THE SOLDIER, THE CIGARETTE, AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER 
FORCE .....................................................................................................144 
 
VII. SOLDIER-STARTERS ...........................................................................165 
VIII. HEALTH CARE AND THE AVF ..........................................................192 
IX. CAP, JOE, AND THE JESSE HELMS CREW GO TO WAR ...............217 
X. THE CIGARETTE SNOWBALL ...........................................................255 
XI. THE END OF THE SOLDIER AND THE CIGARETTE: SFA2000 
INVADES THE DOD..............................................................................282 
 
XII. EPILOGUE ..............................................................................................308 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................320 
vii 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AAA  Agricultural Adjustment Act  
AAR  After Action Reports 
ADVON Advanced Echelon Team  
AEF  American Expeditionary Force 
AVF  All Volunteer Force 
B&W   Brown and Williamson 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer  
CHAMPUS Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services  
CoS  Chief of Staff 
CTCA  Commission on Training Camp Activities  
CTR  Council for Tobacco Research 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DRMS  Defense Resource Management Study 
FDR  President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
FTC  Federal Trade Commission 
FY  Fiscal Year
viii 
 
GHQ  General Headquarters 
H&K  Hill & Knowlton 
HASC  House Armed Services Committee 
HEW  Department of Health, Education, and Welfare  
HHQ  Higher Headquarters  
ICBM  Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
KIA  Killed in Action 
LBJ  President Lyndon Baines Johnson 
MP  Military Police 
MSC  Medical Service Corps 
MTF  Military Treatment Facility 
MWR  Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Subcommittee 
NRA  National Recovery Administration  
OCS  Officer Candidate School 
OMB  Office of Management and Budget 
OPR  Offices of Primary Responsibility  
OSD/HA Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs 
ix 
 
OSD/MPP Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel 
PME  Professional Military Education  
PR  Public Relations 
PX  Post Exchange 
RJR  R.J. Reynolds 
SECDEF Secretary of Defense 
SSD  Special Services Division 
TI  Tobacco Institute 
TIRC  Tobacco Industry Research Council 
UCMJ  Uniform Code of Military Justice  
UMT  Universal Military Training  
USP  Unique Selling Position 
USO  United Services Organization  
VA  Veterans’ Association 
VD  Venereal Disease 
WIB  War Industry Board  
WWI  World War One 
x 
 
WWII  World War Two 
USAF  United States Air Force 
 YMCA/The Y Young Men’s Christian Association 
1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of 
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial 
complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will 
persist. 
 
–President Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 17, 1961 
 
The military-industrial complex has been the topic of intense conversation among 
historians since President Eisenhower gave the phrase life during his January 1961 
farewell address.1 The term typically conjures up images of massive weapons programs 
involving supersonic bombers, strategic missiles, armor-plated tanks, nuclear submarines, 
and complex space systems. Eisenhower was concerned the vast amounts of money and 
power involved in the design, procurement, and deployment of these weapons would take 
on a life of its own, creating a dangerous relationship between the military, industry, 
politicians, and big business.  
However, it also ironically involved one of the world’s most highly engineered 
consumer products, the manufactured cigarette2 “The Soldier and the Cigarette: 1918–
                                                          
1
 Examples of scholarly works which discuss the military-industrial complex from various angles: 
Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and The Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York : 
Basic Books, 1985); Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There In the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the 
Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Aaron L. Friedburg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: 
America’s anti-statism and its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2000); Ann R. Markusen, The Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of Industrial America (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American 
Right (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2001); Herbert Stein, Presidential Economics: The 
Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); 
and Hedrick Smith, Power Game: How Washington Works (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996). 
2
 Cassandra Tate, Cigarette Wars: The Triumph of the Little White Slaver (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 65; Robert Proctor, Golden Holocaust: Origins of the Cigarette Catastrophe and 
the Case for Abolition (Berkley: The University of California Press, 2011), 29, 39–40. The manufactured 
cigarette (as opposed to hand-rolled) first appeared in noticeable numbers when James Bonsak invented a 
cigarette rolling machine in 1885. James B. Duke’s American Tobacco Company bought the rights to this 
machine and began manufacturing cigarettes at a rate of 210 per minute. This allowed Duke to gain a 
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1986” describes the unique, often comfortable, and yet sometimes controversial 
relationship among the military, the cigarette industry, and tobaccoland politicians during 
the twentieth century. For purposes of continuity and focus, “The Soldier and the 
Cigarette” centers on the manufactured cigarette smoking culture in the United States 
Army from 1918 to 1986 excluding other branches of service and modes of tobacco 
intake. The dissertation argues that initially the Army, an organization with vested 
interests in soldiers’ combat readiness, health, and morale, played the leading role in this 
relationship. Well into the twentieth century, the Army freely distributed billions of 
manufactured cigarettes to soldiers via combat rations, or at great discount through the 
military resale system. This distribution system supported a cult of smoking in the Army 
that effectually entrenched the relationship between the soldier, the cigarette, and the 
cigarette enterprise.3 
After the Surgeon General issued the federal government’s first warning about 
health hazards associated with smoking in 1964, the nature of this relationship changed. 
After five decades encouraging the soldier-cigarette relationship, “The Soldier and the 
Cigarette” argues the Army faced formidable political, cultural, economic, and internal 
challenges as it sought to unhinge the soldier-cigarette bond it had helped entrench. Not 
only is the dissertation an exhaustive study of change over time presenting an Army 
                                                                                                                                                                             
monopoly on the cigarette market. By the time of WWI, the industry was able to manufacture 480 
cigarettes a minute. Today, the industry can make 19,480 per minute. 
3
 Allan Brandt, Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of the Product that 
Defined America (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 50. Brandt describes the moral dilemma faced by the 
military in the early twentieth century: “On the one hand, the military represented conventional nineteenth-
century views of discipline, morality, and health as well as the conviction that the state had the essential 
responsibility of protecting ‘manhood’ from vice . . . the cigarette, like alcohol, was often seen as 
undermining the control essential to military discipline . . . and did not project a desirable image of military 
decorum.” Also, the term cigarette enterprise, or just the enterprise, is used throughout this work as a 
collective term to describe a formal and informal grouping comprised of the cigarette industry, cigarette 
brands, lobbyists, growers, tobacco state politicians, smokers, and other individuals or groups that have a 
unified stake in promoting cigarette smoking, culture, and sales.  
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transitioning from extreme measures to support the cigarette vice to decisive actions to 
restrict it, it is also a study in modern American corporatocracy.  
The Oxford Dictionary defines corporatocracy as “a society or system that is 
governed or controlled [to some extent] by corporations.”4 The term corporatocracy is 
often a loaded, pejorative term. Some on the far left use it to refer to those who exploit 
third world countries, break up unions, start war to profit from war, and reap earnings 
from human misery. A more moderate interpretation defines corporatocracy as simply the 
reality of the modern economic arrangements that have governed the American economic 
system throughout most of the twentieth century.   
The latter definition is the lens appropriate to the discussion of the soldier and the 
cigarette. Under this framework, elements of corporatocracy collectively include federal 
activism, too big to fail bailouts, powerful special interests, political action committees, 
corporate capitalists, and a political-economy that can only be described as paradoxical. 
The story of the soldier and the cigarette occurs where these elements of corporatocracy 
intersect with a host of characters possessing vested and varied interests in the cigarette 
enterprise. Whether bureaucrats, soldiers, lobbyists, government executives, legislators, 
litigators, or anti-smoking activists, they all struggled over far-reaching policy issues 
involving one of the most lucrative consumer products ever developed.  
Under the visible hand of modern economic arrangements, these groups interacted 
on a field paved with irony and hemmed by special interests. Whether elected, appointed, 
or retained, they attempted to blend issues of conscience, commerce, and personal 
freedom. At the same time, they strove to incorporate the needs of big business, 
                                                          
4
 The Oxford Dictionary Online, s.v. “corporatocracy,” accessed January 29, 2015, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/corporatocracy. 
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taxpayers, the cigarette industry, and the military-industrial complex.5 Within this 
framework, the soldier and the cigarette bonded and then broke apart. This study of 
entrenching, unhinging, and corporatocracy is important because the cigarette-soldier 
relationship established by the Army in WWI, and renewed time and again thereafter, 
underpinned one of the most prolific social, cultural, economic, and health care related 
developments in American history: the rise and proliferation of the American 
manufactured-cigarette smoker.6  
 The relationship between the soldier and the cigarette has a rich and storied 
history. Dating to the close of the Civil War, Confederate sailor and tobacco farmer 
Washington Duke returned home to find thousands of soldiers camped on his small North 
Carolina farm. Duke was drafted into the Confederate Navy at age 42 and was anxious to 
return home and put the war behind him. Approaching his homestead, however, he was 
shocked to find the war in his front yard. After General Robert E. Lee surrendered at 
Appomattox on April 9, 1865, the rest of the Confederate Army followed suit in North 
Carolina when Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston surrendered to Union General 
William T. Sherman on April 26, 1865, at the Bennett Farm, located just a few miles 
from Washington Duke’s homestead. Thus, a makeshift camp materialized on Duke’s 
land. 
As the gaggle of bored blue and grey soldiers awaited orders, or pardons in the 
case of Confederate soldiers, Duke attempted to resume his life. Returning home 
                                                          
5
 Terms like “visible hand” and “modern economic arrangements,” accesses a vast literature most 
completely encapsulated in the works of Alfred Chandler Harris in The Visible Hand: the managerial 
revolution in American business (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1977) and Michael Lind in 
Land of Promise: An Economic History of the United States (New York: Broadside Books, 2012). 
 
6
 Tate, Cigarette Wars, 75–76; Proctor, Golden Holocaust, 57. 
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penniless, necessity became the mother of invention when Duke concluded these bored 
soldiers, weary of camp life and thirsty for any diversion, were ideal customers for the 
yellow leaf tobacco stored in his barn.7 He and his son, James B. Duke, pitched their 
product to the soldiers as small packages of ribbon-cut tobacco sufficient for pipe or 
cigarette paper. Subsequently, Duke’s blend of Carolina gold-leaf tobacco became 
popular among Union and Confederate veterans once they returned home and resumed 
civilian pursuits. When Duke founded the American Tobacco Company in 1890 and 
focused its energies on the emerging cigarette market, he leveraged popularity among 
veterans to monopolize the entire manufactured cigarette market by the early twentieth 
century.8  
During WWI, American soldiers were rationed smooth smoking, flue-cured, 
manufactured cigarettes for the first time in American history.9 Through flue curing, 
American cigarette producers blended, toasted, and rolled cigarettes into a deeply 
inhalable product enabling the most inexperienced smoker or virgin starter to become a 
sophisticated, veteran smoker in no time. Chapters II and III (“The Rise of the Soldier 
                                                          
7
 Tobacco is a unique agricultural product in that bulk, raw tobacco can be stored for years before 
being brought to market. Indeed this process of aging and flue curing was perfected by the cigarette 
industry in the early twentieth century and allowed them to bring a very enjoyable blend of cured tobaccos 
to the market in the form of a deeply inhalable and satisfying manufactured cigarette. So, the fact that Duke 
left large bundles of unprocessed tobacco leaf at his farm three years prior and returned to process it for 
sale to the soldiers is ironic, because that three year curing period became industry standard during the 
twentieth century.   
8
 “Duke Homestead,” Division of Archives and History, Department of Cultural Resources, North 
Carolina Historic Sites, accessed January 30, 2015, http://www.dukefamily.org/Duke_Homestead.htm; 
Ronald Troyer and Gerald Markle, Cigarettes: The Battle Over Smoking (New Brunswick, New Jersey: 
Rutgers University Press, 1983), 33. 
9
 Tate, Cigarette Wars, 69. To some degree, the Army was aware of the dangers of deeply inhaling 
cigarette smoke as early as 1915, when West Point advised its cadets “smoking cigarettes is [no] more 
injurious than other forms of tobacco unless continually inhaled well into the lungs.” By issuing the 
soldiers the new American-blended, flue-cured, manufactured cigarettes during WWI, the Army gave them 
the most inhalable, smooth smoking object ever created.  
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and the Cigarette” and “The Damn Y, the Soldier, and the Cigarette”) explore the early 
stages of the soldier-cigarette relationship and how it eventually erupted into an insatiable 
demand. Pre-WWI American smoking culture, armed progressivism, the Y Man, and the 
battlefield conditions that gave rise to the soldier-cigarette relationship are explored in 
these chapters.  
If the Progressive Era was known for moralism, social uplift, association, 
efficiency, clean living, and “the strenuous life,” then it should be no surprise that the 
organizations fighting the war and supporting the war effort were a reflection of the 
times.10 In The Killing Ground, Tim Travers describes the British Officers who 
commanded soldiers during WWI as products of British civilian society and military 
culture. Likewise, American military officers, YMCA volunteers, and civilian officials 
who led, trained, and equipped soldiers in the Great War were products of the American 
progressivism associated with this period.11 For example, the YMCA Men and Women 
who served both at home and overseas during WWI were archetypes who captured the 
spirit of the Progressive Era. As they served the millions of Doughboys deployed to 
Europe, the Y workers carried a substantial portion of work involving relief and soldier 
welfare during WWI.12 Two decades of American progressivism affected War 
Department decisions regarding soldier welfare, how the Army was organized, who was 
                                                          
10
 Theodore Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life: Essays and Addresses (New York: The Century 
Company, 1900). 
 
11
 Timothy Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence 
of Modern Warfare: 1900–1918 (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987).  
 
12
 Howard Hopkins, History of the YMCA in North America (The University of Michigan: 
Association Press, 1951), 499. Using data pertaining to resources expended, Hopkins estimates the YMCA, 
as compared to all the other relief agencies, performed 90.55 percent of all the civilian welfare work for the 
American Expeditionary Force (AEF). 
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responsible for various aspects of soldier morale, and important to the story of the soldier 
and the cigarette, whether or not soldiers received a cigarette ration.13  
These armed progressives were relatively successful in restricting soldiers’ access 
to prostitutes and alcohol. However, progressives not only looked the other way in the 
case of manufactured cigarettes, they actively participated in giving these instruments of 
vice to the soldiers. By war’s end, relief agencies distributed over two billion 
manufactured cigarettes to the Doughboys. Further, through the combat ration and other 
means, the government furnished over five-and-a-half billion manufactured cigarettes to 
soldiers at a cost of $80 million to the American taxpayer.14 
Chapter IV (“General Peyton March, the Soldier, and the Cigarette”) further drills 
into the genesis of the soldier-cigarette relationship and focuses on Chief of Staff of the 
Army General Payton March and the factors driving him to reverse a War Department 
order and initiate a cigarette rationing program one year after America entered the war. 
When Congress passed the Selective Service Act on May 18, 1917, the nation ordered 
millions of young men to arms and created a conscripted military service. Influenced by 
the tenets of the Progressive Era, Congress and the War Department took extraordinary 
measures to ensure these soldiers were protected from vices traditionally associated with 
soldiering: alcohol and prostitution.15  
                                                          
13
 For a good description of Progressivism during this period, see Robert Wiebe’s Search for 
Order, Michael McGerr’s A Fierce Discontent, and T. Jackson Lears’ Rebirth of a Nation. For a discussion 
regarding the problems with the term Progressive Movement, see Peter G. Filene’s “Obituary for the 
‘Progressive Movement,’” American Quarterly, 22, no. 1 (Spring, 1970), 20–34. 
 
14
 Tate, Cigarette Wars, 75–76. 
 
15
 Edward Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in WWI 
(Louisville: The University of Kentucky Press, 1998), 357, 363. According to Coffman, 3,703,273 
American men served in the Army during WWI. At the end of their service with the AEF, most were 
discharged rather rapidly, allowed to take only a helmet and gas mask as mementoes. During the war, 
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These progressives were generally successful in shielding the soldiers from the 
traditional vices. However in the case of the emerging cigarette vice, they either looked 
the other way or actively participated. When General March and the Army added their 
blessing with the cigarette rationing program, the nicotine addicted Doughboy veterans 
completely transformed the American cigarette industry and the nation’s smoking 
culture. Most historians agree that more than any other single factor, the Great War 
“legitimized the cigarette” and “moved cigarettes into the mainstream of American 
culture . . . by linking them to an icon of manliness and civic virtue: the American 
soldier.”16 Historians Allan Brandt and Robert Proctor argue that “WWI would mark a 
critical watershed in establishing the cigarette as the dominant product of modern 
consumer culture,” Proctor adding that the war “turned smoking from a marginal 
indulgence of questionable morality to an unobjectionable mark of stalwart manhood.”17 
In the end, the decision to ration soldiers billions of cigarettes created an enduring 
American icon: the soldier and the cigarette. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
50,475 Americans were killed in action and another 193,611 were wounded in action. By comparison to the 
Allied Force, and representative of the total devastation of the Great War, the total amount of US casualties 
for the entire war was “175,000 less than those the British suffered in the Somme in 1916.” 
 
16
 Jarrett Rudy, The Freedom to Smoke: Tobacco Consumption and Identity (Montreal: McGill-
Queens University Press, 2005), 110–111, 132; Tate, Cigarette Wars, 65–66; Julian Sivulka, Soap, Sex, 
and Cigarettes: A Cultural History of American Advertising (Boston: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 
1998), 166. Rudy makes a further link between cigarette smoking and masculinity. “Ultimately, it was the 
association between cigarettes and First World War Soldiers, largely promoted by newspapers that made 
cigarettes ‘manly’ giving them new legitimacy. The First World War has been seen by some as marking a 
trend away from ‘rugged masculinity’ toward a ‘domestic masculinity.’” Sivulka adds yet another reason 
why WWI made cigarettes culturally acceptable for the first time: sanitation. “During WWI, cigarettes 
gained wider acceptance when both soldiers and civilians found smoking cigarettes to be more convenient, 
cheaper, and more sanitary than chewing tobacco.” During a time when society was gravely concerned 
about disease (more soldiers would die from disease than combat), the idea of germ-ridden spit floating 
around in the bottom of a trench or on a factory floor was viewed with disdain. 
 
17
 Brandt, Cigarette Century, 51–54; Proctor, Golden Holocaust, 45. 
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In terms of historiography, the argument presented in Chapters II through IV of 
“The Soldier and the Cigarette” differs from that of the only other historian who has 
written on this specific topic. In Cigarette Wars, Cassandra Tate argues, “Congress 
ordered the War Department to include [cigarettes] in rations issued to soldiers 
overseas.”18 It was actually the military, and specifically General Peyton March, who 
ordered the War Department to rescind its previous decision to exclude the cigarette. The 
War Department then requested that Congress earmark additional funding for 
government-procured cigarettes.  
This may seem strange to think a general officer could exert such strong influence 
over the civilian-led War Department. However, the War Department had been greatly 
fractured for over a century and had just gone through an extensive reorganization before 
the war, bringing the logistics and procurement bureaus under the control of the newly 
empowered Army Chief of Staff billet. When March assumed this office, he quickly used 
these powers to make extensive changes, the cigarette ration being just one of them. As a 
result of the military’s leadership in the soldier-cigarette relationship and pro-smoking 
policies, a culture of cigarette smoking infiltrated the Army. Underpinned by soldiers and 
veterans, the rise in the consumption of manufactured cigarettes after the war resulted in 
one of the “most rapid increases in smoking ever recorded” in American history.19 
The ration of four manufactured cigarettes a day became the standard issue for the 
next 55 years, except during WWII when that number quadrupled. WWII is the focus of 
Chapter V (“Smoke em’ if you got em’: the Greatest Generation Goes to War”). This 
                                                          
18
 Tate, Cigarette Wars, 66.  
 
19
 Proctor, Golden Holocaust, 45. The Doughboys developed a nearly insatiable demand for 
cigarettes during WWI. “Per capita consumption of manufactured cigarettes in the United States nearly 
tripled from 1914 to 1919 . . . this is one of the most rapid increases in smoking ever recorded.”  
10 
 
 
chapter explores the continued entrenchment of the cigarette-smoking culture America 
inherited from the Doughboys and WWI. The chapter starts with a description of the 
prolific smoking culture in America fueling a WWII Army made up of conscripts. To 
assuage their nicotine habit, the Army went to great lengths and expense to procure and 
freely distribute hundreds of billions of manufactured cigarettes to the soldiers, openly 
encouraging them to smoke ‘em if you’ve got ‘em.  
This chapter spends considerable time examining the proceedings of the United 
States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program. Known as 
the Truman Committee, the panel convened during September and December 1944 to 
examine the cigarette ration, among other issues. Regarding cigarettes, the committee 
was specifically concerned with the Army’s procurement of large amounts of cigarettes 
for soldiers’ rations. The Army cigarette program drove up the price and affected the 
availability of cigarettes to the American public. The irony is thick . . . Americans’ 
demand for manufactured cigarettes had been borne on the backs of Doughboys; now the 
Doughboys’ GI sons siphoned off their cigarette supply and caused a shortage of 
immense proportions.  
During the hearings, Army officials testified that they had procured nearly 100 
billion manufactured cigarettes for fiscal year 1944 alone, an amount that ensured every 
Army soldier would receive 1.3 packs (16 manufactured cigarettes) per day. In the midst 
of the testimony presented to this panel, an Army logistics officer gave shocking 
testimony to the concerned Congressmen. To their surprise, he told them his department 
procured cigarettes under the assumption that every single soldier in uniform at that time 
smoked cigarettes, a premise that was not far off the mark.  
11 
 
 
No greater evidence exists for the entrenchment of the relationship between the 
soldier and the cigarette during and after WWI than this revelation regarding Army 
procurement and consumption policies during WWII.20 After issuing five-and-a-half 
billion manufactured cigarettes to soldiers during the entirety of WWI, just 26 years later 
the Army issued nearly 100 billion cigarettes during a single year of WWII and required 
the cigarette industry to turn over 18 percent of its output for military purposes. 
Americans only smoked 2.5 billion cigarettes in 1900, and lung cancer was so rare (only 
140 cases worldwide) it was considered an odd “treat” when medical school students 
could examine a cadaver with the disease.21 After WWI, the number shot up to 45 billion 
cigarettes smoked in 1920, with 2,837 cases of lung cancer reported by 1925. After 
WWII, the number increased again to 341 billion cigarettes smoked in 1945 with 12,130 
cases of lung cancer reported. This massive groundswell of cigarette-smoking WWI and 
WWII veterans was instrumental in establishing America as a cigarette-smoking nation.22  
As a result of the pro-smoking environment established during WWI that 
continued during WWII, millions of veterans returned home acculturated to cigarette 
smoking, many becoming nicotine addicts.23 Note especially that in the end, soldiers’ 
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 Cigarette Rations, The United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National 
Defense Program, 78th Cong. Part 26, page 12108, (1944), accessed January 30, 2015, 
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Authorization Act for 1986 to end subsidized cigarettes for service personnel.  
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overwhelming demand for cigarettes was not purely a function of chemical dependency 
driven by nicotine. Though dependency was a contributing factor, Tate argues the culture 
of the military, the soldier’s lifestyle, and the combat environment were the primary 
factors driving cigarette demand. “When soldiers recorded their own thoughts about 
cigarettes, they emphasized the social context, smoking as a display of camaraderie, a 
remedy for boredom, a solace to the dispirited . . . learning to smoke was as much a part 
of [a soldier’s] initiation into military life as learning to swear.” 24  
The Greatest Generation was also a prolific smoking generation transforming 
America from a society that smoked only about two billion manufactured cigarettes a 
year on the eve of WWI to a country that burned through an average of 350 billion 
cigarettes each year between 1946 and 1964.25 Veterans were afforded every opportunity 
to continue their smoking habit through generous smoking benefits guaranteed them by 
Congress. Congressional representatives were keenly aware of the power wielded by the 
veteran voting bloc and fiercely guarded veterans’ commissary benefits and access to 
cigarettes. They provided free cigarettes in Veterans Affairs (VA) hospital facilities and 
underwrote veterans’ smoking routine by offering them low-cost, subsidized cigarettes in 
the Post Exchange (PX) and commissary. Moreover, despite scientific data that 
definitively proved that smoking caused lung cancer (1950), and the 1964 Surgeon 
                                                                                                                                                                             
annual consumption, the numbers are telling. In 1900, Americans over 18 smoked on average only 49 
manufactured cigarettes a year. After millions of veterans were given billions of cigarettes as part of their 
service during the two World Wars, the Korean War, and as a drafted military force on the Cold War 
frontiers, they formed the foundation of cigarette smokers in America who were by 1963 smoking on 
average 4,345 cigarettes per person, per year—or “11 cigarettes per day for every American over the age of 
18.” 
 
24
 Tate, Cigarette Wars, 90. 
 
25
 The 1946 to 1964 average figure is an informed estimate. However the 1945 and 1963 figures 
quoted earlier are accurate and verifiable. 
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General’s Warning to smokers, the military continued to issue cigarettes to soldiers as 
part of their rations in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.26  
As an institution, the military was the cigarette industry’s most reliable cradle to 
grave supplier of cigarette smokers and starters. However, after half-a-century 
entrenching the relationship between the soldier and the cigarette, the federal government 
began to question the military’s cigarette policies. A small cabal of fiscally conservative 
Congressman and concerned government officials took steps to sever the relationship 
between soldier and cigarette in the early 1970s. They were motivated to action by the 
mounting data supporting the dangers of smoking and the rising costs of the All-
Volunteer Force (AVF). The AVF was not a use and dispose force as the drafted force 
had been; the AVF was comprised of long-service professionals who carried a hefty price 
in terms of health care expenses, as well as a myriad of other costs. 
As the nation ended the draft and committed to this long-service, professional 
AVF, a veteran Congressman named Charles Bennett quietly took measures to end the 
military’s requirement to ration cigarettes to soldiers. He was concerned that “the 
taxpayer was being taken for a ride in two directions at once” due to the requirement to 
                                                          
26
 Proctor, Golden Holocaust, 149, 190, 226, and 235. Proctor provides an excellent description of 
the early studies that proved cigarettes caused cancer. Experiments in the early nineteenth century utilized 
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Interestingly, Adolph Hitler was a leading proponent of cigarette research, as he was interested in 
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was in “defending cigarettes.” However, the landmark year for definitive scientific data linking cigarette 
smoking with lung cancer was 1950, the year Claude Teague and Ernst Wynder separately concluded 
research that made the lethal connection. Wynder’s research was published in the Journal of American 
Medicine in 1950. Once Wynder’s research was socialized among the public health, medical, and scientific 
communities, it led to a reassessment of the relationship between cigarette smoke and disease. As a result, 
between 1950 and 1964, a host of agencies, including the American Cancer Society, the British Medical 
Research Council, the American Heart Association, and a litany of leading medical schools, all came to 
understand and support the conclusions of Wynder’s groundbreaking study—smoking is deadly. 
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pay for the soldiers’ cigarettes and the mounting health care costs attributed to excessive 
smoking in the military.27 Thus the primary concern of fiscal conservatives committed to 
the removal of rationed cigarettes was the monetary liabilities presented by soldiers’ 
association with cigarettes. Chief among these were trepidations connected to the long-
term expense of cigarette-related health issues assumed by the American taxpayer when 
the Army transitioned to an AVF.  
The Army’s transition from a drafted to a volunteer force, the vast expenses 
associated with this transition, as well as the enterprise’s concerns regarding its faithful 
soldier starters, is the subject of Chapters VI, VII, and VIII (“The Soldier, The Cigarette, 
and the All-Volunteer Force,” “Soldier Starters,” and “Health Care and the AVF”). 
America’s move to replace the draft and Congress’ elimination of the cigarette ration ran 
parallel with the cigarette industry’s response to shifting cultural perceptions regarding 
cigarette smoking in America. Industry executives were concerned the cigarette 
enterprise was locked in an uphill battle against negative public opinion over the 
scientific data connecting cigarettes to various health hazards and diseases. If measures 
were not taken soon, movement up that hill would stall, and, like an airplane that runs out 
of airspeed and altitude at the exact same moment, the industry would crash and burn.  
Just as the federal government showed alarm at the proliferation of costs 
associated with Americans who smoked, the cigarette industry was concerned with the 
loss of profits associated with Americans who did not smoke. Powerful tobaccoland 
politicians and cigarette industry executives took extraordinary measures during this 
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period to ensure cigarettes survived amidst a sustained war on tobacco, of which the 
battle over soldiers and cigarettes was only one front.  
As the 1970s drew to a close, the battle lines were clearly drawn. The country had 
transitioned from a drafted force to an AVF, and government appropriators now 
questioned what they had bought. Specifically, they questioned the vast expenses 
associated with a recruited, professional, all-volunteer military establishment. As small 
pockets of the federal government took steps to extinguish the relationship between the 
soldier and the cigarette, the cigarette industry and key tobaccoland politicians committed 
to a program guaranteed to further entrench cigarette smoking as a masculine norm 
among America’s volunteer force.28 The enterprise was rather successful in this 
endeavor, and statistics reveal a majority of the soldiers in the Army were avid smokers 
as the Carter years gave way to the Reagan Revolution.  
During the 1980s, many Congressmen and Department of Defense (DoD) 
officials worried that the overwhelming number of smokers in the Army would represent 
substantial cost liabilities in the near future. The actions taken to address the growing 
evidence that the AVF was a prohibitively expensive force, with short- and long-term 
health care expenditures associated with smoking only adding to this expense, are the 
subject of Chapters IX, X, and XI (“Cap, Joe, and the Jesse Helms Crew Go to War,” 
“The Cigarette Snowball,” and “The End of the Soldier and the Cigarette: SFA2000 
Invades the DoD”). These chapters describe the legendary struggle between career 
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efforts of the cigarette enterprise, was able to thrive in the face of mounting evidence linking cigarettes to 
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bureaucrat-litigators, represented by the likes of Casper Weinberger and Joe Califano, 
and enterprise politicians and lobbyists, represented by characters such as Jesse Helms 
and Horace Kornegay.  
As Congress approached mid-1980s budget drills in a fiscally-constrained 
environment, concerned government officials were doubtful they could implement 
effective policies to curb smoking-related health care expenses and address the combat 
readiness issues presented by soldiers addicted to cigarettes. They were especially 
perplexed by enterprise tough men like Helms, Kornegay and Dan Daniel from Virginia. 
Considering the power of tobaccoland politicians and the deep pockets of the cigarette 
lobby, whose reaction is also documented in this chapter, government appropriators faced 
a daunting task as they attended to taxpayer liabilities represented by the expensive 
smoking culture in the Army.  
Fueled by Surgeon General C. Everett Koop’s 1984 Smoke Free America 2000 
(SFA2000) Campaign, and a 1985 DoD study revealing 54 percent of uniformed 
personnel serving in the military were smokers as opposed to 32 percent of the general 
public, elements within Congress and the DoD initiated a broad and far-reaching 
campaign to substantially decrease the smoking rate among uniformed personnel.29 Their 
actions ignited a firestorm of controversy as both sides of the cigarette debate dug in and 
prepared for battle.30  
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 The Senate Congressional Record, August 6, 1986, at S10534, accessed February 28, 2013, 
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On one side were the industry officials, pro-tobacco legislators, and concerned 
military smokers interested in perpetuating the special relationship between the soldier 
and the cigarette. Led by pro-tobacco Congressmen and industry lobbyists, the enterprise 
circled the wagons in a last-ditch effort to safeguard its unfettered access to the lucrative 
military market. They wielded extensive influence over various defense-related 
committees and subcommittees and railed against legislation or regulatory measures 
aimed at curbing soldiers’ access to cigarettes. They fought the Army’s efforts to 
institutionalize smoking cessation plans and stripped language in defense appropriations 
bills that would have removed commissary and PX cigarette subsidies. They utilized a 
finely tuned and superbly coordinated campaign to connect smoking to vitality, maturity, 
liberty, individual rights, and freedom of choice: all themes resonating with the military 
market.  
The other side was represented by small elements within the DoD, as well as 
several elected officials who were still concerned with the expenses associated with 
soldiers’ smoking habits and the moral liability of encouraging a practice that would 
ultimately destroy their heart and lungs.31 With the lines drawn, these officials soon 
discovered that severing the long-standing bond between the soldier, the cigarette, and 
the enterprise was a difficult, complex, and a time-consuming task.  
Similar to WWI when the military, knowingly or unknowingly, took actions 
entrenching the relationship between the soldier and the cigarette, in the 1980s, powerful 
internal forces within the DoD, under the guise of soldier rights and freedom of choice, 
blocked efforts to unhinge the soldier-cigarette relationship. In a stark moment of 
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frankness, Secretary of Defense Weinberger described DoD’s difficulty as it endeavored 
to implement responsible cigarette policy in a corporatocracy starved for cigarette 
revenue and taxes. He said, “The tobacco issue has presented the government (federal, 
state and local) with a paradoxical situation attempting to balance the negative health 
impacts against the positive economic impacts (Italics mine).”32 In the end, the Army, in 
a bold move just as decisive as General March’s decision in 1918 to issue cigarette 
rations, stepped through a tiny crack in Weinberger’s DoD Health Promotion Directive 
1010.10 guidance to once and for all end the soldier-cigarette culture dominating Army, 
and by extension American culture, for nearly 70 years.  
“The Soldier and the Cigarette” employs a research methodology leveraging the 
extensive repository of primary source documents contained in the Legacy Tobacco 
Documents available online through the University of California-San Francisco. The 
Legacy Documents contain over 70 million optically scanned documents, thousands of 
which relate directly to the soldiers’ experience with cigarettes during the entire period 
covered in this dissertation. It is difficult to describe the richness of this digital archive—
one could spend years mining the data, exploring any topic from representations of 
females in modern advertising to links between cigarette advertising and newspaper 
profitability.  
Allan Brant, a pioneer in this area of research, offers the best description of the 
importance of the Legacy Documents to scholars in this field. Brant comments, “the 
availability of research materials limits every historical inquiry,” adding that his study 
would have been no exception were it not for one of the great ironies of “modern 
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corporate history.” During the discovery process utilized during the Master Settlement 
proceedings, the industry employed a tactic of “vetting internal materials and policies 
with legal council to claim attorney client privilege” in an effort to hide the most 
damaging documents. This tactic backfired when judges, as part of the massive Master 
Settlement Agreement (MSA) between the industry and the plaintiff states, required the 
industry’s legal teams to turn over all these confidential documents, which were 
subsequently digitized and meticulously organized.33  
Robert Proctor, another pioneer scholar in this field, adds that research leveraging 
archives like the Legacy Documents “represents a new kind of historiography: history 
based on optical character recognition, allowing a rapid combing of the archives for 
historical gems (and fleas).” An archive this immense enables “research opportunities 
that are largely unprobed . . . [and] entirely new kinds of topics . . . [including] the history 
of single words or turns of phrases.” Proctor adds, “It is hard to say how this will 
transform historical writing, but we are likely to find new paths opening up that we could 
not have imagined.” “The Soldier and the Cigarette” steps into this path by using the 
power of the Legacy Archive to narrowly focus on one topic—the soldiers and 
cigarettes.34  
This mountain of archival documents is supplemented with a vast array of other 
primary sources including personal memoirs, Congressional proceedings and hearing 
transcripts, government studies, military regulations, oral histories, and newspaper 
articles from the periods covered. Finally, these archival and primary sources are 
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supported by an extensive array of secondary source literature covering topics directly 
and indirectly related to the soldier-cigarette saga.  
From 1918 to 1986, the military established a powerful sub-culture of cigarette 
smoking soldiers. The relationship was so entrenched it took 37 years to sever after the 
1964 Surgeon General’s Report warned Americans that cigarettes were hazardous to 
one’s health. The manufactured cigarette, despite its simplicity in appearance, had a 
profound and far-reaching effect on American history. “The Soldier and the Cigarette” 
cuts across a broad spectrum of historical methodologies and schools of inquiry. Though 
it is grounded in the field of War and Society, a school seeking to understand military 
history with an eye toward appreciating how war affects society and culture, and vice 
versa, it also speaks to many other disciplines. It is at once social and cultural history as 
the soldier’s relationship with the cigarette displays elements of class, mentalité, and 
material culture. It touches on economic and advertising history as it traces the effects of 
the most highly-engineered and profitable consumer product ever created. It leverages 
aspects of political history as it uncovers the nuances of a federal system allowing for a 
corporatocracy of special interest groups and politicians with specific political, economic, 
and agricultural interests to dominate the American legislative process. In the end, “The 
Soldier and the Cigarette” moves the field of War and Society into new territory as it uses 
the manufactured cigarette as a vehicle to explore the interaction between war, society, 
and corporatocracy during the twentieth century. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE RISE OF THE SOLDIER AND THE CIGARETTE 
When America entered WWI, manufactured cigarettes were only slightly popular 
in America. The first nationwide manufactured cigarette campaign prior to WWI was R.J. 
Reynold’s (RJR) debut of the Camel cigarette brand in 1913.1 The manufactured 
cigarette, as opposed to the hand rolled, had first appeared in noticeable numbers when 
James Bonsak invented a cigarette rolling machine in 1880. James B. Duke’s American 
Tobacco Company bought the rights to this machine, and began manufacturing cigarettes 
at a rate of 210 a minute. This allowed Duke to gain a monopoly on the cigarette market. 
By the time of WWI, the industry was able to manufacture 480 cigarettes a minute; 
today, the industry can make 19,480 per minute.  
These new manufactured cigarettes were easy to smoke, fairly cheap, and readily 
available. They were easy to smoke due to the relatively new flue-curing and blending 
process, and were “sweet and flavorful from [their] use of candied-up air-cured burley, 
and . . . mild and inhalable by virtue of its incorporation of low pH flue-cured leaf.” Flue-
curing and blending was a process whereby the industry perfected combining the “lower 
pH of flue-cured with the higher pH of sweet-flavored burley.” Cigarette historian Robert 
Proctor calls this industry innovation “the deadliest invention in the history of modern 
manufacturing,” because this seemingly minor adjustment to cigarette production created 
the “milder, more flavorful, and inhalable . . . American blend [that] would quickly take 
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Great War.  
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the world by storm.”2 The storm was only a spot on the horizon at the start of WWI; by 
the end of the war it was a dark cloud, and by WWII, the storm had grown into a 
worldwide hailstorm of cigarettes.  
Yet this hailstorm was in the distant future. Though RJR had an impressive, well-
coordinated roll out of its smooth smoking cigarette, the manufactured cigarette still only 
garnered less than seven percent of the tobacco market on the eve of WWI.3 As it had 
been for centuries, the market was still dominated by cigars and pipe tobacco, followed 
by chewing tobacco and snuff.4 There are several reasons why cigarettes were not as 
popular as other forms of tobacco in early twentieth century America. Retailers and 
traditional tobacco men thought they were cheap and poor of quality. One retailer, upon 
hearing of a cigarette ban in his state, exclaimed “I am tired of getting off my stool 250 
times a day to sell a five cent package of cigarettes and then making only ten cents on the 
whole lot.”  
Cigarettes were also seen as “perverse” and a “moral and cultural offense.” They 
were viewed as a form of tobacco consumption “typically practiced by disreputable men 
(and boys).” The highly influential temperance movements dominating the Progressive 
Era both politically and culturally lumped cigarettes with alcohol, labeling them both as a 
despicable vice. In progressive America, they became a symbol of the “seismic . . . moral 
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pipes as the dominant form of smoking until the 1920s and 1930s.”  
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and cultural crisis in the nation” and were associated with juvenile delinquency and 
criminal behavior.5  
However the most important determinant regarding cigarette acceptability hinged 
upon their reception by the cult of manhood that dominated American society during the 
early twentieth century. Among the refined and gentlemanly, cigarettes were juxtaposed 
against the more culturally accepted and masculine pipes and cigars, which were 
typically smoked in private rooms and gentlemen’s clubs. Many American men 
considered cigarette smoking an effeminate vice associated with immigrant city dwellers 
and those unable to exercise self-control. The literature on the cult of manhood is 
extensive. 6 Consistent themes in this canon include the concepts of manhood, self-
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control, the comparison of the dominant American white male against the immigrant, 
non-American factory worker, and fears that white male virility was in danger. One 
journalist from the period, reflecting on the rise of cigarette smoking, commented that 
cigarette smoking was “for a time considered a sissy habit” associated mainly with 
factory-bound, immigrant city dwellers whose work patterns drove a desire for “a short 
smoke such as a cigarette offered.”7 WWI Historian Tim Travers recalls British General 
Baden-Powell who, when commenting about the state of young men prior to WWI, 
“criticized loafing, hooliganism, cigarette smoking, watching football . . . and gambling – 
all of these [cause] loss of self-control, and hence loss of manliness.”8 
Bert Moses, a contemporary journalist from this period, commented that 
“somehow or other, every good, decent and manly American instinct protests against the 
thing [cigarettes] . . . The man with a cigar or a pipe loses none of his manly attributes 
because of the [cigar or pipe] habit.”9 Cigarette smoking researchers Troyer and Markle 
provide a similar sense of the effeminate nature of cigarette smoking, commenting that 
the “Cigar and pipe smokers characterized cigarette smoking as the improper use of a fine 
product.”10 Robert Proctor adds further nuance to the effeminate discourse surrounding 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in the accident of personal, material birth. Roosevelt is clearly the perfect locus genii and patron saint for 
the museum and its task of regeneration of a miscellaneous, incoherent urban public threatened with 
genetic and social decadence, threatened with the prolific bodies of the new immigrants, threatened with 
the failure of manhood.”   
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cigarettes with his assessment that “Cigarettes were for dandies and sissies.”11 In an 
article penned in 1920 by journalist Torrey Ford, he wondered at Americans “taking 
increased joy in more tobacco,” and concluded that WWI had changed the way American 
saw cigarettes: “Ten or fifteen years ago, cigarettes didn’t have much of a standing in the 
community. There was a neat distinction between the man who smoked cigarettes and the 
man who smoked cigars or a pipe. That distinction seems to have disappeared today.”12  
Prior to the surge in cigarette smoking resulting from WWI, the anti-cigarette 
environment was bolstered by the overarching progressive impulse towards moderation, 
self-control, efficiency, and in the case of some vices, complete abstinence. The 
progressives’ were determined to provide American soldiers with an “invisible armor” 
sufficient to make their morals and conscience impervious to the designs of the enemies 
of decency. The invisible armor discourse was first employed in a speech by Secretary of 
War Newton Baker where he stated,  
These boys are going to France; they are going to face conditions we do not like to talk about, that 
we do not like to think about . . . I want them armed; I want them adequately armed and clothed by 
their Government; but I want them armed with invisible armor to take with them. I want them to 
have an armor made up of a set of social habits replacing those of their homes and communities … 
a moral and intellectual armor for their protection overseas.13 
 
Julian Sivulka, an historian of American advertising, says that “moralists blasted 
cigarettes, referring to them as ‘coffin nails’ and ‘gaspers’ . . . others held that cigarette 
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smokers were most likely criminals, neurotics, or possibly drug addicts.”14 Progressives’ 
and moralists’ concerns regarding cigarettes and vice in general, seen in Baker’s speech 
quoted above, were especially alerted when it came to the gathering of America’s boys 
for war.  
 When Congress passed the Selective Service Act on May 18, 1917, drawing 
millions of young men for conscripted military service, progressives took extraordinary 
measures to ensure soldiers protection from the vices traditionally associated with 
soldiering.15 For example, they banned liquor sales and shut down slums around training 
camps. They made it a crime for any civilian to give soldiers alcohol; they could not even 
offer a glass of wine at Sunday dinner. There is scant evidence that the Army was 
concerned with tobacco or cigarettes at all in the months prior to America’s entrance into 
the war. This is a bit odd considering groups like the Women’s Christian Temperance 
Union, the Anti-Cigarette League, the Non-Smokers Protective League, and the YMCA, 
consistently targeted cigarettes as a pernicious vice during this period.16  
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 The Army sent all potential citizen soldiers a document to read before they 
arrived at training that described what to expect to help alleviate fears and shed light on 
the unknown. In true progressive fashion, smoking, a vice that had not yet achieved 
derision on par with alcohol or illicit sex, is only mentioned in context to moderation. 
The Army instructed potential soldiers to “cut down [and] get your wind” if “smoking 
immoderately” was part of their daily routine. In the same sentence, it encouraged 
prospective soldiers to “chew their food well . . . drink a great deal of cool (not cold) 
water . . . [and] don’t eat between meals.” Finally they encouraged moderation with 
tobacco, especially while exercising or marching . . . smokes were “much more enjoyable 
if you wait till you can sit down quietly during one of the periods of rest.”17 For sure, 
there was no plan to issue the soldiers cigarettes as part of their daily rations. 
WWI would turn this relationship—at times casual, at other times hostile—
between the manly cult and the manufactured cigarette on its ear. After the Great War, 
the manufactured cigarette in America soon became the most successful consumer item 
ever developed, making it a central issue to any understanding of twentieth century 
American culture, society, politics, or economy. Historians of the cigarette-smoking 
culture in America agree that the Great War “mark[ed] a critical watershed in 
establishing the cigarette as the dominant product of modern consumer culture,” turning 
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smoking “from a marginal indulgence of questionable morality to an unobjectionable 
mark of stalwart manhood.”18 
Entrenchment 
It was early September, 1917. As his family back home readied for bed, Private 
Jonathan Lee from the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) was on the move in 
France.19 Lee was part of the first American units marching to their assigned sectors on 
the Western Front.20 For the AEF, this would be a day to remember: the day American 
combat units first entered the trench line to serve alongside hardened British and French 
combat veterans. The veterans Lee joined were seasoned combat veterans with three 
years fighting already under their belts. The Allies had fought the Germans to a standstill 
in several major campaigns, suffering millions of casualties. Things were certainly not 
going the Allies way as the first American forces deployed into the trenches. French units 
had already mutinied, and morale was at an all-time low.21 Lee’s unit was part of the 
leading edge of what would grow to a massive expeditionary force. In America’s 32 
training camps, a multitude of conscripted soldiers were already in the pipeline. The AEF 
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would not reach full strength until the spring of 1919; until that time, it was up to Lee and the rest 
of the AEF provide relief to the Allies and join on-going operations on the Western Front.22  
For this young American conscript marching toward the sound of battle, the 
sights, sounds, and smells were overwhelming. Trench warfare was a grueling 
experience, full of danger, deprivation, and isolation. Historians Geoffrey Jensen and 
Andrew Wiest argue that, despite advances in technology, warfare was still essentially 
unchanged at its most basic level:  
While industrialization improved the killing capabilities of the army, in terms of both hardware 
and the wherewithal to keep its troops fighting, it did little to influence the way in which the 
average soldier spent his time, whether in or out of the line, largely because the stationary nature 
of the war.23  
 
Though he faced a combat environment churned by the modern advances in lethality, his 
was similar to the age-old destiny of millions before him: cold, mud, boredom, hunger, 
noise, and death.24 
As Lee moved forward, he saw lines of French soldiers slouching towards him, 
going the opposite direction. Trench war was a grinding schedule.25 The Allied soldiers 
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Lee passed had completed a four day rotation in the trenches and were moving to the rear 
areas to rest and recuperate. They were burdened by their filth-soaked coats that weighed 
as much as 58 pounds with the extra accumulated dirt, grime, sweat, and caked-on 
blood.26 They were chilled to the bone, some wounded, and others sick. They left several 
comrades behind, buried in miry graves behind the trench line, some having drowned in 
mud.27 They left deceased comrades tangled in the barbed wire or at the bottom of bomb 
craters somewhere in no man’s land. Men were missing in their formation; they were 
returning with fewer men than they had deployed with a month earlier. Lee was aware of 
the trench schedule, but he now saw the effects of that schedule firsthand as he observed 
these tired, worn men. He wondered if his training had prepared him for what lay ahead, 
or if he would survive. 
Upon entering the reserve trench, Lee continued forward in communication 
trenches running perpendicular to the frontline. After moving through the support 
trenches, he moved another hundred meters, and encountered the Western Front for the 
first time. He smelled the trenches long before he saw them.28 Years later, the stench still 
stung, as generations of WWI veterans recalled the smells associated with trench warfare. 
The sources of these pungent odors were numerous and unrelenting, namely the smells of 
rotting flesh. As thousands of soldiers vied for ground in the several offensives of the 
previous three years, they were blown to bits by millions of artillery shells hurled into 
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their slow-moving lines.29 Bodies were torn asunder, human remains littered the churned 
landscape, and into this terrain were carved hundreds of miles of trenches. An eyewitness 
to the destruction of the land later commented that “the ground had been so churned up 
and fought over that even the military graves and their occupants had long since 
disappeared.” In a letter home during the war, this observer said “It makes one think of 
the surface of the moon . . . the only figure that comes to mind is that of the gigantic 
spoon furiously stirring a liquid earth until it becomes frozen or rigid, and then sprinkling 
over the top if it bits of wood, steel, bones, rags, and other debris.” 30 Indeed, walking 
through the trench was walking through an open grave. 
One French soldier commented, “We all had on us the stench of dead bodies. The 
bread we ate, the stagnant water we drank, everything we touched had a rotten smell, 
owing to the fact that the earth around us was literally stuffed with corpses.”31 The smells 
of human excrement, urine, and mud added to the pungent aroma. British units, for 
example, detailed unlucky soldiers, known as “shit-wallahs,” to act as trench sanitation 
agents. These special details might designate a shell crater in the trench line as the 
regimental latrine, simply covering it over when it was full. Sometimes empty ration tins 
were employed as toilet bowls and buried in mud when they overflowed.32 The effect was 
predictable, and the earth was rent with human excrement. The mud and squalor were so 
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atrocious, soldiers urinated in their rifle barrels in a panicked effort to break loose dirt 
and un-jam their main battle weapon.33 Added to the smells of putrefaction and human 
waste were the body odors of thousands of soldiers who went weeks on end without 
showers, living under the acrid aroma of nitrate that hung in the air, the result of a million 
explosions.34  
In addition to the smells, the other horror Lee and generations of WWI veterans 
vividly remembered was the fear and stress of trench warfare. Their constant 
companions, fear and stress were sustained by prolonged exposure to the enemy and the 
elements. Living like cave dwellers, “Death’s Men” existed on a fine line between 
nervous breakdown and combat effectiveness. Death or maiming seemed to lurk around 
every corner. First was the combat death resulting from close contact with the enemy; 
killing was the business of warfare and 50,475 American soldiers died in WWI. Upon 
hearing the screams of wounded men, and seeing the destruction of poison gas and the 
results of shell shock, one observer commented on the “brutality and waste” of modern 
warfare saying that “the thing hits you between the eyes . . . as you watch it your mind 
revolts against the idea that this is the accepted and time-honored technique by which 
homo sapiens, on the pinnacle of creation, settles his little differences.”35  
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Lee spent the next four days manning the frontline trench, where he was a mere 
one-hundred meters from the Germans. He marked his time in constant vigilance, 
standing alert and participating in endless equipment repair and trench maintenance 
details. The environment was unforgiving and included both the harsh weather, which 
eroded their trenches and soaked their equipment, as well as the combat environment. 
More soldiers died in the trenches from German snipers than from any other source–
death could come at any moment.36 He endured stand-to alerts, exercises, drills, and pre-
combat checks. He participated in several nighttime raids into no man’s land, and had 
even gone over the top as part of a general offensive.37 In the vernacular of his Civil War 
ancestors, Lee had ample opportunity to “see the elephant,” a term used by Civil War 
soldiers to describe their initial experience with combat and death fifty years earlier.38  
However, Lee also dealt with the fear and stress associated with the intangibles of 
war. If he refused to go over the top when the order came, the AEF commander, General 
Pershing, authorized officers to shoot stragglers or deserters on site. One division 
commander permitted his officers to “throw bombs into dugouts of men who refused to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1918, he was ready and willing to go serve, despite the fact he was thirty-five. Newton Baker stepped in 
and claimed exemption for Fosdick, ordering him to continue his work as head of the CTCA.  
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go over the top.”39 In addition to these, he also had to face the dual threats of disease and 
accidents, both of which together killed 63,195 American soldiers.40 If these factors were 
not enough to drive a man crazy, random death could come at any moment, a fate that 
added to the stress and fear. A soldier might peer through one of the many lookout portals 
in the trench wall, as he had a hundred times before, only to have his eye, and then his 
head, instantly pierced by a well-placed shot from a German sniper. The results were 
horrifying. Historian Denis Winter observes that witnessing death in this manner had a 
profound effect on the soldiers, as there are “references without number to the depths of 
fear soldiers felt when confronted with death in its most tangible form.”41 One soldier 
spoke of the sheer indiscriminate nature of the killing, recalling an officer who was struck 
down by a chance artillery shell while on a leisurely stroll in the woods miles from the 
frontlines.42 Another soldier was killed when a stray bullet was cooked off in a fire, 
piercing the man’s gut. With his comrades helplessly watching, he died an agonizing 
death.43 
To make matters worse, even when combat ended on November 11, 1918, the 
stress of Army service did not end with the war as rampant rumors frayed the soldiers’ 
already shattered nerves. Some were convinced they would go to Russia next to fight 
                                                          
39
 Ronald Schaffer, America in the Great War: The Rise of the War Welfare State (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), 167; Fosdick, Chronicle of a Generation, 180-181.  
 
40
 PBS in association with The Imperial War Museum, “Deaths from disease during World War 
One,” accessed November 22, 2014, http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/resources/casdeath_pop.html. 
 
41
 Winter, Death’s Men, 81, 133. 
 
42
 Winter, Death’s Men, 81, 131. 
 
43
 Winter, Death’s Men, 81, 131. Another tragic story involved a British Tommy on his maiden 
voyage to the trench, confident of the safety provided by the bulletproof waistcoat his parents had furnished 
him. He was subsequently, and tragically, shot through the forehead on his first step to the firing line. 
 
35 
 
 
against the Bolsheviks. On top of the stress of uncertainty, Pershing added the additional 
requirement that soldiers had to drill at least 25 hours a week. One morale worker 
commented on the sheer absurdity of such a program: “Most of the men were not looking 
forward to any career as soldiers . . . to see a Battery that has fired 70,000 rounds in the 
Argonne fight going listlessly through the movements of ramming an empty shell into a 
gun for hours at a stretch, or training the sights on an enemy that does not exist, is 
depressing enough to watch, and its effect on the spirits of the men is apparent.”44 Long 
hours of boredom, stress over the unknown, and mandatory, senseless drill, increasingly 
meant one thing: copious amounts of cigarette consumption.45  
Such a dangerous and unpredictable environment meant that nearly everyone was 
on edge – especially at night. Shrouded in darkness, soldiers like Lee moved about the 
trench at night calling out the watch word every five steps, weary of the nervous trench 
dweller who might shoot at them by mistake. Despite these precautions, many were killed 
by their fellow soldiers who mistook them for German raiding parties who came to kill 
them in their sleep. One soldier told a story about “one of the finest sergeants in one of 
the companies . . . greatly respected and loved by all his comrades . . . [that] did not 
respond to the sentinels call, and in a moment he was lying dead in the trench.” A 
particularly optimistic, if grave, soldier recalled that it was better to be shot at night by 
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your own men because their aim was diminished in the low light conditions and aid 
stations were relatively free at that hour.46 
Lee slept in catacomb-like chambers dug into the walls of the trench. He lived in 
constant fear of a direct hit by artillery that would easily bury him alive in his sleep if it 
did not instantly turn him into atoms. The Germans fired thousands of artillery rounds 
each month, and Lee weighed his probability of survival. He was constantly awakened by 
the sound and smell of men’s feet shuffling by on the duck boards forming the floor of 
the trench. Rats and lice were omnipresent. The rats were enlarged from gorging 
themselves on human remains. Cats were deployed against these giant rats, and the cats 
were never seen again; they were presumed killed in action (KIA), eaten by their prey. 
Some were so familiar with the rats they named them, not even phased when they ran 
across their bodies as they slept.47  
After four days enduring the frontline trench warfare environment, Lee went 
through a back-out procedure as his unit moved to the support trench line for four days. 
He then moved to the reserve trench line for another four, and finally, Lee emerged caked 
in mud, just like the British and French units he observed a month earlier, as he marched 
to the rear area. As described by soldier-poet Siegfried Sassoon, Lee had finally obtained 
what his “animal instincts” desired above all else: “freedom from . . . oppressiveness.”48 
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The AEF soldier would continue in this schedule until the war was won, or he was killed 
or wounded–whichever came first.49 
The Soldier and the Cigarette 
It was from these dangerous, dirty, smelly, deadly trenches and combat conditions 
that an insatiable demand for cigarettes emerged among the AEF.50 In the cigarette, Lee 
and his Doughboy comrades found a source of solace that calmed their fears, steadied 
their hands, and helped them pass the time. In 1920, Torrey Ford said, 
Any soldier would trudge fourteen kilometers and run the risk of being declared A.W.O.L. on a 
slight rumor that American cigarettes could be bought at a certain station. No man thought it a 
waste of time to spend four hours standing in line on his free afternoon for the opportunity of 
buying a couple of packages of cigarettes . . . they said an army ‘traveled on its stomach,’ but it 
seemed more to the point that it proceeded along with its cigarettes.51 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that the sky was one of the redeeming features of the War. Behind the support lines where I stood, the 
shell-pitted ground sloped somberly into the dusk; the distances were blue and solemn, with a few trees 
grouped on a ridge, dark against the deep-glowing embers of another day endured . . . the evening star 
twinkled serenely. Guns were grumbling miles away . . . Moments like those are unpredictable when I look 
back and try to recover their living texture. One’s mind eliminates boredom and physical discomfort, 
retaining an incomplete impression of a strange, intense, and unique experience. If there be such a thing as 
ghostly revisitation on this earth, and if ghosts can traverse time and choose their ground, I would return to 
the . . . sector as it was then. But since I always assume that spectral presences have lost their sense of smell 
(and I am equally uncertain about their auditory equipment) such haunting might be as inadequate as those 
which now absorb my mental energy. For trench life was an existence saturated by the external senses; and 
although our actions were domineered over by military discipline, our animal instincts were always 
uppermost. While I stood there then, I had no desire to diagnose my environment. Freedom from its 
oppressiveness was what I longed for.”  
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Another journalist from the period penned an article shortly after the war also extolling 
the virtues of the cigarettes in warfare: 
A spiritless army is doomed in advance to retreat. And the one thing that more than any other 
keeps an army on the go is tobacco . . . Our boys were willing to forget trench feet and cooties and 
shellshock as long as they were allowed the consolation of inhaling tobacco. One of the most 
popular of their trench songs advised, ‘Smile boys, smile, while you’ve a Lucifer to light your fag’ 
. . . and they did. 52 
 
If the French soldiers were known for their state-sponsored brothels and the British for 
their daily rum rations, the Doughboy and his cigarette quickly became the enduring 
American image of WWI.53  
The historical record is replete with examples of the unique relationship each of 
the allied countries had to vice.  Through film, the cultural image of the American soldier 
with the cigarette was established very soon after America entered the war. In Charlie 
Chaplin’s 1918 film “Shoulder Arms,” Chaplin “chose a rifle, a gas mask, and a cigarette 
as essential props for his portrayal of a Doughboy.” One historian describes how the 
“French and British officers gave their men a measure of rum or brandy before they were 
ordered to attack; American officers passed out cigarettes instead.” 54  
YMCA volunteer James Shillinglaw records one particularly unfortunate event 
regarding the Tommys and the Rum: “at six the Germans came over the top and by nine 
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they were past the third line of defense. By the end of the night they had gone 15 
kilometers and probably captured 35,000. British officers were drunk. To think of this 
stupidity, and after four years’ experience with the Hun.”55 However, in all fairness, other 
historians have recorded that this German advance in 1918 slowed to a halt when German 
soldiers stopped to imbibe upon British rum. With no such state-sanctioned access to rum 
or women, historian Richard Schaffer describes the growing relationship between the 
American soldier and cigarette the best:  
Americans did not issue alcoholic rations before battle . . . nicotine was their [the Americans] drug 
of choice – as tranquilizer and stimulant . . . observers noted the power of tobacco . . . Lieutenant 
Frank P. Isensee watched officers and men . . . leaving their jump off point . . . smoking their 
cigars and cigarettes and shouting commands . . . advancing while shells landed among them, most 
of the men smoking cigarettes; all were calm, not talking much.56 
 
 To understand the Doughboys’ and subsequent generations of soldiers’ 
commitment to the manufactured cigarette, one must understand the pharmacology of 
nicotine. Half a century after the soldier-cigarette bond was first cemented, the cigarette 
industry sponsored scientists at a gathering to articulate and record why people smoked.57 
In doing so, their papers and essays were gathered in a conference report explaining in 
vivid detail why a soldier would reach for his cigarette first, and his food, water, or a 
blanket second. 
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 The report found that “cigarette smoking was a diversional activity,” a general 
adaptation to stress when flight is not an option, and a “defense mechanism” that has a 
“tranquilizing effect” and offers a sense of euphoria.58 Smoking was presented as a 
scientifically proven way to steady the hands and calm a person down, even while 
increasing heart rate so one is more alert. Smoking was proven to reduce aggression.59 It 
was even described as providing a level of “pulmonary eroticism,” an apt way to describe 
the euphoria and release of a smoke.60  
  Prior to the war, the cigarette had gone through a bit of a revolution. Through a 
process called flue-curing, American tobacco was blended, toasted, and rolled into a 
smooth and deeply inhalable product.61 When inhaled in this manner, besides creating 
addiction if done repeatedly over extended periods, it also creates a deep sense of 
euphoria as the blood vessels are constricted and the nicotine absorbed. Science also had 
proven that chronic smokers could take considerably more shock than a non-smoker.62 
Hollywood was quick to pick up on this smoking theme; the report described how John 
Wayne “could take more on the chin” with a cigarette as without.63 All of these traits and 
physiological benefits of smoking were absolutely essential to soldiers involved in 
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combat conditions presented in WWI, or any war for that matter. The report 
acknowledged this soldier-cigarette connection as well, singling out soldiers as the prime 
examples of the benefits of smoking at one point: “Soldiers smoke before a battle . . . to 
quiet themselves under stress.”64  
The enterprise scientists’ bottom line was clear: science proved that for a soldier 
in combat, a cigarette can deliver certain physiological effects that will allow him to 
cope, make him a better shot, calm his nerves, and increase his ability to take shock and 
risks. In a war that placed men in the direct line of fire for weeks of shock over an 
extended period, the most significant driver of the demand for cigarettes by far in WWI 
was this relation to nerves.65 Soldiers were told not to speak about fear, so they dealt with 
fear by smoking cigarettes. One soldier, recalling a terrifying seven hour artillery barrage 
during the Battle of Ypres, declared that he “smoked eighty cigarettes,” adding that he 
did not know “what I should have done without them.”66  
 One medical officer recalled a soldier who entered his tent on a stretcher, 
grievously wounded, missing a hand, and suffering from a crushed leg. The doctor 
observed that the only comfort for this poor fellow were the cigarettes he enjoyed, 
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“lighting each cigarette from the stump of the old one.”67 There are graphic images of 
soldiers, blinded and burned by gas warfare, their heads wrapped in bandages, with only 
their lips protruding, a cigarette delicately placed between the lips. In a strange way, 
cigarettes kept men connected with compassion and helped them stay linked with the 
peaceful world they had left behind. 
 In addition to these pharmacological effects of nicotine on the soldier’s ability to 
persevere in combat, there were also very practical reasons why they appealed to millions 
of soldiers like Lee. The “little white slavers,” as industrialist Henry Ford described them, 
helped cover up the horrific odors of the battlefield.68 Cigarette smoke dulls the sense of 
smell and leaves only the sweet aroma of tobacco in the nostrils. The smell of tobacco 
was preferred over the disgusting smells that would have invaded their senses otherwise. 
One group of German soldiers, for example, demanded a double ration of cigarettes after 
the Verdun offensive to “mask the overwhelming stink of the corpses” and putrefaction 
encountered when they overran the pulverized French defensive lines.69 
 Another practical aspect of smoking was the connection it gave the soldier to 
dignity and humanity at a time when he was often surrounded by neither. While living 
what many saw as a cruel, animal-like existence in the trench, an important aspect of the 
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soldiers’ connection to humanity was his ability, and freedom, to smoke. Caught up in the 
savagery of killing and maiming, a smoke provided a solemn moment of reflection and a 
bit of relief from the shock of the battlefield. In this way, cigarettes helped the soldier 
maintain his composure in the midst of horrific circumstances, giving him fortitude and 
bearing.70  
As the soldiers’ devotion to the physiological and practical aspects of cigarette 
smoking grew stronger during the war, they became particularly agitated with the various 
temperance organizations tirelessly working to take the cigarette from their hands. One 
soldier, who came from a family of moralistic progressives, wrote his anti-cigarette 
brother a particularly scathing letter upon seeing a mangled soldier soothed by a cigarette. 
He told his brother, who was active in the anti-cigarette movement, not to dare talk to 
him about the supposed evils of the cigarette habit. He then claimed that if Jesus were to 
come to the frontlines, He would surely be the first to hand out cigarettes to the soldiers, 
adding that the “cup of cold water in my name” referred to in the Biblical parable would 
likely “be a cigarette” if Christ was to visit the Western Front.71   
A Y Man, as men who volunteered for service with the YMCA were known, once 
exposed to the conditions in the trenches, commented to a fellow Y Man, “If I have a 
Bible and a packet of cigarettes in the trenches, I’d give a boy the cigarettes.”72 One 
might disagree with their theology; however, their commentary expresses the seriousness 
of the soldiers’ feelings about cigarettes during the Great War. Finding humor in the 
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midst of war, historian and veteran infantryman Paul Fussell tells how WWI soldiers who 
wanted to ensure their packages of tobacco and cigarettes made it through used a unique 
labeling trick to ensure delivery. Soldiers instructed their family to write “Army 
Temperance Society Publications Series 9” on the box containing the much-needed 
cigarettes. Since a vast majority of soldiers wanted nothing to do with the various 
cigarette and alcohol temperance societies, their cigarette delivery was almost guaranteed 
when labeled in this manner.73  
 With this understanding of smoking pharmacology and practicality in place, it is 
not hard to understand why demand for cigarettes grew by leaps and bounds during WWI 
and subsequent wars. Popular culture was quick to pick up on this link as well. One 
journalist from the period said that, “All in all, the war turned some millions of men back 
into civilian life with a more or less set habit of driving in the daily ‘coffin nails.’”74 In an 
article written for the Tobacco Leaf Journal soon after the war, an unknown author 
describes the soldier’s militancy toward the “anti-cigarette” crowd:  
Every now and then we hear rumblings and grumblings for the camp of . . . small minded people 
who entertain the silly hope of placing the prefix ‘anti’ before . . . ‘tobacco’ . . . but as the 
Doughboy just returned . . . says ‘they haven’t got a chance in the world – there are too many 
sensible people left in America to let a little crowd of hard-boiled fanatics put over a thing like 
that! . . .can you blame the returned soldier for becoming somewhat of a cynic about his homeland 
when he is greeted in this way after the sacrifices he has made? Is it any wonder that the young 
chap who has just gotten back into civvies is inclined to question just how much the nation 
appreciated what he and his fellows have done? 
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This particular author concludes by quoting a just returned Doughboy who described this 
link between smoking, liberty, and patriotism by exclaiming “keep the home fags 
burning!”75 
Understanding the soldier’s demand for cigarettes is one thing; however 
understanding why, in one of the war’s great ironies, the willingness to supply them was 
even greater is a bit more difficult.76 By war’s end, the United States government 
provided over 5.5 billion manufactured cigarettes to the Doughboys, aide groups like the 
YMCA providing an additional two billion.77 This drastic reversal of pre-war policy 
requires further exploration for any understanding of the powerful political-military-
industrial themes that grew to characterize the soldier-cigarette relationship during the 
twentieth century. After WWI, the bond between soldier and cigarette was continually 
reinforced and became increasingly entrenched over the next eight decades. The 
relationship between the soldier and the cigarette, forged in the trenches on the Western 
Front, subsequently had a profound effect on American history as it resulted in the 
world’s first mass wave of newly addicted nicotine consumers, a group that grew 
exponentially both in number and influence in the decades following WWI.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE DAMN Y, THE SOLDIER, AND THE CIGARETTE IN WWI 
During WWI, this combination of physiological, cultural, and practical stimulants 
to cigarette smoking ensured that demand grew to enormous proportions. Despite this 
insatiable demand for cigarettes among the American soldiers of the AEF, it may be 
surprising to learn that the American government did not issue cigarette rations to the 
Doughboys until nearly a year into America’s participation in the war. What ultimately 
drove the military to take decisive measures and issue general orders placing 
manufactured cigarettes into all combat rations? As with many of history’s questions, the 
answer to this one is more complex than one might imagine.  
The soldiers’ demand for the machine-rolled cigarette created an odd situation 
that caught the US Army by surprise at the start of the WWI. The soldiers possessed an 
ever-increasing demand for cigarettes, yet initially, the Army refused to issue them. This 
forced the YMCA, a civilian relief agency active in the anticigarette movement, to step in 
and become soldiers’ sole cigarette purveyor during the war. In order to understand why 
the YMCA became so involved in the soldier-cigarette distribution system, and why this 
eventually led to the Army’s entrance this transaction, one must first understand the 
awkward relationship between the soldier, the cigarette, and the Y Man. 
 If the Progressive Era was known for moralism, social uplift, associational 
affiliations, efficiency, clean living, and the strenuous life, the YMCA men and women 
who served both at home and overseas during WWI were archetypes that captured the 
spirit of the times. David Lee Shillinglaw, John B. Ferguson, and Katherine Mayo were 
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just three of 12,800 Y Men and Y Women who served the AEF overseas.1 Employed by 
the YMCA to serve the millions of Doughboys fighting in Europe, they carried the lion’s 
share of work related to relief and soldier welfare during WWI.2 Shillinglaw was a 28-
year-old man who dreamed of joining the Army and fighting in the Great War. Problems 
with his vision eventually ended his prospects of serving in the military, so he 
volunteered for service as a Y Man. He entered France on September 24, 1917, and was 
immediately placed in charge of Y Hut construction. He moved about France building the 
huts where the soldiers drank coffee, purchased cigarettes, and participated in morale and 
welfare programs.3  
The Y Huts Shillinglaw built were the hubs of morale activity during WWI, and 
one of the chief activities was group singing, by far the most popular activities the Y Hut 
sponsored.4 Singing activities may seem strange, but was considered a vital part of Army 
morale by the armed progressives. These armed progressives were Army officers and 
leaders greatly influenced by the progressive impulses toward efficiency, social welfare, 
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morale, and good governance during this period. General Leonard Wood was a typical 
armed progressive. Besides implementing progressive programs such as schools, 
sanitation, and municipal reforms as military governor of the Philippines, Wood also 
believed singing was a vital aspect of soldier morale. He once commented that “it is just 
as essential that the soldiers know how to sing as that they know how to carry rifles and 
shoot them. It sounds odd to the ordinary person when you tell him every soldier should 
be a singer. . . [but] there isn’t anything in the world . . . that will raise a soldier’s spirits 
like a good catchy marching tune.”5 When French and British military advisors came to 
America to advise the Army training camps, they too insisted that the AEF train the 
soldiers in group singing. Many of the more traditional senior officers like Peyton March 
were skeptical about the singing programs, but this did not change the fact that the AEF 
became not only a fighting force, thanks to the efforts of the Y Men, they became a 
singing force as well.6  
John B. Ferguson was a Presbyterian pastor from a country church in Franklin, 
Indiana. He was too old for the draft yet still yearned to serve and was excited about the 
prospect of working with the boys of the AEF as a Y Man. He saw Y service as a great 
opportunity to assist the AEF, and, as a trained evangelical pastor, he saw an even greater 
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opportunity to spread the gospel. He entered training to become a Y Man in September 
1917, and soon after was working in the stateside training camps. He was eventually 
transferred to France and served in the Y Huts near the frontline. He ventured forward 
into the trenches and brought candy and chocolates to the soldiers and sold them the 
cigarettes they so desperately needed. Wanting to give account of his sabbatical to his 
church congregation and leave a record of his service during the war for his children to 
read, Ferguson’s journal of his time as a Y Man was published in 1919 in Through the 
War with a Y Man.7 
 Katherine Mayo was one of 3,480 women who served with the YMCA overseas. 
She was invited by the Head of the Overseas YMCA, Edward C. Carter, to work as a 
public relations specialist and press agent. Her job was to give Americans an account of 
how the Overseas YMCA was using donations to support the soldiers. She was able to 
travel to several different Y postings in France and was a keen observer and unashamed 
admirer of Edward C. Carter. Former President of the United States William Howard 
Taft’s edited, multi-volume Service with Fighting Men describes Mayo as a press agent 
for the Y on “whom the public has learned to rely for accuracy and truthfulness.”8 Taft’s 
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description of Mayo speaks to her bona fides as an accurate eyewitness to the operations 
of the Overseas YMCA and the origins of the “that damn Y Man” moniker. In 1920, 
Mayo published a chronicle of her experience with the Y Men in her book That Damn Y.  
Shillinglaw, Ferguson, and Mayo, as well as all the Y workers, received some 
rudimentary training before deploying to France. Unlike the AEF soldiers, they were not 
taught how to kill with the bayonet or hit center mass from 500 meters with the standard 
infantry rifle. Their training generally consisted of classes on YMCA procedures, how to 
run a Y Hut, and how to set up and teach Bible studies. Y Men were screened for alcohol 
and tobacco use, and were banned from participating in these vices while under the 
auspices of the YMCA. Of the thousands of Y workers who served the AEF in France, 
many were affiliated with Christian services, religious education, or church work before 
the war. Most sought to engage in “practical Christianity,” putting hands and feet to their 
faith. Shillinglaw captured this spirit best in a letter home where he commented that his 
work in the Y hut was “worthwhile . . . It is practical Christianity” that acknowledges his 
“responsibility wherever American soldiers are to uphold their moral and spiritual 
welfare.”9  
Some were pacifists or came from religious traditions that discouraged war. Many 
were too old to serve or deemed physically unfit for the draft. Of course women were not 
eligible for the draft at all and saw service as Y workers as the best way to contribute to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
reads as an apologetic for progressive policies near and dear to progressives during this period. He states 
that the four volume set will “preserve the marvelous story of American energy, executive genius, enduring 
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the war effort. Others appeared as adventurers wanting an all-expense-paid tour of 
France. However, the majority were competent, conscientious men and women who 
wanted to do their part and share in the dangers of war. Ferguson recalls inspiration 
gleaned from the words of a YMCA executive before he boarded his ship for France: 
your job is to “render a definite service for men involving a real love for men; to help win 
the war in which there is no place for pacifist or socialist; to set forth the kingdom of God 
in unmeasured terms.”10 In many ways, they were merely answering their nation’s call, 
when men such as General Pershing, Secretary of War Baker, YMCA Chairman Dr. John 
R. Mott, and Commission on Training Camp Activities (CTCA) Chief Raymond Fosdick 
challenged the Y Men and Women to rise up and support the war effort.  
The Y Men provided services that, at least on the surface, appear vital to the 
Doughboys. However the Y Men were often the objects of ridicule, criticism, even rage 
among the soldiers they served.11 Unfortunately, despite the good and kind intentions of 
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March thought that they should not be so near to the front, but that is a different matter. For this reason, the 
remainder of the text will generally deal with the Y Men, as the Y Women were excluded from the angst 
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the majority of these workers, they were, in the end, rejected by the military and war 
department leadership that had cried out for their support.12 The volunteers’ motivation to 
serve as Y Men instead of riflemen was called into question. They were often labeled 
money grubbers and do-gooders and were falsely accused of marking up cigarettes, only 
to then give soldiers Biblical lessons on charity and love for fellow man. As a result, in 
addition to hypocrite, the Doughboys came to refer to them as “the damn Y Men.” Why 
were soldiers cursing the men sent to serve them? As is often the case, the truth is buried 
somewhere between fact, fiction, and myth. 
The Facts Concerning the Y Workers 
The facts are quite clear. The YMCA’s interaction with the AEF dates back to the 
Mexican Border Expedition of 1916 where the YMCA was active in the Army camps that 
dotted the border.13 Though the camp conditions were deplorable and many men 
habitually frequented the liquor “resorts” and prostitute houses hastily constructed just 
outside many of the camps, the YMCA did what it could to provide positive, wholesome 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the soldiers had toward the Y Men.  
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soldier morale and welfare. Prompted by Fosdick’s guidance, Marshall created the Special Services 
Division (SSD). The SSD served as an Army Branch that replaced the CTCA and the YMCA.  
13
 Fosdick, Chronicle of a Generation, 140; Taft, Service With Fighting Men, 1:57–59; Hopkins, 
History of the YMCA in North America, 486. While serving on the Mexican Border Expedition, General 
Pershing displayed an early acceptance of YMCA morale work, asking “Association facilities to follow the 
punitive expedition into Mexico, having come to expect them to be ‘as much a part of army equipment as 
the army mule or the commissary cook.’” His connection with the YMCA would be displayed once again 
in WWI when Pershing essentially deeded soldier morale and welfare work to the Y. 
 
55 
 
 
outlets for the soldiers who chose to partake.14 When America declared war on Germany 
on April 2, 1917, Secretary of War Newton Baker immediately formed the Commission 
on Training Camp Activities (CTCA) to ensure the AEF Training camps were free of the 
moral depravity associated with the border expedition. To help guide the Army, Baker 
appointed Raymond Fosdick to chair the CTCA.  
Fosdick was a tireless progressive and was familiar with the soldier morale and 
welfare mission. During the Mexican Border Expedition, Baker had sent him to inspect 
the conditions in Army camps, and Fosdick was appalled by what he found. Though 
Fosdick spoke highly of General Funston, the commander of the border force, he 
eventually labeled Fosdick “The Reverend” because of his do-gooder mission, and 
Funston grew suspicious of Fosdick’s methods. This was a similar fate that awaited Y 
Men who served in France during WWI. Other senior army officers questioned Fosdick’s 
intentions even more directly, informing him that “men were men, and sissies were not 
wanted in the Army.” In the end, Fosdick was backed by Secretary of War Newton Baker 
and President Woodrow Wilson, and the CTCA program moved forward forcefully.15  
Fosdick’s staff grew to thousands, and included a vigorous law enforcement 
branch to enforce Sections 12 and 13 of the Draft Law, which forbade soldiers access to 
liquor and prostitutes, and allowed for the punishment of anyone who involved soldiers in 
either of these vices. The government would go on to incarcerate 30,000 prostitutes 
during the war, shut down hundreds of red light districts, and disband all saloons within 
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ten miles of any Army training camp.16 The government did this by force, if required, and 
dispatched Marines to patrol the streets of Philadelphia and threatened the removal of 
training camps, and government funds, in cities that were slow to comply with Fosdick’s 
instructions. In the CTCA and the power the organization wielded during the war, one 
can see the extent to which progressives were able to impact all areas of American 
society, including the mission of training for war.17  
Fosdick’s sole responsibility was to guarantee the 32 Army camps training the 
conscripts, regulars, and guardsmen provided an environment conducive to good morals, 
social hygiene, and progressive efficiency. To succeed in this massive endeavor, Fosdick 
asked various civilian agencies like the YMCA to provide personnel, supplies, and 
expertise. It should come as no surprise that there was grumbling among the institutional 
Army as old met new. Among pockets of the old Army—men who had cut their teeth 
fighting Indians on the American frontier and insurgents in the Philippines—all this 
“molly-coddling” was anathema. George T. Fry, the military editor of the New York 
Journal and former Colonel of the Tennessee National Guard, was one of the old guard. 
In an article for the Infantry Journal, Fry laments that the nation was saturated with 
progressives: 
obsessing themselves with the idea that unless the American Army is thoroughly molly-coddled 
the world won’t be any safer for democracy than a bottle of rum is if found in transit through 
Idaho; and they are working overtime to turn a perfectly good husky, built and geared for a scrap, 
into a Little Lord Fauntleroy preparing for an evening’s entertainment in the nursery. If all of the 
misdirected energy that is being wasted on plans to rescue the morals of the young fighter and 
protect his chest, throat, indigestion, and home-cooking appetite from ruin were devoted to 
providing the essential things for a real army, the aggregation that followed Old Man Xerxes over 
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the plains would look like the Salvation Army compared to the Army of Freedom, and the Boche 
would be sending distress calls.18  
 
However adamant they were about not “molly-coddling” the new Army, the old 
guard was overruled. When the AEF deployed to France, the CTCA’s spirit of moral 
activism and soldier welfare work followed the men across the ocean. Once in country 
however, CTCA functions fell under the auspices of the YMCA, and came under the 
direct supervision of Edward C. Carter.19 Picking up the CTCA’s extensive morale and 
welfare mission, the YMCA subsequently became intimately involved in the life of the 
Doughboys, and hordes of Y Men descended upon France during the war.20  
One of Katherine Mayo’s earliest memories of the AEF was a near riot averted on 
account of the swift action of a fellow Y worker, Mr. Frapwell. Mayo and Frapwell, 
along with many Y workers, had deployed to France as advance echelon teams 
(ADVON) to prepare for the arrival of the AEF. They were busy securing administrative 
facilities, logistical contacts, and building materials when the Doughboys began to arrive. 
As the first AEF soldiers disembarked in France, those already hooked on nicotine found 
no place to obtain gold leaf relief. Mayo recalled “one wild cry” for smokes among these 
panicked smokers. An alarmed Y worker ran up to Edward Carter, eyes wide, “shivering 
with tension,” visibly distraught about the mayhem brewing at the port facility. The 
disturbed man told Carter, “I tell you sir, they’ve simply got to have it. This thing has 
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reached its limit. If you could only see those boys!” Prior to the AEF’s arrival, Carter’s 
ADVON team frantically queried the YMCA home office in New York about various 
logistical issues related to cigarettes and other sundries. However, the home office was 
too embroiled in a moral dilemma regarding the prospect of providing cigarettes to 
soldiers to respond.21 Carter and his ADVON team averted the nicotine riot through 
purchases of drastically marked up cigarettes for soldiers’ consumption during this early 
stage of the war, however this was an unsustainable solution.  
For years, the YMCA proudly backed and even led various temperance 
movements, including the anti-tobacco movement. Now, in one of the great ironies of the 
war, as the soldiers deployed to the trenches they began fielding requests for millions of 
packs of cigarettes to stock the shelves of the Y Huts. Moreover, as the demand for 
cigarettes increased exponentially once the full weight of the AEF had experienced time 
in the trenches, civic groups in America pushed the YMCA to sponsor charity drives to 
provide the soldiers with gifts of cigarettes. Howard Hopkins, historian of the 
progressives, argues that the war had a profound effect upon the YMCA and “association 
thinking.” He says, “Some superficial attitudes underwent a degree of modification, such 
as the previous intolerance of the use of tobacco which became untenable when the 
Associations found themselves the largest distributor of the article in the world through 
the canteen service.” The editor of the YMCA journal Association Men declared “we may 
not like it, but we have no business criticizing those that do.” 22  
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Essentially, the Y was forced to choose between the lesser of three evils: alcohol, 
prostitutes, or cigarettes. Historian Cassandra Tate describes the conundrum saying, “the 
goal of both organizations [YMCA and CTCA] was to divert the men from drink, drugs, 
lust, and gambling by providing ‘substitute attractions’ such as athletics, groups singing, 
inspirational movies and books—and tobacco, including cigarettes.”23 Jarrett Rudy 
argues the cigarette presented the temperance societies with a choice as to “where a man 
would go if he was not allowed to smoke indoors—a tavern. And if a man had to go to a 
tavern to have a smoke, he would be exposed to more serious temptations, such as 
alcohol or other unnamed vices.”24 However Robert Proctor probably captures the nature 
of the shift in policy best with his comment that the cigarette critics were summarily 
“silenced during the First World War . . . why should anyone worry about cancer or 
emphysema thirty years down the road, when bullets are whizzing overhead?”25  
While the YMCA sorted through these moral, cultural, and institutional issues 
presented by this strange turn of events, Y workers paid enormous markups to obtain 
cigarettes from the French market—costs they passed on to the soldiers. Commenting on 
the Y’s reliance on local markets for goods such as cigarettes and the price inflation that 
resulted, Mayo says that “the Y alone, in its first three months of buying, practically 
exhausted the war-drained markets of the French.” Mayo also attributed the price 
inflation to the fact that the Army quartermasters and the YMCA were bidding against 
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each other on the local market, a habit that “bid prices up on each other, and thereby 
reduced the purchasing power of the people’s funds.”26  
Stung by frustration over supply and angered over cigarette prices, as the soldiers 
deployed to their training areas in France, and eventually into the trench lines, the 
relationship between the Y Men and the Doughboys quickly soured. Army officers, over-
tasked with the responsibilities of fighting the war, planning for troop deployments, and 
attending to General Pershing’s never-ending list of demands and queries, begged the Y 
workers to come to the front and give attention to the soldiers’ waning morale. 
Expressing the severity of the situation, one particularly agitated commander exclaimed 
to a Y Man, “for God’s sake come down here before it is too late and do something for 
my men!”27  
The Y workers quickly responded and were soon found among the soldiers on the 
frontline. Initially lauded by the AEF, especially considering the lengths which they went 
to provide cigarettes and move Y Hut operations forward, the Y Man soon became the 
object of ridicule and mockery—even hate.28 After the war, Pershing once commented 
that “the welfare organizations obtained prestige in reverse relation to the share of 
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services given.” Pershing was expressing the sentiment of many progressives after the 
war who felt the YMCA gave the most, but was also hated the most, and were offered 
“doomed ungratefulness [for] the task” they were given. Upon hearing a report from an 
overjoyed Y Man who reported that he overheard some soldiers say they were pleased 
with the work of the YMCA, Edward Carter commented, “I am glad there are some who 
are saying good things, and that the whole world is not against us.”29 Summing up these 
sentiments, law professor, historian, and future Undersecretary of Commerce in FDR’s 
administration John Dickinson, writing in 1922, recalled that the Y Man soon thereafter 
became the “best loved institution in the Army and the most violently criticized [hated] 
institution in the Army.”30 
The Loved 
Stories of the Y Men’s selfless acts motivated by love and compassion abound, 
and many involved cigarettes and the Y’s collective desire to serve and attend to the 
soldiers’ morale and welfare. Regarding the desire to act in service to fellow man, 
Shillinglaw confided in his diary that he was particularly affected by a sermon given at a 
church service in France for all Y workers preparing for field service. The pastor said, 
“Four of ten commandments deal with love of God, six with fellow men, then two in the 
New Testament with same thing.”31 In a strange way, Y Men often performed this service 
of dispensing smokes to the soldiers motivated by the desire to serve fellow man, despite 
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their personal beliefs about the moral, spiritual, and health hazards associated with 
smoking.  
Mayo recalls the story of one Y Man who was a conscientious objector and served 
men in an aid station near the frontlines. He had never smoked a cigarette in his life, and 
was personally opposed to the habit. Receiving wounded soldiers into the first aid tent, he 
gently helped a grievously wounded soldier place a cigarette between his lips, laboring to 
light it for him as cigarette lighting was not a skill the Y Man had ever attempted, much 
less perfected. Successful in his task, he watched as the soldier drank in the tobacco, the 
effect noticeable and immediate: instant calm in the midst of this soldier’s panicked battle 
to stave off death. He soon realized he had used his last match, and became flustered as 
he observed many more wounded soldiers clambering about for a cigarette and a light. So 
he did something unthinkable a year earlier: he lit a cigarette for himself, using this 
soldier’s now lit cigarette, and began puffing, and coughing no doubt, in order to light 
other soldiers’ cigarettes one after the other—with his own cigarette. He had seen them 
do this a thousand times; he now joined the ritual. When his cigarette burned down, he lit 
another and then another, off the stumps of his own with the skill of a seasoned chain 
smoker. In this way he lit “hundreds of cigarettes for wounded soldiers, one after the 
other, all day long.”32 
In like manner, Ferguson recalls the story of a colleague who was a particularly 
pious pastor before volunteering as a Y Man, who overcame his own crisis of conscience 
as he shook hands with his call to serve the soldiers. As he operated his mobile vending 
station, selling cigarettes and candy to the soldiers, he mused about what his congregation 
back home might think about their pastor selling cigarettes to the soldiers he had sworn to 
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look after both morally and physically. He also grieved over the YMCA engaging in such 
sinful activities on Sunday, something he felt would never happen back home. However 
he overcame these emotions, as well as his personal grief over the soldiers’ constant 
cursing, in order to bring a sense of comfort and relief to the men who had seen and 
experienced the horrors of the active trench line. On the subject of smoking and cussing, 
vices that often went hand-in-hand, Ferguson commented that “swearing seems to go 
with army life . . . the American soldier soon became . . . adept” at the ancient art of 
cursing in uniform. Ferguson added that the boys cursed so much he “soon found 
[himself] swearing in my dreams.”33 He also wondered at the irony of the whole scene: 
an ordained pastor, screened for smoking and drinking “alcoholic beverages” as a 
condition of employment, selling cigarettes on Sundays to cursing soldiers.34  
Shillinglaw also engaged in a bit of ironic discourse when he mentioned that 
despite these strictures, some of the Y Men picked up the smoking habit as soon as they 
were at sea in the Atlantic headed to France. The head of his shipboard group was 
alarmed at the sight of Y Men smoking, a specter that caused a bit of a “storm in a 
kettle.” He said the storm soon subsided, and “the narrow men are keeping their injured 
feelings to themselves and the others are smoking.”35 Most Y Men, Ferguson and 
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Shillinglaw included, cloaked themselves in the notion, or myth, that at least in the end, 
the soldiers were protected from the greater evils of wine and women.36 
The Hated 
If the Y Men were acting in love and service, much of their activities were 
eventually met with hate and consternation. Pershing’s insistence that the YMCA take 
over) canteen operations in France initiated this atmosphere of disaffection with the Y 
Men. Pershing’s Adjutant General described the reason behind Pershing’s firm desire that 
the Y take a leading role: “the Commanding General does not approve of the 
establishment of canteens by the [military] organizations themselves . . . because it will 
take officers and men away from their proper functions of training and fighting, but will 
be glad to have them established by the YMCA.”37 The nature of this decision is a hotly 
contested issue in the historical documents. Mayo describes the Y’s association with the 
canteen as a forced one for which “we had no choice,” and as a relationship that was the 
“deadly tester of souls.”38 Historian Howard Hopkins offers a different angle, claiming 
the Y’s chief executive in France, Carter, willingly accepted the Army’s request to take 
over the canteen service. Hopkins was a historian, as well as a booster of the progressive 
culture in America during this period, so it is understandable that he was slanted toward 
portraying the Y as eager and capable.39 The truth is somewhere in the middle. 
The facts are relatively clear. The mission to run the Army’s canteen service was 
an operation many in the YMCA felt wholly unqualified to perform, but nonetheless a 
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mission they assumed under the mantle of selfless service. Carter accepted the canteen 
mission despite advice to the contrary from the Y’s own financial and legal counselors. 
Mayo comments, 
Y counselors, themselves large business men, had strongly disapproved. The work would involve 
from twelve to fifteen million dollars of capital . . . a trained organization of from five to six 
thousand grocery stores installed . . . and maintained under conditions more difficult and 
hazardous than any known to the world before.40 
 
As supervisor of hut construction, Shillinglaw added to Mayo’s assessment. He was 
particularly affected by Carter’s decision and felt it was the source of a great many of the 
Y’s problems in France:  
During and immediately after WWI, the YMCA was subjected to a good deal of criticism for its 
conduct of the war work . . . the major difficulty from the time the organization committed  
itself . . . was the size of the operation. Because the YMCA accepted the canteen responsibility, it 
had to get into areas in which it had little familiarity. The job got bigger and bigger until it became 
the largest monetary and organizational effort ever made by a voluntary philanthropic group.41  
 
From these comments and others, the Y’s leadership was obviously worried about 
taking on such a large enterprise. Mayo frankly admits that it was impossible for Carter to 
say no; how could he back down from the task for which he was sworn … to serve the 
soldiers at all costs? How could he respond with “No—the price is too high?” He would 
not, and did not, despite the Army breaking many promises regarding their relationship.42  
Carter’s willingness to accept the mission was underpinned by certain key 
assumptions that he would receive shipping support, exclusive merchandising rights, and 
the opportunity to defray costs with profits. This was not an unfounded assumption; the 
Adjutant General had already commented that in running the canteen system, the YMCA 
should expect to make “a small profit” that it could use to defray the cost of other YMCA 
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amusement and morale programs.43 Thus, Carter’s response to Pershing’s request 
indicated the pecuniary nature of their affiliation with canteen operations. Carter said he 
realize[d] that if we undertake to render the Army this service, it would involve us in a huge task, 
involving a very large staff and several millions of capital, but, as we have assured you, we have 
come to France to serve the Army in every possible way, and if our undertaking this job relieved 
or aided the Army in any way, we would be glad to consider it.44  
 
When Carter submitted his plans and conditions regarding the YMCA’s 
assumption of PX duties, Pershing responded: “I have carefully considered the headings 
and heartily approve the program.”45 Though many in the YMCA felt wholly unqualified 
and understaffed for this mission, in the interest of the troops’ morale and welfare and 
their desire to support the Army, they put their hand to the work. However they did so 
armed with an understanding that they would receive logistical support from the Army 
and profits to defray the added costs.46 
The final judgment on who was responsible for the Y’s assumption of Army 
morale and welfare functions was settled after the war in hearings and investigations 
purposed to discover how the YMCA handled (or some said mishandled) funds. 
Pershing’s Assistant Chief of Staff Colonel Frank R. McCoy, when asked about Carter’s 
assumption of canteen duties, responded, “We were making [the] most of desperate 
efforts . . . to think of every way we could save combat personnel. We decided to put it 
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up to M. Carter.” When asked if Carter had suggested that the YMCA take over canteen 
operations, McCoy indicated “Colonel Logan and I put that up to him first.”47  
In the final analysis, the historical record clearly states that the Army, led by 
Pershing, recruited the YMCA to take complete control of morale, welfare, and canteen 
services during the war.48 On September 6, 1917, Pershing granted the YMCA full 
authority to “establish exchanges for the American troops in France,” adding that they 
were “intended to fill” the place of Army-run post exchanges so the military could focus 
on their “paramount military function of training and fighting.”49 Commenting on this 
momentous decision that tended to distract the Y Men from their core mission, Ferguson 
said, “the Y did stand for some real spiritual and ethical ideals altho (sic) at times it 
seemed our whole duty was the work of the canteens.”50 
With the operational framework and proper authority to take over the morale 
mission in place, Pershing next expressed his desire that the Y canteens be “pushed as far 
to the front as military operations will permit” so that soldiers in the trenches could 
receive “comforts and conveniences” where they were needed most.51 A key feature of 
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this agreement was the Army’s commitment, by order of General Pershing, to remove 
any and all Army Quartermaster or Service of Support Corps morale related facilities 
from every part of the theatre where the YMCA operated canteens.52 This sequence of 
events, culminating with the emergence of Y Canteens and Y Huts across the allied 
sectors, effectually removed the Army from attending to the morale and welfare of the 
soldiers, placing this burden wholly and completely on the backs of the Y Men and 
Women.53 
As it had since the AEF had arrived in France, now that the link between the Y 
Men and the soldiers was officially recognized and sanctioned by the Army, the 
relationship between the soldier and the Y Men plummeted even further.54 In accordance 
with their agreement, besides giving the YMCA exclusive rights to operate canteens, the 
Army was to allocate the YMCA precious shipping tonnage so they could transport the 
goods needed to outfit the canteens, cigarettes being a vital commodity in these seaborne 
shipments. However, on January 13, 1918, the Army informed Carter of its decision to 
decrease the Y’s shipping allocation by fifty-three percent. How could the Y serve one 
hundred percent of the troops with only forty-seven percent shipping capacity? The 
answer was they could not. As a result, Mayo lamented “fifty-three percent of the troops, 
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then, must remain un-served.”55 However the soldiers did not know about the dire 
shipping situation or the fact that all shipping had been dependent on the activity of the 
German submarine fleet. To the soldier, the YMCA’s management of the canteen “made 
[them] appear to be a commercial and mercenary welfare organization” and they cursed 
their “appointed purveyor because of his [the soldier’s] empty hands.” 56  
By March 1918, Carter was feeling the pinch caused by the shipping 
restrictions.57 He complained in a letter to the AEF Service of Supply Division (whose 
chief, Charles Dawes, became Vice President of the United States during the Coolidge 
Administration) that there was “constant complaint from commanding officers and men 
throughout France, particularly at the front, regarding [the] utter inadequacy [of] Post 
Exchange supplies.” Carter’s warning went unheeded, and the soldiers’ cries “increased 
in volume and bitterness.” Further, Mayo claims that GHQ instructed Carter to “go on in 
silence doing your best, and let them [the soldiers in the AEF] scold.” Mayo is adamant 
in her assertion that GHQ was never at any moment unhappy with the YMCA’s 
performance in running the canteens, despite the Y’s damnation by the enlisted men and 
their officers.58 
In addition to empty hands, the soldiers blamed the Y Men for their empty 
pockets. The source of their angst was almost wholly related to concerns over the price of 
                                                          
55
 Mayo, That Damn Y, 78, 80, 81. 
 
56
 Hopkins, History of the YMCA in North America, 498. 
 
 
57
 John J. Pershing, The Final Report of General John J. Pershing (Washington, DC: The US 
Government Printing Office, 1919), 91. In Pershing’s final report on the war, he said, “The YMCA 
undertook the burden of supplying needs of the entire AEF. Their efforts were in many respects limited by 
a lack of tonnage . . . shortage in tonnage, transportation, or personnel, meant inability to carry out 
completely their appointed tasks.” 
 
58
 Mayo, That Damn Y, 78, 80, and 81; Hopkins, History of the YMCA in North America, 498. 
   
70 
 
 
cigarettes. Despite the Y’s agreement with the Army regarding the suspension of 
quartermaster morale operations in areas where Y canteens operated, the Army still 
maintained some PXs in the vicinity of Y canteens. Because the Army did not have to 
account for any overhead or shipping costs in the price of their cigarettes, soldiers 
obtained cigarettes at much cheaper prices in the Army PX system as compared to the Y 
Canteens. This gave the Army PX a marked advantage and presented soldiers with the 
impression the Y Men were only in France to cheat soldiers and pursue profits. Soldiers 
who had earned their meager paychecks in muddy trenches lined with the shattered and 
broken bodies of their comrades were not happy shelling out money to the “damn Y 
Men.” They were under the impression that the YMCA had “obtained large amounts of 
money from” Americans to perform free welfare services among the soldiers, and the 
soldiers envisioned that “considerable more would be given away . . . than was actually 
the case.”59 Add to this the Salvation Army’s free cigarettes in the same areas and the 
Red Cross’ free smokes at aid stations, and the fate of the Y Man was sealed.60 However 
the sources of the soldiers’ disgust with the Y Men did not end there. 
Donation Downfall 
In a shocking change of heart that historian Cassandra Tate found particularly 
ironic, the YMCA decided to cast aside its prewar fight against smoking, throwing its full 
weight behind various donation campaigns that collected millions of cigarettes for the 
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soldiers.61 Allan Brant describes how this decline in anti-smoking fervor during the war 
was informed by the notion that “the campaign against tobacco . . . now appeared prudish 
and out of tune with the moment. In the face of war’s bloodshed, the traditional notions 
that a prohibition on tobacco protected the troops from moral harm and health risks 
seemed frivolous.” Brandt claims that “few transformations in our culture are so vividly 
clear as the shift from the bitter opposition to cigarette smoking voiced by the YMCA 
before the war and its enthusiasm for distributing cigarettes during the war. Many YMCA 
workers returned from their outposts in France as dedicated smokers.” Americans jumped 
at the chance to support their Doughboys, and the YMCA and other Progressive Era 
social welfare organizations happily assisted them with this endeavor.62  
In addition to the cigarettes, the YMCA encouraged campaign participants to slip 
personal notes to the soldiers in each pack of cigarettes they donated. These donated 
cigarettes were boxed and shipped overseas where they were supposed to be given away 
to the soldiers. It was only a matter of time before the overstretched Y Men, now running 
the Army’s massive canteen system, accidently sold packs of donated cigarettes to the 
soldiers. One can only imagine the response when these soldiers, already cursing the Y 
Man for the high prices they paid for canteen cigarettes, returned to their tents to find a 
nice note from a complete stranger gushing over the opportunity to give the Doughboys  
free smokes. The response was automatic, hateful, and nearly universal by that point—
That damn Y Man!   
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Memory, Myth, Legends, and Soldiering 
The “donation downfall,” along with soldiers’ real or perceived conceptions 
regarding Y Men and high price cigarettes, contributed to various forms of memory, 
myth, and legend that worked against the Y Man. The way soldiers remember combat 
and the myths and legends to which they fall prey during war are topics of great interest 
to new military historians. In Paul Fussell’s excellent work The Great War and Modern 
Memory, he recalls the Doughboys’ penchant for engaging in myth, legend, and rumor. 
This habit is as old as soldiering itself. Be it a Roman fortress along Hadrian’s Wall or a 
Civil War encampment near the Rappahannock River, soldiers throughout time have sat 
around fires and pontificated over several standard questions and engaged in all manner 
of rumor and conjecture. Where will the Army march next? When are they going to go 
home? Why did another unit receive combat citations and theirs did not?  WWI soldiers 
were quick to join in this time-honored military tradition. Always on the alert for an 
attack or preparing for the next offensive, soldiers supplemented their trench duties with 
countless hours ruminating over the day’s happenings or engaging in spirited story telling 
contests. In this way they created an environment ripe for some tall tales. 
Fussell was a decorated infantryman in WWII and was imminently qualified to 
give account of myths and legends among WWI. One legend told of Germans taking the 
bodies of dead soldiers and cutting out the fat and boiling it down to produce much 
needed heating and lamp oil, as well as other industrial chemicals. Another legend 
claimed there was a zombie company of Allied and German soldiers that lived among 
caves in no man’s land and only came out at night to gorge on the dead and wounded. 
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Yet another accused the Germans of crucifying a poor Canadian soldier captured between 
the lines during a raid.63  
Besides these legendary myths, rumors regarding future combat actions or 
deployments to other sectors circulated among the soldiers. As the end of the war 
appeared at hand, many of these speculated that the AEF would go to Russia to deal with 
the Bolsheviks. The soldiers spread other rumors detailing the pending revocation of their 
draft status, a dreaded fate that would force them to remain in the Army permanently. In 
his diary, Ferguson records many of these rumors as well. Soldiers thought they were 
moving on to Italy because “had not the overcoats been called in?” Or maybe it was 
Russia: “had there not been an issue of blankets?”64  
Much of this rumor and legend was connected to the Y Man and the nature of his 
service in France. In all fairness, Katherine Mayo, one of the Y Man’s staunchest allies, 
admits that she had no connection to the YMCA when she went to France and that even 
she was a bit prejudiced against the Y Man when she first arrived in France. It was a 
sentiment that “intensified . . . into violent resentment” after her first few weeks in France 
listening to soldiers’ “wrath and loathing” of the Y Men and “heartbreaking accounts of 
the meanness, the stupidities, [and] the little big cruelties of that damn Y.” She confessed 
that had she written an account of Y Men during this period, it would have simply echoed 
the “green lies,” myths, and legends she was already aware of.  However she gave it time 
and soon based her recollections in “the most considered thought that I can give, on the 
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widest and most sifted material available.” Grounded in what she felt was informed 
objectivity, she gave an account that praises the work of the Y Men, despising the 
injustice they suffered at the hands of ungrateful soldiers.65   
 Mayo describes one rumor particularly devastating to the already maligned 
reputation of the Y Men. Soldiers were spreading the rumor that Y men denied cigarettes 
and other sundries to wounded soldiers who did not have the money, or even the physical 
ability, to pay for the items they so desperately desired. Listening in on a conversation 
between two soldiers, Mayo overheard one recalling his experience at Belleau Wood 
when he observed a stretcher team hurrying by with a wounded officer. The grievously 
wounded soldier had his bottom jaw blown off and was in terrible shape. At that instant, a 
Y Man passed by carrying a backpack loaded with cigarettes and chocolate cakes. 
Noticing some sort of commotion between the stretcher bearers and the Y Man, the 
soldier approached to see what was happening. The stretcher team told him that “the 
captain, here, wants a cake of chocolate. He hasn’t eaten for two days but this fellow 
won’t give it to him because he hasn’t got the price.” Enraged, the soldier turned to the 
“damn Y scoundrel,” pulled his gun, and demanded that the Y Man give the wounded 
captain whatever he wanted. The soldier described the “big tears of thankfulness a-rollin’ 
down his cheeks” when the wounded captain realized what this soldier had done for him 
by putting the “damn Y Man” in his place.66  
Elsie Janis and the Y Men 
The distaste for the Y Men did not end with the men of the AEF; it bled over to 
the women as well, which was a particularly painful blow. Already suffering from the 
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frustration that accompanied every jeer and jab from battle-hardened Doughboys, the Y 
Men also suffered the sarcasm of the AEF’s most beloved lady: Elsie Janis.  
Janis was a well-known entertainer who went to France to entertain the boys of 
the AEF during the summer of 1918. Janis meandered about the French countryside in 
her sleek Cadillac touring car, escorted by her mother and a traveling entourage of 
escorts. Writing about her experiences with the AEF soon after she returned home, her 
stories are filled with sarcastic references to the Y Men. Her text overtly favored the AEF 
soldiers over the “young Christians,” her mildly sarcastic name for the Y Men. The AEF 
boys, in her opinion, were the real representatives of American virile masculinity in 
France. She was confident that she had become intimately familiar with the Doughboys 
jargon, songs, myths, and stories. She ventured into the trenches and even pulled the 
lanyard on an artillery piece, pulling it over and over until “the observation posts reported 
that there was nothing left of the positions we had been shelling.”67  
Thoroughly familiar with the soldiers’ likes and dislikes, she became aware of 
their loathing for Military Police (MPs). She described the MPs sarcastically as the 
“[men] who tells the AEF how not to behave.”68 Nursing veiled contempt for the Y Men, 
she made light of their do-gooder activities and was convinced they were frustrating her 
efforts to gain close access to the young soldiers of the AEF.69 In a typically cynical 
story, she describes an instance when she overtook Edward Carter’s “Young Christian 
Packard” in her Cadillac. Janis described Carter as “kicking up more dust than any 
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Christian car should kick up.” Determined to show up the “young Christian,” Janis ended 
their “short but sweet argument as to who owned the road” by leaving him in the dust, 
giving him some of the “thickest AEF Cadillac dust that ever flew.”70 
Much of her jeering and jabbing of the Y Men was tongue-in-cheek humor. 
However, Janis concludes her recollections of her time with “the boys” with a 
particularly telling statement informed by her months of close observation of the AEF 
grunts. In a passage that must be read with deference to context and due consideration 
given to her previous statements about the Y Men, Janis concludes: 
Most of the men liked the War, and most men will always like war, and as long as there are 
women to fight for, men will fight, so if they really want to do away with war they must 
exterminate women. We must not kill the spirit that won the War; we must not forget that for 
every dear lad who was lost at least ten were made into real men . . . Oh, war had its good 
points!71 (Italics mine.) 
 
This statement is thick with double meaning. Many of the Y Men did not like war, yet 
they chose to serve in a way that satisfied their conscience and was true to their 
convictions, answering the nation’s call for volunteer welfare workers. The Y Men’s 
status as brave, virile men was called into question by many of the soldiers they served, 
and now Janis was extolling the virtues of men who would fight and protect women—a 
statement that seems to exclude the Y Men. Finally, she lauds the “spirit that won the war 
. . . [and] made real men,” a spirit the Y Man, at least in Janis’ estimation, did not 
possess.72 
The Day of Reckoning: The Y Man Meets the General 
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Whether truth, fiction, rumor, or legend, the “damn Y Man” found he was the 
object of intense ridicule—even hate. The facts concerning his service in France were 
fairly clear, at least to the Y Men and the upper echelons of Army leadership, including 
General Pershing and Secretary Baker. The majority of Y Men had every good intention 
in volunteering, and they had dutifully responded to the Army’s requests. Yet their 
decision to run the Army’s canteen and morale operations was a good deed that, in the 
end, opened them up to slander and accusation.73  
All of this frustration, hate, and sarcasm regarding the Y Men had a predictable 
effect. Soldiers in every corner of the battlefield, from the trenches to the support areas, 
loved to hate the Y Men. Shillinglaw was aghast at the criticism and sarcasm. Describing 
how the Y Man was often blamed for logistic and pricing issues that were out of their 
hands, he says, 
Most of the soldiers who used the YMCA facilities had no knowledge of these problems and they 
quickly criticized the organization for all manner of ills. In their bitterness over the conditions 
which they found in the trenches, the soldiers were quick to cry “slacker” or “shirker” at a Y 
canteen secretary.74  
 
Shillinglaw further lamented that one of his fellow Y Workers, who was too old for the 
draft, couldn’t take the harsh ridicule anymore: “a good man resign[ed] his Y assignment 
because of this criticism. C.D. Jackson was actually over draft age, but he looked young 
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enough to be eligible. He worked hard . . . but he could not take the brutal criticism which 
he got from the soldiers.”75  
Ferguson remembers well his first encounter with stiff criticism. Despite the Y’s 
tireless efforts to keep bringing in supplies as thousands of soldiers withdrew to rest areas 
after their trench rotation, the Y Men could not keep up with their demands and “some 
men began to complain bitterly.”76 They cursed the Y Man for bleeding them dry with 
marked-up cigarettes, and they cursed the Army for not issuing them free cigarettes. 
Cigarettes were the one item, in addition to bullets, that soldiers needed to win the war 
according to Pershing, and soldiers despised giving their hard-earned pay to Y Men to 
obtain them. Regarding the military necessity for cigarettes, top staff aide to Pershing, 
Major Grayson M.P. Murphy, once said that “a cigarette may make the difference 
between a hero and a shirker . . . in an hour of stress a smoke will uplift a man to 
prodigies of valor; the lack of it will sap his spirit.” Ironically, Murphy was essentially 
saying that “shirkers” (Y Men) were providing cigarettes to soldiers to help them avoid 
being “shirkers.”77  
In the midst of the soldiers complaining about cigarettes, commanding officers 
extolling the benefits of tobacco, and a glaring absence of government cigarette rations, a 
tall, ramrod straight, West Point-trained artillery officer stepped into the trenches in 
February 1918. He was there to inspect the troops one last time before returning home to 
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assume command of the Army.78 This officer was General Peyton March, the newly 
appointed Army Chief of Staff (CoS), and he was on his way to Washington, DC. As the 
new CoS, March subsequently took swift action to ensure the soldiers looked to the Army 
for their well-being and morale—not the damn Y Man. His actions to address this morale 
problem would have profound effects on twentieth-century America that still echo to the 
present day.    
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 CHAPTER IV  
GENERAL PEYTON MARCH, THE SOLDIER, AND THE CIGARETTE 
 When Major General Payton March inspected the trench-dwelling soldiers of the 
AEF one last time in February 1918, he had been in France for seven months serving as 
General Pershing’s Chief of Artillery. To his great dismay, he was recalled to 
Washington, DC, by Secretary of War Newton Baker to become the new Chief Staff of 
the Army. Secretary Baker had his eye on March for quite some time and informed 
General Pershing that he desperately needed Pershing’s Chief of Artillery, saying, “I feel 
it urgently necessary to have him.” March’s recall to Washington, DC, was covered by 
the media outlets who hailed him the “foe of red tape” and a “real soldier in his prime.” 
Baker’s desperation and the statements by the media belie the state of the Army General 
Headquarters (GHQ) during this period: bogged down in red tape, mired in bureaucratic 
bickering, and led by archaic generals whose time had long ago passed.1  
Like any true Army combat-arms professional, March longed for the sound of 
battle and men to lead. When he eventually met Secretary Baker for the first time as the 
new Army Chief Staff, March informed Baker that he was “sick at the stomach” at his 
removal from combat duty in France, adding that it was a matter that “was never referred 
to again in all our long service together.”2 However, he knew the job to which he was 
called was very important, and he appreciated the opportunity. March appealed to Baker 
because he had experience downrange and was personally acquainted with the soldiers’ 
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needs.3 He also liked that March was known as a very direct ramrod (the “foe of red 
tape”) fully capable of fixing the deadlock in Army GHQ and addressing the staff’s 
inability to make decisions or see things through to conclusion.4  
The previous two chiefs, Generals Tasker H. Bliss and Hugh L. Scott, were 
deemed too outdated to handle the complexities of modern war and were quietly removed 
from office.5 As March visited the troops and inspected the lines, some innate instinct 
combined with his months of experience in France and informed his belief that something 
was wrong. Considering the prioritization of his actions upon taking the helm as the 
Chief of Staff, what he observed in the trenches convinced him that the Army was not 
attending to the soldiers’ most basic needs. While visiting with the AEF staff in France 
prior to departure, he realized the chasm between the GHQ and the AEF was extensive 
both in distance and ideology. As he prepared to return home, he wrestled with his 
conviction that drastic changes were in order to ensure the Army’s General Staff and 
Supply Service Corps were properly oriented on the AEF soldiers on the frontlines. As 
fate would have it, one of the bold decisions March made within days of taking command 
of the Army has had profound economic, social, cultural, political, and health effects he 
could never have fathomed.6 
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As March sailed across the ocean, he processed all he had seen and experienced in 
France, as well as the enormous task that lay ahead of him.7 First, he thought of death. By 
the time he left France, millions of Allied soldiers and thousands of AEF soldiers had 
perished in combat, with no end in sight. Tragically, he had once again experienced the 
pain of death firsthand. His first wife Josephine had died while March was overseas in 
1904, and now his eldest son and namesake, Peyton Jr., had met a tragic death while his 
father was away. Peyton Jr., was a lieutenant in the Army and was killed in an aircraft 
accident just before March set sail to return home. He drew comfort from President 
Theodore Roosevelt, who sent him a letter expressing his grief over March having “drunk 
the waters of bitterness,” adding that he might soon “have to drink of them” as well, for 
he had sons in combat. Ironically, Roosevelt did eventually have to drink of these waters, 
as his son Quentin was killed while engaged in air to air combat with the Luftwaffe. A 
gracious, if gregarious man in life and death, Roosevelt later encouraged both March, and 
himself, to “hold our heads high when we think of our sons.”8  
March also drew additional support from Generals Pershing and Dawes, two men 
with immense experience in grief and loss. Pershing had lost his wife and daughters to a 
house fire in 1915 while serving on the Mexican Border Expedition, later commenting 
when selected for Major General that “all the promotion in the world would make no 
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difference now.”9 Pershing was forced to leave his young son, the only remaining 
survivor of his family, with relatives when he took command of the expedition to France. 
General Dawes, the Chief of the Service of Supply, had lost his twenty-two year old son 
in a drowning accident at Lake Geneva in 1912. These men were tough Army officers 
and men of their times—but they were also human. Dawes’ diary reveals an emotional 
exchange between Dawes and Pershing about the pain they both shared in losing sons. 
Dawes records a telling conversation in his war diary that he had with General Pershing 
while together in a carriage in France: 
I hope I do not fail him [Pershing]. We have both passed through the greatest grief which can 
come to man. As we rode up together there occurred an instance of telepathy . . . neither of us was 
saying anything, but I was thinking of my lost boy and of John’s loss and looking out the window, 
and he was doing the same thing . . . we both turned at the same time and each was in tears. All 
John said was, ‘Even this war can’t keep it out of my mind.’” 10 
 
Despite the tragedy and death of the past, March had many challenges and 
opportunities to welcome him upon dropping anchor in America. Upon disembarkation, 
he promptly gave his daughter Vivian away in marriage to an Army Captain in New York 
on March 1, 1918. Moreover, despite his “disgust” with having to leave his field 
command in the AEF, he was soon to take charge of his beloved Army, an organization 
to which he had given the greater portion of his life.11 After the war, March recalled that 
“the declaration of war found the United States thoroughly unprepared for the great task 
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which confronted it.”12 He had experienced this unpreparedness in France, and now he 
knew a mountain of work awaited him. He heard reports that the GHQ was a failing 
organization, a rumor he found hard to dismiss. One officer even predicted that the GHQ 
would soon collapse and “break down.”13 The responsibilities were immense, for added 
to the task of fixing the GHQ were the needs of a million men under combat arms and 
additional millions at military training camps across the United States.  
During his trip across, March also pondered one of his most deeply-held beliefs 
regarding Army organizational culture. Dating to his days serving in Japan in 1904 as a 
military observer of the Russo-Japanese War, March grew in his conviction that the 
“American General Staff was a long way from being the effective agency the Japanese 
General Staff was.”14 March was known to his peers as an Uptonian, a professional 
military officer that followed and revered the teachings of Army General Emory Upton. 
Upton was a West Pointer, decorated Civil War veteran, and staunch supporter of a 
strong, large regular army structured around a professional, rigorously trained officer 
corps. They were conservatives in the Army that believed in the Professional Military 
Education (PME) system, expansion of the military academies, a general staff system 
based on the German model, and a large standing army expanded by a supplemental draft 
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in wartime. According to historian John Whiteclay Chambers, they were “distrustful of 
‘instant’ soldiers as compared with ‘reliable’ regulars.”15  
The opposite of the Uptonians were the progressive UMTers who believed in a 
Universal Military Training system. They supported a small but professional officer corps 
and expansion via universal conscription during war. They saw UMT as not only a 
national defense measure, but a citizenship and moral training initiative—a proclivity that 
belied their true roots in progressivism. President Teddy Roosevelt, General Leonard 
Wood, and General Pershing were UMTers who stood in opposition to many of March’s 
conservative views regarding America’s military establishment.16  
With this conviction regarding the profession of arms, it followed that even at an 
early date, long before the Great War, March advocated a reorganization of the Army. He 
firmly believed that the Army staff was out of touch and irrelevant. Based on his earlier 
experiences observing the efficiency of the Japanese General Staff, which was based 
upon the German General Staff, he said he “knew, before I came back to America, 
precisely the changes which I proposed to put into effect when I took over the Office of 
Chief of Staff.” Interestingly, during his earlier experience observing Japan at war, March 
predicted the Japanese aggression the allies were forced to confront 40 years later with 
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blast, heat, and fragmentation. March said then that the Japanese “hated all white races” 
and would find satisfaction with “nothing less than predominance in the Pacific.”17 
March mostly took contention with the old staff system constraint of appointing 
an officer to the Army Staff, and then leaving him there for the rest of his career. This 
system tended to “solidify each . . . department into a compact bureaucracy preserving its 
own unbroken traditions . . . and independence . . . from each other . . . and the rest of the 
Army.”18 This system ensured a dearth in trained staff officers.  Moreover, they were not 
only in short supply, they were so removed from the line they were ineffective at best, 
detrimental to the mission at worst. This situation was addressed incrementally with a 
suite of acts rolled out between 1901 and 1913 that streamlined staff functions by 
creating the General Staff Corps and the Army Chief of Staff position, as well as the 
detail for duty system which detailed an officer to staff duty for four years and then 
returned him to the line.  
These reforms started with the innovations of Elihu Root, who served as Secretary 
of War from 1899 to 1904. Historian James L. Yarrison declares these Root Reforms “of 
great importance for the Army and its future,” because Root had spent time studying the 
lessons learned from the war with Spain and concluded that “most of the mistakes made 
during the war were the product of faulty organization and planning.”19 Replacing the 
weaker Commanding General of the Army billet with the new General Staff headed by a 
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“Chief of Staff of the Army,” Root centralized the power to command operations, supply, 
logistics, and planning in one office.  
Moreover, General Leonard Wood commented that the Detached Service Act of 
1913, a follow on to the Root Reforms, was crucial because it established the 
aforementioned detail system, ensuring that staff officers had “practical knowledge of the 
needs of the [Line] troops . . . and appreciation of the conditions under which they are 
living . . . [as] officers permanently detached from troops eventually lose touch with their 
needs.”20 Though March and Woods came to despise each other, the detail system was 
something upon which they readily agreed. Despite these needed changes that had 
occurred during the two decades after the Spanish American War, staff dysfunction was 
still rampant when March assumed command in 1918.  
The greatest area of concern to March was not just the gridlock built up in the 
staff, but the physical and ideological divisions between the line AEF units and the GHQ 
staff. Regarding these unnecessary divisions, nothing caught March’s ire more than the 
Sam Browne belt, an unauthorized uniform item that was the physical manifestation of all 
he believed was wrong with the Army. March hated the Sam Browne belt because it was 
rooted in the British aristocracy. He was particularly averse to the belt because the 
Browne Belt cult painted staff officers in Paris as veterans and war heroes and staff 
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officers performing similar duties at the GHQ as “slackers” and “swivel chair officers.” 
To March, a true combat veteran, these distinctions were anathema, and were fits of 
drama that directed attention away from the soldiers serving in the trench.21  
However Pershing quickly adopted the Sam Browne belt and authorized it only 
for AEF officers.22 Edward Coffman, March’s biographer, commented that “a small 
difference in uniform, the Sam Browne represented a larger difference between March 
and Pershing.”23 March also felt the belt was a waste of war industry material at a time 
when leather was a rationed commodity in the United States. March was a staunch fiscal 
conservative and estimated the Sam Browne belts would cost over two million dollars if 
the war had gone on through 1919.  
Moreover, he reasoned they were not only costly, they served no use to the 
soldiers in the trenches, where enlisted soldiers carried rifles with shoulder straps and 
officers, in true American fashion, used pistol belts and suspenders. March insisted that 
the staff needed to focus time and resources on the needs of the soldiers in the trenches, 
not the silly Sam Browne belt mafia. He asked Pershing to do away with the belt soon 
after taking command of the Army. Pershing refused, his Chief of Staff General adding 
that March was “narrow” and that going without the Sam Browne belt “was like going 
without one’s pants.”24 To March, such elitism represented disconnects between the AEF 
Staff officers in France and the GHQ Staff in Washington that went much deeper than a 
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simple piece of leather. Even worse, it distanced the AEF staff officers from the men in 
the trench. 25  
With these anti-elitist sentiments in mind, March returned to the United States in 
March 1918 and took command. Rather than focusing on soldiers’ needs and killing 
Germans, March saw many officers and leaders more concerned with inter-Army cultural 
wars and distracted by the staff-versus-line quagmire that had plagued the Army for 
decades. March was determined to eliminate the apparent disconnects that fueled the 
GHQ and AEF staffs’ lack of focus and internal dysfunction.26 He found the situation 
worse than he thought. When he disembarked, he went directly to GHQ and was shocked 
to find offices empty and dark: 
I came down to the War Department that night and found the General Staff Offices dark, nobody 
was there; I wandered along the deserted corridors . . . I found the corridor piled high with 
unopened mail sacks . . . I finally found one officer on duty . . . and he was the only officer I did 
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find. The next night the entire General Staff were on duty, and they stayed on duty at night until 
the end of the war.27 
 
March took swift and decisive action. March, as an Uptonian, was a staunch 
proponent of a professional, productive GHQ and a highly qualified officer corps. He put 
an end to the lax nine-to-five schedules and initiated twenty-four hour, ‘round-the-clock 
operations for the remainder of the war.28 He reorganized GHQ staff and made it more 
efficient and responsive to the AEF. He implemented a staff-to-line exchange to improve 
morale and create synergy. This program afforded staff officers with the opportunity to 
go downrange in exchange for select AEF officers who would return stateside to serve on 
the GHQ staff.29 One of his most controversial decisions was to remove former Chief of 
Staff General Scott from command of Fort Dix. Scott had been retired in September 
1917, one month prior to the AEF’s combat deployment to France, but as a close friend 
of President Wilson, Scott was recalled to active duty and given command of Fort Dix. 
Despite Scott’s political connections, March removed him from command to make way 
for younger, more qualified Regular Army officers.30 Additionally, he ended the archaic 
system of politically appointed officers. He insisted that only properly trained, combat-
ready officers could have the privilege of leading his men.  
Though he angered many Congressmen, Marsh stuck to his plans to build a 
professional Army purged of aged retirees and well-connected political appointees. Thus, 
March was the target of considerable angst from Congress. No decision was more 
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controversial than his decision to block General Leonard Wood’s appointment to 
command in France. Wood was a well-heeled political favorite of Teddy Roosevelt, and a 
nasty fight ensued when March sacked Wood and placed him on the inactive retirement 
list. Further, his policy of ending political promotions and not helping Congressmen 
obtain draft deferments for their sons, did even less to endear him to certain elected 
officials. After the war when Pershing and March were nominated to retain their war rank 
as full generals, Congress approved Pershing and denied March. Despite this indignity, 
March believed his Army purged of political appointees and inappropriate political 
influence was a first in the history of modern war.31  
After reorienting the General Staff on the soldiers, winning the war, and 
addressing Army organizational and cultural issues, March turned to soldier morale 
issues. He reinforced the newly formed Morale Branch, a Newton Baker initiative 
hatched before March arrived. Though fully sanctioned by Baker, the GHQ staff drug its 
heels for months, essentially ignoring the new branch and sticking to the time-honored 
policy of allowing commanders in the field the leeway to command.32 March was a true 
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believer in this command adage. However he viewed the morale branch through a slightly 
different lens. He viewed the branch as a way to regain control of the morale mission. In 
order to spur the staff to action and show the importance he placed on soldier morale, he 
promoted the Morale Branch Chief Colonel Edward Munson to the rank of general. With 
the branch and the newly minted general under the General Staff, March was happy to 
absorb the CTCA into the Army chain of command and once again exercise full oversight 
over soldiers’ morale and welfare.  
March later claimed that the systematic management of soldier morale and 
welfare was one of the greatest new achievements of the war.33 Though an enthusiastic 
supporter of soldier morale, he had his limits. In many ways, he was still the old Indian 
fighter who resisted programs that, in his opinion, turned disciplined military training into 
“summer camp.”34 For example, he did not approve of a measure to rid the Army of 
saluting. He still believed in rigid discipline and thought such uninformed measures 
would only lead to Bolshevism.35 He did not like the singing programs touted by Munson 
                                                                                                                                                                             
statistics was fraught with danger, while, conversely, the opinions of regimental and even staff officers, 
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and Fosdick.36 Upon meeting Fosdick for the first time, March ordered him to remove all 
singing programs and athletic instructors at the training camps. He told Fosdick, “we’re 
not running a circus or grand opera – take them out!” However, in time, he came to 
recognize the value (in theory) of the CTCA’s work under the auspices of the Army 
Morale Branch and often sought compromise.37  
Despite these moves to orient his staff on soldier morale issues, March was still 
disturbed that the GHQ and the AEF staff had nursed a culture where morale was seen as 
a task for civilian agencies like the YMCA and the CTCA. March wanted no progressive 
relief agencies serving in combat zones. March, the staunch Uptonian, felt the combat 
zone was reserved for military professionals, not civilian volunteers. March was careful 
to praise the work of the civilian morale workers, while at the same time claiming that it 
was work reserved for the Army in combat zones.38  
March had considerable distaste for Baker and Pershing’s decision to subcontract 
the morale of the soldiers to the YMCA. Simply put, he despised the Y Men. March 
firmly believed soldier morale was the commanding officer’s responsibility and that it 
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frontlines. He also made a Statistics Branch to measure GHQ efficiency and their ability to attain goals and 
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was off limits to any subcontracting scheme, especially in a war zone. March believed “in 
time of war there should [not] be any organization serving with the troops in the field 
which is not militarized.”39 Pershing and March were noticeably incongruent on this 
matter. Pershing was happy to subcontract morale so his officers could “fight the war.” 
March would argue that morale was the war.40 He did not like the Y Men serving among 
his soldiers and he “drew blood all along the line” when he registered his official 
opposition to Y workers while he was the AEF’s Chief of Artillery. Angered over men 
who appeared as healthy, “husky men” serving as morale workers instead of carrying 
rifles, he said he believed “at the start that no man should be permitted to enter or become 
a member of any noncombat organization who was capable of carrying arms.”41  
Further, he accused the Y Men of having a higher Venereal Disease (VD) rate 
than his own soldiers, which caused immense excitement at Y headquarters in Paris. 
March was satisfied with the work the YMCA was doing at the stateside training camps, 
but he declared that for “any army in the field, to achieve success, it is necessary to have 
the commanding general in complete control of the entire personnel.”42 He demanded 
that Fosdick, head of the CTCA, wear provisional military rank and a uniform when he 
was in France. He deplored soldiers looking to others for their morale in the combat zone, 
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and insisted that “military morale was a problem for the Army itself to solve . . . the 
commanding officer of an organization is its real morale officer.”43  
After the war, March described how Baker eventually reversed his position on 
soldier morale and embraced March’s morale doctrine. He said, “As the war proceeded, 
[Baker] completely changed his mind about the matter and came to the conclusion that he 
had been wrong in his organization of these welfare bodies for war service. He became a 
convert to the necessity of completely militarizing all such bodies.” Baker himself 
repeated these sentiments in a speech he delivered to the Army War College in 1929. He 
told the audience that if he were Secretary of War again, he “would not have with the 
Army in the field any collateral welfare organizations” and was “persuaded that [morale 
work] would have been, and in the future should be, done as well by the Army itself as by 
outside agencies.” Baker argued that conducting morale operations in this manner would 
allow the Army to “avoid a number of things that are highly undesirable.”44  
March had a keen eye for detail. His experiences in France, culminating with his 
inspection of the trenches before departing, left him with a particular conviction that the 
greatest symbols of the Y Men’s connection to his soldiers were cigarettes. To soldiers, 
cigarettes were instant morale and welfare. They were relaxation and serenity in a clean, 
sanitary, disposable stick—“dream sticks [that] help you to pass away many a dreary and 
home-sick hour.”45 March saw the agitation and discord created by soldiers angered over 
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the “slackers” and “shirkers” they had to depend on for their cigarettes.46 Falling prey to 
many of the rumors and legends about the Y Men, March developed a fairly harsh set of 
beliefs himself. He freely admitted that he had “impatience with individuals who hid 
behind this service [Y work] to avoid carrying a gun, or used it to obtain special favors 
for themselves.”47 He felt they did “the work of women” and should carry a rifle or go 
home.48 Morale was a command responsibility, sacred as the units’ battle standards or 
unit guide-ons. March felt the progressive-oriented, civilian-led morale and welfare 
programs had gone too far. Soldiers more focused on getting goodies and treats in the 
trench, distracted by endless bickering over the cost of cigarettes instead of focusing on 
the enemy in front of them, were not properly focused according to March. The Allies 
had spent years in the trenches waiting for their next rum ration or trip to the brothel. The 
Doughboys were in France for one reason: to shoot straight and kill the Boche. In 
General March’s view, morale in the trench was a five-hundred-meter head shot, a 
bayonet through the ribs, hot rations once a day, and copious amounts of free, 
government-supplied manufactured cigarettes.  
Peyton March and the Cigarette Ration 
When March took command of the Army, he was also in sole command of the 
War Department for his first months, as Secretary of War Baker was in France on an 
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inspection visit. After taking the previously mentioned steps to address GHQ battle 
rhythm and work shifts, fire or demote incompetent officers, and make organizational 
changes to ensure efficiency and better staff response times, March had immediately 
moved on to important soldier morale issues. At the top of his list was the cigarette 
ration. March noticed that the staff reacted to difficult issues by giving excuses, shifting 
the task to another department or agency, or giving reasons why a particular action was 
not possible. March observed that “well-meaning and zealous officers came to me to tell 
me I couldn’t do this or that thing because of some decision or regulation.”49  
March did not suffer fools lightly and was disgusted by the staff’s can’t do 
culture. He interpreted his position as the head of the Army to mean he “could do 
anything necessary to carry out the military program” and determined he “would not have 
any such officers” serving on his staff. March was going to enforce a paradigm shift that 
would root out incompetence and reward men of action. According to March, nowhere 
was this subsequent paradigm shift more evident than in the prompt, can-do response by 
the staff to an order he issued in early March 1918. In this momentous order, he directed 
the Army to procure stocks of manufactured cigarettes to issue as standard daily rations 
to the soldiers in France. At the time, March could not realize the long-term impact this 
order would have on the cigarette smoking culture in America.50  
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When Secretary Baker returned to the War Department on April 16, 1918, he 
quickly noticed that March had ordered a cigarette ration for the AEF in his absence. 
Baker politely informed March that he had explicitly ordered that cigarettes not be 
included in the soldiers’ rations a year earlier. He knew March was a man of action, but 
was surprised that he had countermanded his guidance. In his recollections of the war, 
March indicated he did not know of such an order by Baker when he gave the command 
to initiate a cigarette ration. Moreover, he said the fact his staff officers had not balked at 
his orders was rather satisfying because it “showed the distance that the War Department 
had progressed along the lines I had marked out for it.” Rather than telling March why he 
could not issue the cigarette ration or that the Secretary of War had already provided 
guidance on the issue, the staff officers simply obeyed and “went out and did it on the 
run.”51 As to Baker’s query regarding March’s apparent insubordination, March told 
Baker: 
I had become convinced, during my service in France, that the use of tobacco by the troops there 
needed regulating. Tobacco was obtainable by the soldiers only by buying it [from Y Men], and 
many tired men were deprived of the use of this solace because they had no money, while more 
fortunate comrades with means of their own were getting all the tobacco . . . [therefore] I directed 
that an order be issued making tobacco a part of the ration for issue to the soldiers.52 
 
Baker supplied no objection, and with that, it was done: the manufactured 
cigarette and the American soldier were officially linked, for the first time, through a 
daily meal ration. This relationship with a tap root in WWI became deeply entrenched 
over the next six decades.53 The tobacco ration was set at “four ready-made cigarettes” 
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per day.54 When the New York Times heard about March’s decision, they reported, “A 
wave of joy swept through the American Army today . . . this step has been long hoped 
for by the soldiers . . .”55 The demand for cigarettes among the soldiers was so great the 
government secured “the entire [1918] output of Bull Durham [cigarettes] for distribution 
to the troops.” When shortages ensued, the Times encouraged Americans complaining 
about the empty shelves at their cigarette retailer: “There is a remedy! Enlist and all will 
be well!”56  
Entrenched 
After the Armistice, most of the Y leadership, including YMCA Overseas Chief 
Edward Carter, left France rather quickly. Unfortunately the Army thanked the YMCA 
for running the Army’s canteen system during the war by accusing the civilian relief 
agency of profiteering and other nefarious activities. These accusations ignited a fairly 
extensive investigation that lasted four years.57 Y Man David Shillinglaw was left to deal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
which were less cumbersome that were other popular forms of tobacco. WWI entrenched the cigarette in 
popular culture . . . this phenomenon is well documented in North America . . . after WWI, many 
adolescent and young adult males started smoking . . .” (Italics mine.) 
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with the Army’s investigators and white-gloved bean counters. He became the object of 
intense scrutiny despite the fact his only experience was in building the Y Huts and 
salvaging Y equipment after the war. In this high stakes game of musical chairs, the 
music had stopped and Shillinglaw was the last one standing. The scrutiny and 
accusations were so intense Shillinglaw eventually had a nervous breakdown and 
returned home where it took him two years to sufficiently recover. Shillinglaw was never 
officially accused of any wrongdoing; much of his anxiety was related to fear, intense 
pressure, and his overwhelming desire to do a good job.58 
Whether Shillinglaw and his fellow Y Men did a good or bad job, or were 
servant-purveyors or pusillanimous profiteers, are questions that may never find adequate 
answers.  However, there is little doubt that WWI completely transformed the American 
cigarette industry and the culture of smoking in America.59 Most historians agree that 
more than any other single factor, the Great War “legitimized the cigarette” and “moved 
cigarettes into the mainstream of American culture . . . legitimitiz[ing] cigarettes by 
linking them to an icon of manliness and civic virtue: the American soldier.” Historian 
Jarrett Rudy adds fidelity to this post-war link between cigarette smoking and 
masculinity: “Ultimately, it was the association between cigarettes and First World War 
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soldiers, largely promoted by newspapers that made cigarettes ‘manly,’ giving them new 
legitimacy. The First World War has been seen by some as marking a trend away from 
‘rugged masculinity’ toward a ‘domestic masculinity.” Rudy argues that after WWI, 
inner-city, urban-dwelling labor men, for example, could achieve the same level of 
perceived masculinity as rough-and-tough cow punchers or soldiers by simply smoking a 
cigarette.60 Finally, historians Allan Brandt and Robert Proctor argue, “WWI would mark 
a critical watershed in establishing the cigarette as the dominant product of modern 
consumer culture,” Proctor adding the war “turned smoking from a marginal indulgence 
of questionable morality to an unobjectionable mark of stalwart manhood.”61  
Proctor further posits that the cigarette critics were summarily “silenced during 
the First World War . . . why should anyone worry about cancer or emphysema thirty 
years down the road, when bullets are whizzing overhead?”62 The Doughboys grew to 
possess a nearly insatiable demand for cigarettes during WWI: “Per capita consumption 
of manufactured cigarettes in the United States nearly tripled from 1914 to 1919 . . . this 
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is one of the most rapid increases in smoking ever recorded.”63 The Great War had 
established a smoking habit that would grow exponentially during the twentieth 
century.64 One commentator from the period observed: 
if there were any among all those millions of soldiers who were non-smokers when the War began 
there were none by the time it was over. The officers in command fully recognized the value of 
smoking as a means of deadening the men’s susceptibilities to the fearful strain to which they 
were constantly exposed, as well as of mitigating the danger of periods of enforced idleness, and 
they used every possible effort to ensure a constant supply of the requisite materials.65 
 
The ration of four manufactured cigarettes a day became the standard issue for the 
next 55 years, except during WWII when that number was bumped up quite drastically to 
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sixteen cigarettes a day. Americans’ smoking habit, which would reach staggering levels 
after WWI and not peak until 1980 in terms of billions smoked per year, was born during 
the Great War.66 When General Peyton March decided to move the Army into the 
cigarette rationing business, he initiated a storied relationship between the Army, the 
soldier, and the cigarette that would be renewed time and again. The soldier and the 
cigarette subsequently became the official national symbol of American warfare and 
military service during the twentieth century.67 After the war, in what amounts to an ode 
to the cigarette, Joseph Mills Hanson provides a final, telling description of the way the 
soldier felt about the cigarette in WWI:  
You played the game with fighting men? Why this is good! You’ve seen the big show then. Here, 
have a Lucky. It’s the Doughboys drag. And always good to taste. But, say, the fag that burned a 
spot of memory in my brain was one I got one night up in Lorraine–off of a long-geared chap 
who’d made the grade with me that night in my first trench raid. I never saw his face all through 
the scrap there in the dark. I’d like to see his map again, to thank him. Wounded, cold, and wet, it 
meant a lot, that mashed-up cigarette.68 
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CHAPTER V 
SMOKE EM’ IF YOU’VE GOT EM’: THE GREATEST GENERATION GOES TO WAR1 
 In December 1943, Ann Dettori was twenty-two years old. Two inches shy of five feet in 
height, she always walked tall on the way to her job as a riveter at the Grumman Aircraft bomber 
factory on Long Island. A first-generation Italian-American Catholic, she was proud of her 
contribution to the country’s war effort. That particular day she was doubly proud. Responding 
to an appeal by management, she had decided to participate in a cigarette drive for the soldiers. 
On her way to work, she stopped at the corner store to spend some of her hard-earned money on 
a carton of cigarettes to send overseas. When she arrived at the factory, she found a slip of paper 
and scribbled a handful of words that changed her life: “Good Luck and a Very Merry Xmas, 
Ann Dettori, #94 Roslyn L.I.” Hoping her note would produce a pen pal, she carefully placed it 
in one of the packs of cigarettes going over there and began the work day proud that she had 
done “something decent.”  
 Sometime around Christmas of 1943, Staff Sergeant Clinton Putnal was going about his 
day serving with the Army in North Africa. Putnal was a tall, Southern boy from an evangelical 
protestant family in rural, central Florida. He served as a medic-crewman aboard an Army Air 
Corps bomber flying medium-range missions against the Germans. Happy to receive a carton of 
smokes from the good folks back home, he was even happier when he discovered the nice note 
from an Ann Dettori. As he enjoyed a good smoke, he decided to write her. Several months later, 
Ann, having forgotten about the note, was surprised to receive a letter from her new pen pal, 
Staff Sergeant Clinton Putnal! 
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 The two began exchanging letters regularly. After several months, Clinton informed her 
that he was being transferred to California where he would contact her later. He eventually wrote 
and asked her to visit him there. She refused because her brother had recently been killed 
fighting in Italy, and she felt she could not abandon her mother during this time of grief. On 
February 20, 1945, Ann received the surprise of her life. While visiting a friend on Long Island, 
she received a message from her mother to come home quickly; a young man in uniform named 
Clinton was on the doorstep! Ann rushed home, and found her mother waiting for her.  
 While Clinton washed up, Ann’s mother admonished her not to “jump in his arms like a 
hussy,” because she had raised her better. Of course, the first thing Ann did upon seeing the 
handsome, tall soldier was to jump right in his arms. Seventy years later, Putnal says she “can 
still feel his arms” wrapping tightly around her, adding that “when he held me in his arms that 
day, I knew that was it.” That day, he asked Ann to marry him. The next day, they married at the 
courthouse. Within two hours of her nuptials, Ann found herself on a troop transport train headed 
back across the US to California in the arms of her handsome soldier, along with hundreds of 
others. Clinton and Ann were married for 54 years. On the day he died, she found in his wallet 
the note she had sent in that fated carton of cigarettes; he had carried it with him for over half-a-
century. Next to Ann’s name on the message she had sent, Clinton had scribbled the following: 
“+ Clinton Putnal Always Together.”2 
This incredible, true story of life, love, soldiers, fate, and cigarettes is full of irony and 
human interest. WWII would bring Americans together as no other event in US history before or 
since. That a pack of cigarettes could bring two vastly different people together in a world falling 
apart is one among a legion of paradoxical and exciting human interest stories that occurred the 
                                                          
2
 Ann Putnal, interview by Joel R. Bius, September 2014, transcript, Center for Culture and Oral History, 
University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS. 
106 
 
 
world over during WWII. Only two decades after the war to end all wars, it was tragically ironic 
that Ann built bombers for Clinton to fly over North Africa as part of a second world war in the 
span of just two decades. America once again harnessed all areas of industry and society to join a 
war in Europe in its third year, just as it had in 1917 when they sent thousands like Jonathon Lee 
to the trenches of the Western Front. By 1942, millions of draftees fought in a war that spread 
from the jungles of the Pacific to the deserts of North Africa, with fortress Europe in between. 
Women entered the foundries and worked alongside men making hundreds of thousands of 
tanks, airplanes, ships, and other war materials. The mobilization for WWII was on a scale 
unlike any the world had ever seen.  
It was striking that the YMCA and organizations like the CTCA, which had played such 
an integral part in WWI mobilization, were roundly denied direct access to WWII soldiers. When 
Army planners exhumed the mothballed mobilization plans from WWI, they discovered an 
abundance of after action reports (AAR) which subsequently informed WWII planning. In these 
AARs, the WWI morale planners lamented decisions to subcontract morale to the YMCA and 
other progressive relief agencies.3 In short, Newton Baker and Peyton March’s renunciation of 
civilian relief work substantially influenced the generation of military and civilian planners who 
led mobilization for WWII.   
As a result, the YMCA’s access to the soldiers was severely curtailed. Neither Y Men nor 
Y Women were allowed on any Army training camps, nor were they permitted to work amongst 
the soldiers downrange in any WWII operational theatre. Y Camps were allowed near Army 
Posts, but ironically were restricted like the bars and brothels of WWI, in terms of distance and 
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proximity to WWII soldiers.4 The Army ran its own canteens leaving the YMCA to run Bible 
studies and recreation leagues in facilities off-post.  
Even more ironically perhaps, the Army wholeheartedly assumed the morale by vice 
mission it was happy to subcontract during WWI. Instead of working in concert with civilian 
agencies to limit soldiers’ access to instruments of vice, the Army actually insisted on issuing 
them millions of condoms and billions of cigarettes from the outset of WWII. Minor grumblings 
in the War Department in favor of a campaign against vice similar to that of WWI progressives 
was ignored. In the case of condoms, the Army conceded that “we cannot stifle the instincts of 
man, we cannot legislate his appetite. We can only educate him to caution, watchfulness and 
perpetual hazards of promiscuous intercourse; and furnish him with adequate preventative 
measures.”5 The Army slogan became if you can’t say no, take a pro. Allan Brandt calculates 
that the Army, through free distribution and PX sales, provided as many as fifty million condoms 
each month during the war, “an important reversal of WWI military policy” and “an implicit 
recognition of the inability of officials to control the troops’ sexual drives.” 6  
In the case of cigarettes, it is no secret that WWII soldiers smoked copious amounts of 
whatever brands they could obtain. The unique relationship between soldier and cigarette during 
WWII is captured in the simple fact that four of the Army’s massive demobilization camps were 
named for the war’s most popular cigarette brands: Camps Lucky Strike, Twenty Grand, Old 
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Gold, and Phillip Morris.7 Soldiers’ unfettered access to billions of manufactured cigarettes 
during WWII required a massive mobilization and troop sustainment program. In addition to 
adequate venereal disease preventative measures, in WWII, the Army also determined to furnish 
the soldier with adequate smoking measures. If take a pro was the slogan associated with the 
soldier and the condom, smoke ‘em if you’ve got ‘em! became the slogan associated with the 
soldier and the cigarette.  
The American G.I. was a product of the cigarette-smoking WWI Doughboy plus two 
decades of profuse cigarette smoking among Americans that followed. These G.I.s wanted to 
smoke ‘em and they didn’t have to go far to get ‘em during WWII. The Army supplied soldiers 
with nearly half-a-trillion manufactured cigarettes through meals and daily rations. This 
avalanche of cigarettes was supplemented by billions more purchased at greatly reduced prices 
through the canteen system or given to soldiers as care packages by generous Americans like 
Ann Dettori. If during WWI soldiers developed an insatiable demand for manufactured 
cigarettes, the soldiers of WWII possessed this insatiable demand from the beginning. They 
brought this demand to basic training, and carried it with them to the far-flung battlefields of 
WWII.  
Thus, the nation entered WWII as a great generation of smokers, and this had a marked 
influence on the way the Army mobilized for war and procured the cigarettes needed to supply 
millions of soldiers. Moreover, it was not just the soldiers who needed smokes; millions of 
Americans back home demanded them as well. As Americans adapted to food rations, empty 
shelves, and barren pantries that accompany total war mobilization, they came face-to-face with 
the magnitude of the soldier-cigarette relationship. With one-quarter of the nation’s entire 
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cigarette supply eventually earmarked for soldiers, drastically limited availability created 
consternation among war workers and nervous Americans who needed cigarettes more than ever. 
To understand how Americans dealt with cigarette shortages, the nature of the soldier-cigarette 
relationship during WWII, and the herculean lengths to which planners went to supply them 
smokes, one must first grasp the power and pervasiveness of smoking in America during this 
period.  
A Great Generation of Smokers 
Americans of the Greatest Generation were prolific cigarette smokers. A marginal habit 
when the nation went to war in 1917 had ballooned to an immense vice as much a part of 
American culture as baseball or apple pie. In 1944, a representative of the cigarette industry 
commenting on this rapid rise, said: 
The First World War had a pronounced effect on the smoking habits of the American people and the 
present war has had an equally profound effect. More persons of both sexes, old and young, are enjoying 
the pleasure, satisfaction, and comfort of cigarettes than ever before. Glance back a quarter century. From 
1914 to 1918, the period of World War I, cigarette consumption increased 300 percent. Yet, despite this 
prodigious gain, in 1920 the per capita consumption of cigarettes was only 414. Today the per capita figure 
. . . has reached the almost incredible figure of 2,240—a gain of 540 percent in less than 25 years. About 60 
percent of this per capita increase has materialized since 1940 and—please note this carefully—this figure 
would be still higher if there were enough cigarettes for everybody today.8 
 
In 1935 with the US in the throes of depression, Americans smoked 134 billion total cigarettes. 
Ten years later the numbers had risen to near astronomical levels: in 1945 alone, Americans 
smoked 341 billion cigarettes.9 From a rate of 1,564 a year in 1935, then 2,240 cigarettes a year 
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in 1944, by 1945 the rate had risen again to 3,449 annual cigarettes for every adult in America.10 
These figures lead to the question: why were Americans smoking so much? 
Norms and Nerves 
 A host of commentators, journalists, and enterprise insiders from the WWII period were 
interested in this question regarding Americans and smoking behavior. Moreover, many 
historians since have sought to understand WWII America in terms of culture, consumption, and 
economic policy as they relate to smoking habits. Of all the answers offered as to why 
Americans smoked so much during this period, they generally fall into two categories: norms 
and nerves. The normalcy of cigarette smoking in America during this period is well 
documented. By 1941, cigarette smoking had become a completely normal, culturally accepted 
vice among Americans. Whereas progressives were aghast at young men, much less young 
women, smoking before WWI, WWII it was so prevalent among Americans that one WWII 
veteran recalls smoking in the locker room with his coach and the rest of his team during the 
halftime of a pre-war junior varsity basketball game!11 In fact, abnormal would describe not 
smoking during this period. One industry representative, when asked why people consumed so 
many cigarettes during WWII, said that smoking simply afforded the average American 
“comfort, solace, and pleasure” in the midst of a world spun out of control.12 By the end of the 
decade, eight out of every ten American men were avid smokers.  
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 If smoking had become a normative American vice by WWII, it was also a nervous habit. 
After suffering through the Great War, the Great Depression, and now another world war, 
Americans were on edge.13 Just as the cigarette had become the craze in the trenches of WWI 
where it calmed nerves and made the unbearable manageable, cigarette smoking took on even 
greater vigor in the foundries, factories, homes, basic training camps, and battlefields associated 
with WWII Americana. Using fear and security as unifying themes in his magnum opus on the 
WWII era, Freedom from Fear, historian David Kennedy describes the conditions driving 
American citizens to such nervous habits as chain smoking billions of manufactured cigarettes: 
Not since the great surge of pioneers across the Appalachian crest in the early years of the Republic had so 
many Americans been on the move. Fifteen million men and several hundred thousand women—one in 
nine Americans—left home for military training camps . . . Another fifteen million persons—one out of 
every eight civilians—changed their county of residence . . . By war’s end, one in every five Americans 
had been swept up in the great wartime migration . . . endless workers poured into the great metropolitan 
centers of defense production—Detroit, Pittsburgh, Chicago, San Diego, Los Angeles, Oakland, Portland, 
and Seattle.14 
 
One observer noted that “War conditions increase the tendency to use tobacco products . . 
. soldiers at the front . . . war plant workers . . . the general population . . . girls left at home . . . 
wives left at home . . . mothers . . . [all] very strongly increased demand.”15 The consumption of 
cigarettes tracked “almost exactly parallel” with the rise and fall of industrial output during 
WWII. When workers worked, they smoked. When soldiers fought, they smoked. When workers 
had money in their pockets, they consumed cigarettes. WWII was one of the most productive, 
labor-intensive eras in American history; American workers reaped the rewards of steady 
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employment and good pay. And when working under pressure of war, whether in industrial or 
combat conditions, their reward often came as a pack of cigarettes.16 
The demand for cigarettes among the American populace grew to incredible proportions. 
Attempting to describe the nearly insatiable demand for cigarettes during WWII, tobacco 
lobbyist Joseph Kolodny said in 1944 that it was impractical even to predict a ceiling for 
cigarette consumption in America. He claimed that WWI and WWII had a significant impact on 
cigarette consumption, stating: “The production and consumption of cigarettes has leaped to 
astronomical heights in recent years, yet the saturation point is not yet in sight. As a matter of 
fact, no one is capable of forecasting when a point of saturation will be reached. It is rather silly 
to even contemplate any limit on cigarette consumption.”17 
Kolodny further claimed that given an adequate supply of cigarettes, the demand for them 
“has virtually no limits.” He also observed that civilians and soldiers under the wartime 
conditions and pressures described above would sacrifice much in terms of rationing of supplies 
and food; however they would not put up with degradation of their steady access to cigarettes. 
Indeed Americans would “go nuts” without them.18  
Recalling this “smoke or go nuts” theme, one veteran Marine Corps fighter pilot 
remembered doing aileron rolls while on a strike mission over the Pacific so he could reach his 
pack of smokes lodged in the floor plates of his aircraft. He may have been on oxygen at 15,000 
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feet over enemy territory, but he was ready for a smoke!19 The Chairman of R.J. Reynolds added 
to revelations regarding consumption mania, stating that “we are making approximately 330 
billion cigarettes this year . . . and to top that, there is [still] a whole lot of unsatisfied demand.”20 
Business Week magazine provided an appropriate summation of the triangular relationship 
among nerves, disposable income, and consumption on the American worker and soldier: “the 
combination of war nerves and war prosperity continues to pile up a record demand for 
cigarettes.”21  
 That Americans consumed copious amounts of cigarettes during WWII is a well-
established fact statistically and culturally. What did this consumption look like? During the war, 
Business Week meaningfully described the enthusiasm for cigarette smoking and the fears nursed 
by Americans deprived access to favorite brands. It characterized this dearth of smokes as a 
“cigarette famine.” Using geography as a literary device, journalists described how L.A. cab 
drivers might volunteer to get your cigarettes for you and help you avoid “the trouble of waiting 
in line.” It was not the fact that cab drivers offered this service; rather, it is important to note the 
long lines forming for cigarettes. This same journalist described how in Dallas, a girl waited 
patiently for the mail to arrive from her soldier-brother in India to receive a carton of much 
sought after Lucky Strike cigarettes. The irony was clear: unable to obtain premium cigarettes in 
America, this girl had to depend on her brother to send them from half-a-world away. 22 
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 Another journalist described the long lines at Macy’s in New York City where lines of 
“cigarette-starved New Yorkers” had become so long that the store had to close down its tobacco 
department and resort to a complex rationing scheme.23 Finally, and most sarcastically, the 
enemy happily joined in on all the lamenting about cigarette consumption anxieties in America. 
In Tokyo, a Japanese journalist cheerfully quipped that “American women are smoking pipes 
because they can’t get cigarettes.”24 Though Japanese awareness of Americans’ frustrations over 
shrinking access to manufactured cigarettes was frustrating, they apparently failed to account for 
Americans’ ability to adapt and overcome—in more ways than one. The Brown & Williamson’s 
roll-your-own cigarette machine was a device born of depression-era ingenuity, and sales of this 
machine soared from an average of 15,000 a month at the start of the war to a record-breaking 
100,000 a month by the end.25  
 However, all was not bleak. One journalist reported a silver lining contained in the 
cigarette shortage crisis, noting that the shortage would drive smokers to abandon “brand 
consciousness in his frenzy to buy anything that can be smoked.”26 Moreover, civilian consumers 
could take pride in their ability to endure extreme cigarette shortages or lack of access to 
premium brands as a form of patriotism. Many civilians in America took comfort in thinking a 
shortage in smokes on their side of the ocean possibly meant a G.I. on the other side had plenty 
of gold leaf relief. On the other hand, just as many citizens did not take solace in this form of 
tobacco patriotism. At best, they simply grew weary of cigarette shortages. At worst, they 
accused the Army of overkill based on rumors of barges and warehouses packed to the brim with 
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thousands of stockpiled cartons of cigarettes, presumably wasting away. Alarmed at the growing 
emergency, these cigarette-starved consumers began to complain to their elected representatives. 
Soon, these complaints were loud and numerous enough to gain the attention of one of the 
Senate’s most powerful leaders: Harry S. Truman. 
The Truman Committee, the Soldier, and the Cigarette 
 Historian Donald H. Riddle describes the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the 
National Defense Program, better known as the Truman Committee, as “the most important 
single Congressional committee dealing with the mobilization program of WWII” as well as 
“one of the most responsible investigating committees in recent history.”27 It was formed through 
an act of Congress on March 1, 1941, to exercise oversight over the enormous defense build-up. 
Recognizing the more-than-ample opportunity for graft, price-gouging, war profiteering, 
corruption, waste, and political patronage, the committee met regularly and held hearings for the 
next seven years, ultimately disbanding on April 28, 1948.  
The committee wielded considerable influence and received testimony from some of the 
leading industrialists and economic planning experts in America. It had a substantial impact on 
policy and reflected the values and concerns of the nation as a whole, not just those engaged in 
war fighting or war material production. In short, the Truman Committee was a reflection of 
America—its concerns were America’s concerns. Thus, the issues upon which the Committee 
chose to focus, as well as its findings, must be understood in that context. The Committee left a 
mountain of reports and transcripts generated from an impressive array of hearings, both public 
and private. In total, the Committee’s work was prodigious: “51 reports . . . totaling 1,946 pages  
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. . . 432 public hearings at which 1,798 witnesses made 2,284 appearances producing 43 volumes 
of printed testimony totaling 27,568 pages.”28  
One of the more notorious Congressional investigating committees in American history 
was the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. During the Civil War, this committee acted 
as the sounding platform for Radical Republicans determined to overshadow President Lincoln’s 
activities as Commander in Chief. The Joint Committee investigated nearly every aspect of the 
Civil War. Truman had seen war, and being a student of history he determined not to repeat the 
mistakes of the Joint Committee. Thus, different from the Civil War Joint Committee, the 
Truman Committee “conducted investigations on almost all phases of the war effort except those 
matters having to do with military strategy and tactics.” Prominent topics included everything 
from rubber rations to labor-industry relations.29 
With Truman’s characteristic determination as guide and his desire just to help the 
President “win the war,” the committee mainly concerned itself with the “domestic side of the 
war effort—the industrial mobilization.” With total mobilization on such a massive scale, 
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conflict was bound to exist as “the armed services clashed with civilian agencies over 
mobilization policies, and the role of the military in industrial mobilization.”30 The majority of 
the complaints that reached the Committee originated with private citizens and arrived by mail, 
in person, or telephone.31 Some of the topics were immense in their scope and complexity. One 
that never reached the official attention of the committee was the Manhattan Project, the covert 
venture to produce the atomic bomb. When the committee was perplexed by the deluge of 
complaints regarding what appeared as strange, secretive military-industrial work in places as 
varied as Tennessee and New Mexico, Truman approached Secretary of War Stimson for 
answers. Stimson told him that “it was an undertaking paralleling a German project and that the 
first country to succeed would probably win the war.” Truman subsequently dropped the matter 
and mentioned it no more.32  
Other topics and complaints were often silly and trivial. A particularly interesting group 
contained citizens’ war-winning strategies or suggestions for ingenious weapons that would 
smite the enemy with a single blow. One pestered the committee with his idea for a fleet of 
single-seat air planes with soil enough to “bury Japan in defeat.” Another suggested the 
manufacture of huge steel spheres with spikes to roll along and chew up armies like a “meat 
grinder.”33 By 1944, however, the committee began to receive a mountain of complaints 
involving an escalating crisis that directly affected Americans’ ability to persevere through the 
long war. In a war with such high stakes, this problem, characterized by one Senator as a 
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“crisis,” received the attention of a full committee hearing in late 1944.34 This crisis was an issue 
of great import not just for the servicemen in Europe, Asia, or training camps stateside, but also 
the men and women on the streets and in the factories. The issue was cigarettes. 
The Army, the Soldier, and the Cigarette in WWII 
 When the committee convened in December 1944 to discuss the nature of the cigarette 
shortage as well as possible solutions, it leaned heavily on the US Army to provide testimony 
regarding the scope of cigarette procurement for soldiers. They also called leading cigarette 
industry executives and logistics experts to testify regarding the cigarette enterprise’s efforts to 
match demand. The Committee was particularly alarmed not only by the complaints from 
civilians stateside, but also rumors of grumblings from soldiers about the availability of 
cigarettes in theatre.35 A close reading and interpretation of the proceedings of this cigarette 
shortage panel goes far to reveal the true nature and enormity of the soldier-cigarette relationship 
during WWII.  
 The first business of the Committee was to ascertain the immensity of the soldier-
cigarette rationing schedule. By creating an entire branch within the Army Service Forces to 
husband the Army’s cigarette procurement program, the Army signaled its remarkable 
commitment to cigarettes. Department Chief Colonel Fred C. Foy provided the Committee 
meticulous details on the size and scope of his department’s activities. The first bombshell was 
the fact that by late 1944, the Army’s adjusted consumption rate had swollen to a projected 114 
billion cigarettes for FY 1944, which represented the planning number it would assume for FY 
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1945. This figure can be extrapolated from data supplied in the testimony showing the Army’s 
initial request for 68 billion cigarettes in 1944 had fallen woefully short and was supplemented 
with another order of 24 billion cigarettes bringing the total to 92 billion.36  
Further, Foy reported that consumption in Army training camps and stateside required 
accounting as well. Reporting that 800 million cigarettes covered only thirteen days of 
consumption stateside, Foy estimated the Army needed roughly 22 billion cigarettes a year to 
cover stateside requirements.37 The grand total of 114 billion cigarettes for the Army alone is 
astonishing considering the fact that the entire United States adult population smoked only 134 
billion cigarettes just a decade earlier, and the Army had only procured 21 billion cigarettes in 
FY 1943.38  
 The testimony also contains data uncovering the Army’s consumption rate. To meet their 
requirements, the Army had requested 23 percent of America’s entire run of cigarettes for FY 
1944.39 However, the industry testified that based on the Army’s sustained, steadily growing 
consumption rate, it felt the Army would require 30 percent of the entire run in FY 1945. This 
would necessitate the industry’s production of an unprecedented 400 billion cigarettes in FY 
1945 to meet both civilian and military requirements.40  
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These huge consumption numbers, both planned and real, were not random guesses. They 
were based on planning estimates generated in theatre by Army combatant commanders who 
were given wide latitude to determine cigarette consumption requirements. By 1944, they had 
pegged that figure at one pack per soldier, per day. This was codified in War Department 
Circular 285, which established the one-pack-per-day consumption rate authorized for soldiers 
on combat rations, as well as an additional one pack per day soldiers could purchase at the 
commissary.41 This drove Foy’s requirements, and he reported that his procurement strategy was 
guided by a 16 cigarettes per-soldier-per-day supply requirement.  
Seeking fully to understand these figures and assumptions, a panelist at one point 
interrupted Foy and asked him the question on everyone’s mind: “Do you just assume that every 
soldier in the United States Army smokes?” To which Foy promptly replied with an emphatic 
and frank “Yes!”42 This consumption calculus is what drove the Army to siphon off 23 percent 
of all cigarettes produced in America. Camel alone designated 51.5 percent of its entire run for 
soldiers in 1944.43 Regarding all these production and consumption figures, the Senators and the 
Army officials on the panel never wavered in their determination to do whatever was required to 
assure soldiers’ unfettered access to cigarettes. The Army was quite clear on its intentions: “we 
are committed to buying whatever the demand is in theatre.”44 The Senators on the panel echoed 
this commitment: “If the theatre commanders, if the boys, are getting all the cigarettes that they 
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require, then we are off to a good start . . . but we want to be sure that they are getting the 
cigarettes first, and in sufficient supply to meet their demands.”45  
Hence the soldier-cigarette relationship was elevated to the highest levels of importance 
during WWII. With these figures in mind, as well as the military-industrial-political commitment 
to cigarette smoking soldiers, one can understand why the civilians back home in the panelists’ 
Congressional districts and home states were perplexed that one-quarter of all cigarettes 
produced, and possibly more in the future, was going to the armed forces.46 Though encouraged 
in their patriotism by American Tobacco, whose packages of Lucky Strikes were sans green dye 
because “Lucky Strike Green Has Gone to War,” there was still consensus among the civilian 
smoking populace that times were not good.47 Considering that during this period over 80 
percent of all Americans were smokers, this was a substantial outcry.48  
Those who took in Business Week and the local and regional papers that reprinted their 
syndicated articles during WWII found a steady stream of news and data supporting their fears 
regarding the size of the Army’s cigarette procurement program. The magazine reported in 1944 
that “consumption is too high . . . and the civilian does not get a nod from the manufacturers until 
military demand has been satisfied.”49 It also reported that the Army had squeezed RJR for an 
additional 150 million of the popular Camel brand cigarettes per week. RJR worked out a flex 
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schedule with its labor union, but that would only account for an additional 65 million per week. 
The remaining 85 million came out of production earmarked for civilian consumption.50  
In addition to the soldier-cigarette “squeeze” on the cigarette supply, senators in the 
Truman Committee were shocked to learn that behavior akin to a shark feeding frenzy was 
informing consumer behavior late in the war. Civilians apparently bought and consumed 
cigarettes even if they did not smoke simply because they were scarce and seen as valuable. Like 
consumers who purchase something simply because it is on sale, whether needed or not, some 
smoked or hoarded just because they could.51 Between soldiers’ burning up America’s stock of 
cigarettes, leading to a cigarette shortage, and this form of complex, frenzied consumer behavior, 
America found itself in a cigarette crisis in 1944. The next logical question the Committee asked 
the cigarette enterprise, why do you not just produce more cigarettes to meet demand was 
complex with no simple answer. 
The Field-to-Lip Foxtrot: The Effects of Tobacco Aging, Labor Relations, and Echoes of the New 
Deal on Cigarette Production 
 Scholars of the New Deal are forced to sort through the issues of production and 
consumption as they related to the causes of and extraction from the Great Depression. This is 
especially true regarding the issues presented by the soldier-cigarette issue and associated 
shortages. Consumption oriented economists subscribe to the hypothesis that free markets are not 
structured to provide full employment and sustainable distribution of wealth, and large-scale 
government intervention in the economy is required in modern, industrial nations. During and 
after the Great Depression, the federal government attempted to fix the failures of the free market 
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and the problems created by the business cycle by engaging in deficit spending and manipulating 
consumption.  
With a renewed emphasis on consumerism, purchase power, government intervention, 
and deficit spending, an American political economy emerged during this period that was 
actually the completion of a half-century long move from a conservative production economy to 
a liberal consumption economy. The purchase power of the middle class was henceforth a crucial 
element of the American economy. In short, after the upheaval of the Great Depression many 
saw a new America whose economy would rise or fall on the backs of wages and consumption. 
These consumption oriented theorists reasoned that an industrial nation can produce all it wants, 
but if there is irrational production, a deficiency in money supply leading to empty pockets, or if 
prices go through the floor, destroying profit incentives, a modern economy will soon sink.52  
An example of this irrational production is found in the Ford Motor Company’s 
production of the Model T during the Roaring Twenties. What was a production rate of a Model 
T every 14 hours ballooned to a car every 10 seconds on the eve of the Great Depression. David 
Kennedy comments that America’s “fabulously successful [production] strategy,” represented by 
the Model T Ford, “had its limits . . . mass production made mass consumption a necessity.”53 
Many historians agree that irrational production on this scale and ignorance regarding the middle 
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class purchasing power conundrum created the conditions that sent America spiraling toward the 
massive business cycle backlash correction known as the Great Depression.  
If a regulated consumption economy was what many New Dealers were looking for, they 
found it in the manufactured cigarette. Legislators, the cigarette enterprise, and economists were 
keenly aware that the cigarette was the prime positive example of consumption theories 
dominating economic thought during this period. When Americans consumed cigarettes at WWII 
levels, it resulted in a host of secondary and tertiary benefits. Growers received top price for their 
leaf; flush with cash, they engaged in material consumption that supported local and state micro 
economies.54 The enterprise was more than happy. Buttressed by an infinite customer base, the 
astronomical quantities of cigarettes consumed during WWII ensured they could sell them at 
price splits that guaranteed sustained consumption and lucrative profit margins. The vast 
cigarette industry profits, second order transactions, advertisement revenue, and wealth in 
cigarette industry stock had a profound effect on America’s twentieth century macro economy. 
The federal government had no shortage of the spoils either. Cigarette purchases were 
taxed transactions that brought billions in revenue to the government which in turn funded the 
social welfare and recovery programs central to Roosevelt’s extended New Deal program. 
Cigarette consumers were happy, the enterprise and its investors were ecstatic, and the federal 
government had a golden goose that would produce fruits in the billions for the remainder of the 
twentieth century. All these measures and supposed benefits were Keynesian in nature and 
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formed the core of the New Deal program. The manufactured cigarette, sought after by soldiers 
and hoarded by civilians, offers a unique lens to analyze the interplay among production, 
consumption, managed economy, and political-industrial-military relations during this most 
momentous period of American history. 
The Field-to-Lip Foxtrot 
 As much as the New Deal political-economy appeared, at least to some, to dig America 
out of the Depression, it acted as a juggernaut to the increased cigarette production required to 
meet soldier and civilian demand during the height of WWII. The Truman Committee clearly 
saw that America was the world’s “Arsenal of Democracy” during WWII, but why the nation 
could not become the Sultan of Cigarettes and supply the world over with an endless stream of 
smokes was not so obvious.55 The nation’s industrial production numbers during WWII were 
nothing less than astonishing. The American labor force produced 295,486 airplanes, 60,973 
tanks, 12.5 million rifles, and 41 billion rounds of ammunition during WWII.56 Historian David 
Kennedy observes during the waning years of WWII, “every American combatant . . . could 
draw on four tons of supplies” per man; by comparison, his Japanese opponent could count on 
only two pounds per man.57  
To meet the skyrocketing demand, cigarette production had escalated to record levels as 
well. The American Tobacco Company, makers of Camel cigarettes, had doubled its cigarette 
production since the start of the war. RJR had already worked to flex production schedules and 
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labor arrangements to meet the Army’s demand for more cigarettes.58 Production numbers for 
1943 had been 290 billion cigarettes and were 325 billion in 1944.59 To meet the demand, and 
right the cigarette shortage, why couldn’t the industry produce a few billion more cigarettes? 
Because the industry was limited by three factors: tobacco aging, labor relations, and echoes of 
the New Deal.   
Tobacco Aging 
 The most obvious reason why the enterprise could not produce billions and billions more 
cigarettes in 1944 is that production was tied to the 1941 tobacco crop. Since manufactured 
cigarette producers perfected the flu curing and blending process that elevated the cigarette as the 
most appealing and lucrative consumer product ever made, the industry had been tied to a strict 
three-year aging process. Back in 1941, the enterprise had forecasted demand for 1944 and then 
contracted for enough tobacco leaf to meet that 1944 demand. The enterprise did not foresee the 
epic rise in cigarette smoking that occurred in the intervening three years; it in turn was left 
short-handed in 1944. As much as the enterprise might have wanted to make more cigarettes in 
1944, it simply did not have enough raw materials. 
 During the Truman hearings, some questioned whether the industry could merely use un-
aged tobacco and borrow from the 1942 and 1943 crop that was aging at that time. Business 
Week reported in 1944 that gossip on the street was that the industry may sacrifice this three-year 
aging cycle to meet the door-busting demand. The magazine reported:  
It’s a matter of trade gossip that many of the producers have cut quality to be certain of meeting volume 
demand. One of the large companies is said to have cut by 50 percent the amount of scarce Turkish tobacco 
which goes into its products . . . to get immediate relief, some manufacturers are represented as planning to 
slash the aging process one year.60  
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Despite this “trade gossip,” executives involved in the Truman Committee hearings made it clear 
that the enterprise was not willing to sacrifice quality. Cutting down on Turkish tobacco in their 
blend was one thing; using un-aged tobacco was another. Responding to this pressure to use un-
aged tobacco, the chairman of RJR stated emphatically: 
We are refusing to destroy our brand and disappoint the American taste and develop an absolute necessity 
of more acute shortage in the future by using green, unusable tobaccos . . . American cigarette taste 
demands cigarettes made not out of green tobaccos, but out of cured tobaccos. The important brands of this 
country are built on a basis of that taste and that demand . . . it is a sealed fact . . . there is just so much 
tobacco that was grown and acquired. It is in the inventories and in the warehouses and there is no way to 
increase it.61  
 
In terms of raw materials for cigarette production, the facts are clear. The industry had plenty of 
machinery and only a limited quantity of leaf; it was producing as much as possible considering 
the imposed cultivation limitations. However, in the process of the hearings, other factors 
emerged that further limited cigarette production in 1944. 
Labor Relations 
 Labor supply was a major issue during WWII. To produce the mountain of material and 
supplies to support the war effort, America required an incredibly large labor force. Over twelve 
million men and women were already in uniform, and the rest of the nation was left to supply the 
labor market. Only so many skilled and unskilled workers were available to go around, and this 
forced Congress, the War Department, and other federal agencies to work together to develop 
schedules of workers considered key and essential at home and exempt from military service. 
This tight labor situation generated unique problems within the cigarette enterprise that often 
stood in the way of its ability to increase cigarette production in 1944. 
First, tobacco growers and associated farm labor was considered key and essential, 
because the government deemed that the leaf provided “comfort, solace, and pleasure” to soldier 
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and citizen alike—it was an “essential commodity.” However, though the cigarette, as opposed 
to the leaf, was the business end of this “comfort, solace, and pleasure” transaction, workers in 
the cigarette industry were not considered key and essential. In effect, the farmer was exempt 
from military service, but the machine operator in the cigarette factory was not. The industry 
wanted both farmer and industry workers designated key and essential so that cigarette 
manufacturers could receive more labor allocations.62  
Addressing this apparent contradiction, one industry representative opined that “although 
the growing of tobacco has been declared essential, the manufacturer of cigarettes . . . is 
officially rated non-essential.” He complained the industry was being denied “sufficient 
manpower to produce and make available cigarettes,” and it was “inconsistent to designate the 
raw material as vital to the Nation’s welfare and yet deny the manufacturers and distributors 
sufficient manpower to produce . . . cigarettes.” Enterprise officials were quick to point out that 
female workers were already being leveraged in the industry in an effort not to impede war 
work—they were “not the type which can be well utilized in the war industries such as heavy 
munitions plants.” However, they were emphatic that without a substantial increase in labor 
allocation, no additional cigarette production capacity could be achieved.63 
Business Week magazine was keen to cover this issue of labor scarcity in the cigarette 
industry. Two months before the Truman Committee met to discuss the cigarette shortage, the 
magazine reported: 
Labor is Scarce—harvesting the crop is the most acute problem confronting Kentucky tobacco growers 
who are short on labor. Close to 2,000 German prisoners of war are at work in the fields. Many schools 
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postponed opening for a week or two to allow students to help, and one county judge dismissed the 
September court term to free jurors and attendants for the tobacco harvest.64 
 
In addition to restrictions placed on cigarette production due to tobacco aging, the industry was 
also limited by these labor issues. Though these were enough in themselves to thwart industry 
efforts to surge production in 1944, the final limiting factor proved decisive. Despite a demand 
curve that appeared to have no ceiling, farmers actually resisted increased production. They were 
new farmers with a new deal, and they did not want to tamper with a good thing.  
Echoes of the New Deal 
 Historians have debated the nature of the New Deal for all of the eight decades since 
Roosevelt took extreme measures to save America’s sinking ship. The scholarship has generally 
focused on three areas: relief, recovery, and reform.65 Relief efforts were intended to meet the 
most urgent needs and involved assistance from the government to put money directly in 
family’s pockets. As previously mentioned, part of this direct assistance was practical 
Keynesianism designed to spur consumption.  
The recovery and reform activities were a mixed bag of government programs, initiatives, 
and legislative measures intended to stabilize the American economy and address the factors that 
drove it into the ground in the first place. The federal government’s involvement in issues like 
finance reform, economic stabilization, job creation, price controls, production schedules, and 
farm assistance were of primary importance. In short, the New Deal was America’s shift to some 
level of planned economy, a move a century in the making that many now call modern economic 
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arrangements.66 Several components of the recovery and reform programs installed in the 1930s 
form echoes of the New Deal that reached out and directly affected the cigarette industry’s 
ability to increase production during the 1940s.  
 The most substantial echo was the New Deal crop control and allotment programs. These 
programs were well received by tobacco growers, the vast majority happy to participate in any 
scheme that would rescue them from the dismal Great Depression price free-fall. Implemented as 
part of the suite of New Deal recovery and reform programs aimed at stabilizing farm 
commodity prices, these programs formed a mountainous barrier that made any real or imagined 
cigarette production surge difficult if not impossible. Though industry executives were gushing 
over seemingly unlimited demand, declaring that it was “silly” even to envision a ceiling, 
tobacco growers had vivid memories of near zero demand just a decade earlier.67 Whether 
cotton, tobacco, hogs, or beef, during the Great Depression the market was flooded with 
agricultural and farm products that were either not needed, not wanted, or for which there was no 
money supply to purchase even if there was want or need. As cotton bales piled up on docks and 
tobacco leaves sat idle in warehouses, prices had gone through the floor. In an effort to keep up, 
farmers increased production to make up for the loss in price, which drove prices down even 
further. This was the death spiral into which the government stepped during the New Deal to 
arrest the fall and stave off the collapse of farming in America.68  
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 One of the first things the government did was pass the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
(AAA). In simplistic terms, this act offered some level of government guarantees in exchange for 
forced decreases in agricultural production and rationalized shortages. In turn the removal of 
surplus and run-away production generated price increases, price stabilization, and confidence in 
the market; which encouraged investment, wages, and consumption. Though the AAA was 
eventually struck down by the Supreme Court, the crop control and allotment programs were 
revived in the Soil Conservation & Domestic Allotment Act of 1936. In the end, these 
government compulsory control measures were only part of the maturation of an activist federal 
government and long-term reform measures that resulted in wholesale transformation of farming 
and a fundamental renegotiation of capitalism in America.69  
The measures were extreme in some eyes. For example, at the height of the Great 
Depression when many families were starving, across America millions of hogs were destroyed 
and left unprocessed, thousands of acres of cotton were plowed under, and farmers were 
forbidden to place additional acreage into production. Weary of chasing the business cycle and 
farm prices for nearly a century of upturns and downturns, 99.9 percent of tobacco farmers 
elected to enroll in the allotment program.70 As a result of this New Deal allotment regime, and 
in the face of a demand curve that was increasing at a rate of 15 percent per year during the war, 
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tobacco acreage was capped by the government at a seven percent annual growth rate.71 
Moreover, rejecting the free market principles of liaissez faire so much a part of their 
Jeffersonian roots, growers were more than content to pursue happiness through steadfast 
adherence to these government imposed crop size and land use restrictions. These would have 
been anathema to Thomas Jefferson; however, they were lifeblood to the modern farmer. The 
nature of this allotment program and the growers’ staunch resistance to increased production is 
crucial to any final understanding of why cigarette production failed to accelerate during the 
waning years of WWII.  
Enterprise insiders and tobacco growers drained by the disastrous price fluctuations that 
had plagued them for decades repeatedly told the Truman Committee that growers were not in 
the least interested in sacrificing crop support programs for increased acreage.72 Some on the 
industrial side of cigarette production were pushing for “more manpower and more acreage” in 
response to Congressional and War Department demands for “more cigarettes.”73 Yet farmers 
were not budging. They were exceedingly happy with the allotment program and government 
oversight of the tobacco crop. They voted FDR into office, gave him his planned economy 
mandate, and felt they were entitled to the full benefits of the allotment program. They were 
content to make a living off of three acres and a government allotment check—and it was not a 
bad living. Even if this meant they might miss out on the promising opportunities for growth 
represented by the remarkable expansion in cigarette consumption during WWII, they could not 
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be budged. Decades of boom and bust had driven them to this determined resistance to the free 
market; they were no longer willing to chase demand and trust in the invisible hand. Tobacco 
farmers had fallen in love with FDR’s managed economy, and came to rely on crop allotments as 
a substantial portion of their annual income.74  
The industry, minus a few exceptions, actually took the side of their growers on this 
issue.75 It joined the farmers and generally resisted any dramatic plans for increased acreage and 
industry leaders were not afraid to testify to as much before the Truman Committee. One 
executive stated, “I assuredly would not recommend under present circumstances that all 
controls be eliminated. I know nobody who is willing to face again the conditions that we had in 
1930–1932 in leaf tobacco . . . when farmers were going all but hungry.”76 Another said that a 
situation whereby farmers were once again chasing demand would be considered a “disaster” 
and that growers would not permit a situation creating the price fluctuations and unpredictability 
they were accustomed to before allotment.77  
Moreover, this was not a problem isolated to just the pit of the Great Depression. Grower 
and cigarette producer alike were keenly aware that as recently as 1939 farmers had produced the 
largest flu-cured tobacco crop on record, of which the industry only bought 53.9 percent. When 
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asked what happened to the 46 percent that was not purchased for flu-curing and cigarette 
production, enterprise executives shifted the conversation to one of risk assumption. Sure, the 
growers could go back to maximum land usage and high levels of production—but who would 
assume the risk for over production? Should farmers assume the risk of low prices, or the 
manufacturer who over-purchased and risked stocks of aging, low-price tobacco rotting in their 
warehouses?  Or should the government be on tap for these risks?78 
 Regarding the government’s ability to assume the risk of unfettered tobacco production, 
enterprise experts pointed out the major problem associated with any government-set general 
minimum. If the government set a price at which it would guarantee the farmer it would step in 
and buy his tobacco if the bottom fell out, the industry would simply wait and buy tobacco from 
government auctions at rock bottom prices. This is the nature of a healthy wealth strategy—buy 
low and sell high. Tobacco was particularly susceptible to this general minimum scheme because 
it could sit in a government warehouse for years and still retain value to the industry, which 
would wait patiently and then scoop up leaf pennies to the dollar.79 
Thus, the Committee was clearly aware that allotment and crop control was here to stay. 
A benefit fiercely guarded by tobacco state politicians, it became a juggernaut political issue of 
great importance to generations of Southern legislators. Business Week consistently covered 
allotments and farm policy as they were issues near and dear to the American agricultural 
community. In July 1944, it reported that even though the industry 
can’t meet demand—tobacco growers are theoretically sitting pretty. Ever since the Depression, when 
overproduction and foundering prices forced Washington to intervene with acreage and crop control, 
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growers have welcomed outside help. The result, however, is that current crops won’t stretch to cover a 50 
percent increase in demand.80 
 
Regarding this allotment program loved by farmers who were “sitting pretty” and high on the 
hog, Senator Homer S. Ferguson provided a telling explanation of mid-twentieth century 
political economy. Ferguson, a conservative, pro-business Republican from Michigan, was quick 
to indicate the root of the 1944 shortage was the 1934 New Deal allotment program at the heart 
of Roosevelt’s federal expansion. Hamstrung by what he saw as a forced, anti-free market 
measure frustrating capitalism’s invisible hand, Ferguson was annoyed at the lost opportunities 
to exploit exploding demand; demand largely driven by the soldier-cigarette duo. Sensing the 
true nature of the problem, Senator Ferguson sarcastically asked, “Isn’t it true that we paid 
growers not to grow tobacco in 1943 . . . and we penalized other growers for growing too much 
tobacco . . . which could be used for cigarettes?” Of course the answer was a resounding “yes.” 
According to Ferguson, this was the sickening irony of the entire cigarette shortage episode the 
committee had met to discuss: the US government paid exorbitantly for the lower production 
from 1941 to 1944 that was at the core of the cigarette shortage they were desperately trying to 
overcome at this late hour in the middle of a world war.81  
Americans were undoubtedly consuming legendary amounts of cigarettes during WWII, 
and civilians at home and soldiers at the front were more than willing to walk a mile for a Camel. 
Further, there is no doubt that during the Truman Committee’s proceedings, the government and 
the enterprise expressed a full understanding of this demand, as well as the importance of 
cigarette consumption to a modern, industrial, post-Great Depression US economy. One 
enterprise executive was rather frank in his assessment of the cigarette’s link to a fiscally 
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healthy, if not physically healthy, consumer economy. RJR Chairman S. Clay Williams had 
much to say about cigarette consumption in a modern American economy. In addition to his 
position at the helm of one of America’s most powerful cigarette companies, Williams had also 
acted as the de facto head of FDR’s National Recovery Administration (NRA) as chairman for 
industry on the National Labor Board (1933–1934), and was a member of the US Department of 
Commerce's Business Advisory Council (1933-1949). Williams said that America’s full 
employment concerns were married to consumption, and that enough cigarettes on the market 
were needed to ensure “maximum land use, the maximum manpower use, whether it be growing, 
or transporting, or warehousing, or manufacturing, or distributing . . . and the maximum volume 
of business for everybody’s benefit.”82  
Senator Ferguson, already frustrated at his inability to break through allotment schemes 
and increase production, added to this cigarette-driven economic policy with his contention that a 
substantial portion of America’s thriving consumption economy was linked to the production and 
consumption of manufactured cigarettes. He was one of many Republicans and conservative 
Democrats of this era who wanted to roll back the production restrictions and government codes 
associated with Roosevelt’s New Deal central planning philosophies and let the free market 
horses run.83 They reasoned that if Americans wanted billions of cigarettes, then by all means 
produce billions of cigarettes. At one point, when asking about the prospects of cigarette 
advertising to increase cigarette consumption among soldiers, he posed the question, “If we are 
going to have any prosperity at all” aren’t the “boys . . . at the front” and “people all over the 
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country” going to have to smoke more? Of course, the enterprise representative receiving this 
line of inquiry was happy to respond to Senator Ferguson’s question with a hearty “We hope 
so!”84  
These were not just the opinions of a lone, pro-business Senator on the Committee or one 
of several enterprise executives supplying testimony. In their summary statement after the 
Cigarette Shortage hearings were complete in 1944, the entire Truman Committee offered the 
most substantial, far-reaching statement acknowledging its beliefs about the vast economic 
importance of cigarette consumption in America. In closing, the Committee stated: 
It can’t be denied that the successful distribution of cigarettes and other tobacco products is vital to the 
successful operation of our economy and the effective prosecution of the war. Any deterrent to the orderly 
and efficient distribution of these products serves to make more difficult the task of the government in 
maintaining morale and confidence. 85 
 
The Greatest Generation of Smokers: The Goose that Laid the Golden Egg 
Despite the challenges presented by the cigarette shortage in America during WWII, the 
truth is evident: as a result of cigarette rationing in America and the Army’s focused efforts, 
soldiers serving overseas or training stateside saw absolutely no cigarette shortage. In contrast to 
their American friends and family, who for the reasons presented above were never able to 
receive the fruits of any marked increase in cigarette production, soldiers experienced a cigarette 
avalanche. The enterprise, Congress, and the Army worked overtime and with much enthusiasm 
to ensure that every soldier who donned the uniform was given at least one pack of cigarettes a 
day for the duration of the war, and had access to at least one other pack through PX sales where 
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available.86 To say the industry was ecstatic at this business boon is an understatement. 
Enterprise executives were pleased to emphasize to the Truman Commission that Army soldiers 
were their greatest clients. When asked if the twelve million men drafted into the service were 
good for business, the Chairman of RJR said that “according to our observation [they were]… 
good smokers, but they became very much better smokers when they went into the Army, and 
the folks left at home became very much better smokers when the war broke out.”87 In this way 
the enterprise benefitted from a two-for-one deal: the soldiers who left home smoked copious 
amounts of cigarettes, and their nervous families back home joined them.  
In what would become a habit, the industry was swift to attach much patriotic emotion to 
the soldier-cigarette relationship, soon to be the veteran-cigarette relationship. In addition to the 
famous advertisement that “Lucky Strike Green Has Gone to War with the Soldiers,” the 
industry also added other patriotic statements to the record. Regarding the Army’s need to supply 
heroic soldiers with a steady stream of cigarettes, one executive testified that “the minute you 
begin to supply to the Army—they want a good stock on this side of the ocean to draw from . . . 
this is no critical expression, for they have to do it this way—the army can’t take chances with 
men who are fighting wars!”88 Another testified, “everyone will agree that our fighting men 
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deserve and should have unlimited quantities of smokes.”89 The soldier was the enterprise’s best 
friend.  
Moreover, in the soldier-cigarette duo, the industry also gained a proven agent for 
overseas expansion. Industry leaders testified to the Truman Committee that they were glad that 
soldiers were acting as missionaries for the cigarette industry abroad, building up a lucrative 
post-war market for American cigarettes. One industry representative testified:  
The men in our armed forces—striding audaciously across the global map with their omnipresent 
cigarette—unconsciously are doing a super job of selling the rest of the world on the unmatched qualities of 
American tobacco. Lend-lease exports of leaf tobacco likewise contribute toward the building up of a 
vastly expanded post-war market which the American farmer should be ready to cultivate and supply . . . all 
this missionary work of incalculable value, will go for naught if the production of leaf tobacco is not 
stepped up sufficiently to allow for a large exportable surplus after the war.90 
 
In subsequent years, cigarettes became a key component of such massive programs as the 
Marshall Plan and the Berlin Airlift; Europe soon came to value American tobacco in ways never 
imaged before the war. Considering the regional, national, and global nature of the soldier-
cigarette relationship, an exchange between Senator Joseph Hurst Ball (R-MN) and RJR 
Chairman Williams provides a clear, concise summary of how important the soldier was to the 
cigarette enterprise. Ball, like Ferguson, was a conservative, pro-business Republican 
vehemently opposed to labor unions and managed economy schemes; he was determined to point 
out the fallacy of New Deal limitations on cigarette production. Ball wanted to know if the 
demand curve over the last 40 years showed that the age group in the Army was the largest group 
of real and potential cigarette consumers. Williams’s response is telling. He replied, “soldiers in 
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the active service are the most diligent consumers of cigarettes as a group in the population” of 
America.91  
Ball was attempting to point out the dangers and incompatibility of overly-managed 
economy in America. In a Republic notionally founded upon free market principles, the invisible 
hand of the market must follow the business opportunities as they are presented, unfettered by 
the visible hand of government.92 These diligent soldier-smokers presented a massive group of 
lucrative cigarette-consuming smokers which grew to epic proportions over the remaining 
decades of the twentieth century. This growth transformed them into the most profitable, greatest 
generation of smokers in American history. Ironically, many of the pro-business, free-market 
legislators that criticized the managed economy that limited Americans access to cigarettes were, 
or became the intellectual fathers of a generation of elected officials who applauded federally 
subsidized smoking in the military and perpetual renewal of government tobacco allotments and 
price supports. 
The Greatest Generation of Smokers: WWII and Beyond 
In Bad Habits: Drinking, Smoking, Taking Drugs, Gambling, Sexual Misbehavior and 
Swearing in American History, historian John C. Burnham provides detailed analysis of the 
enduring impact smoking has had on American culture, society, and economy in the decades 
after WWII. The war subjected the Greatest Generation to substantial physical, emotional, and 
social pressure; all these translated into smoking pressure. Cigarettes calmed nerves and steadied 
hands, and generous amounts were freely given in foxholes, aid stations, chow halls, and USO 
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facilities. They were valued items shared in cafeterias, factories, and coffee klatches back home. 
Tobacco farmers were exempt from the draft. Women were bombarded with images of Rosie the 
Riveter working the pneumatic jack with cigarette in hand. All these cultural, physiological, and 
environmental stimulants meant one thing to the Greatest Generation: smoke em’ if you’ve got 
em’.93 
And smoke they did. As WWII ended and soldiers returned home and life normalized, 80 
percent of all American men became or continued smoking. The percentage of women who 
smoked doubled during WWII.94 In 1900, cigarettes represented only two percent of the tobacco 
market, with chewing tobacco the most prevalent form of intake at 48 percent. By 1952, 
cigarettes represented 81percent of this market, with chewing tobacco dropping all the way to 
last place at three percent.95 Burnham argues that the enterprise eventually co-opted this massive 
groundswell of soldier-veteran cigarette smokers and their American Legion organizing arm as a 
powerful voting bloc. Similar to the Democratic Party co-opting Irish-American urban voters 
after the Civil War and the Republican Party co-opting the Grand Army of the Republic, the 
cigarette enterprise recruited the American Legion after WWII and grafted them into its 
campaign to link smoking with freedom.96 This unique connection between the industry and the 
veteran would surface time and again in the remainder of the twentieth century as the enterprise 
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continued to use soldiers, veterans, patriotism, and liberty overtly and covertly to advance its 
interests.97 
Money buys influence, and the billions generated through cigarette related transactions 
and commerce gave the cigarette enterprise enormous influence over twentieth century American 
political economy. This influence was visible in the way government, businesses, and advertisers 
bowed in reverence to the powerful cigarette firms in the decades after WWII. The enterprise 
generated a rich, renewable source of tax revenue and advertising dollars, a relationship that 
Robert Proctor deems a “tax addiction.”98 Politicians from the municipal to the federal level had 
to square any anti-cigarette initiative with the fact that taxes and duties directly or indirectly 
related to the production and sale of cigarettes underwrote a substantial portion of their agenda.  
Like other statistics related to the growth of cigarette smoking in the twentieth century, 
the numbers regarding the business case for cigarettes and the “tax addiction” are quite telling. 
By 1950, “cigarettes accounted for 1.4 percent of the gross national product and a remarkable 3.5 
percent of all consumer spending on nondurable goods . . . tobacco was the fourth largest cash 
crop in the nation, and in Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia, it ranked first.”99 
As Brandt says, “If the cigarette was deeply insinuated into American culture by the middle of 
the century, it had also become central to the modern nation’s industrial economy.” The 
“triumph” of the cigarette “was complete.”100 For the remainder of the twentieth century, 
advertisers and politicians quickly and consistently seized on the triumphant soldier-cigarette 
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tandem and linked it to that “undefineable something” the American soldier fought for in all of 
America’s wars: the American spirit of independence.101 Yet, how much were Americans and 
their elected representatives willing to pay, both monetarily, morally, and health wise, for the 
free, independent, iconic soldier-smoker? This dilemma would come to dominate the soldier-
cigarette discourse for the second half of the twentieth century.   
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CHAPTER VI 
THE SOLDIER, THE CIGARETTE, AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 
The Military, Transition, and the AVF  
Monday, June 30, 1973: the end of an era, in more ways than one. On that day, Dwight 
Elliot Stone became the last man drafted in America. Stone, a twenty-four-year-old plumber’s 
apprentice from Sacramento, California, spent years trying to avoid the draft. He was first 
drafted in 1969, but avoided service because of complications from a car wreck. Drafted again in 
1970, he tried unsuccessfully to acquire a student deferment. He avoided the local draft officer 
for two more years but was eventually indicted for draft evasion. When his name came up again 
in late 1972, he decided to stop avoiding his obligation and took steps to join the service. Stone 
was delayed for several months while his previous evasion charge was cleared. He eventually 
entered the Armed Forces Induction Station in Oakland, California, at two o’clock in the 
afternoon on June 30, 1973, raised his right hand, and “took the ritual step forward to signify his 
induction” as the newest member of the United States Army.1  
 Three decades before Dwight Elliot Stone was forced to enter the service, a young lawyer 
left his lucrative position in a Florida law firm, where he had been a partner since 1934, and 
volunteered for duty as a line private in WWII. The young lawyer was Charles E. Bennett, and 
he served as a combat infantryman fighting in the jungles of the Philippines and New Guinea. He 
earned the Bronze and Silver Stars in recognition of his valorous service. He also contracted 
polio during his time fighting in the Asian jungles, a disease leaving him crippled for the rest of 
his life. Undaunted by his physical limitation, he won election as a Florida Democrat to the US 
House of Representatives in 1949 and retained his seat for twenty-one straight election 
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campaigns. He was known by his colleagues as “Mr. Clean” for his staunch adherence to ethical 
standards. He was a prolific legislator, introducing legislation that added In God We Trust to 
American currency in 1955 and installed the first Code of Ethics for Government Service in 
1958. House records reveal he never missed a Congressional roll call. He was a firm fiscal 
conservative and refused to take Congressional pay raises. He insisted on returning his veteran’s 
disability pension and Social Security payments to the United States Treasury, exercising 
personal responsibility for what he viewed as the nation’s most disturbing liability: the national 
debt.2  
With this spirit of fiscal and moral responsibility in mind, Congressman Bennett quietly 
began questioning the decades old practice of providing at government expense free cigarettes to 
soldiers as part of their daily field rations. He was motivated to action after a conversation with 
his legislative assistant Roger Hilkert in early March 1973. Hilkert told Bennett of an encounter 
with Warrant Officer Kent Miller at the offices of the 1/380th Infantry Battalion at the 
Washington, DC, National Guard Armory. Miller was a “heavy, heavy smoker,” and was in the 
midst of a coughing spell when Hilkert commented that Miller “wouldn’t have gotten that cough 
if there hadn’t been cigarettes in the Individual Combat Rations served in the field.” Hilkert’s 
remark to Miller was just a passing comment, but later Hilkert gave the conversation more 
thought. He did some checking and came to the conclusion that “it [was] obvious that the 
taxpayer was being taken for a ride in two directions at once.” The two different rides refer to the 
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taxpayers’ requirement to pay for soldiers’ rationed cigarettes in addition to paying for the 
health-related expenses associated with smoking.3 
Hilkert subsequently discussed this issue with Congressman Bennett and pressed him to 
take action, but cautioned him regarding the “political aspects of the decision.”4 Based on the 
events of the next thirty years, there is little doubt about the nature and veracity of the “political 
aspects” Hilkert brought to Bennett’s attention. A seasoned congressional liaison, Hilkert was 
referencing the opposition Bennett could expect from tobacco state politicians and the cigarette 
industry lobby if he decided to attack the cigarette ration. Despite these cautionary warnings, 
Bennett, with little if any fanfare, issued a letter to the DoD on March 6, 1973, requesting 
information regarding why “C, K, and combat rations included free cigarettes.” As a former 
infantry soldier and smoker, Bennett had firsthand experience with the relationship between the 
soldier and the cigarette. Bennett argued a young man’s only justifiable reason for obtaining 
cigarettes in the field was if he was addicted to the use of tobacco. However even considering 
nicotine addiction, Bennett reasoned that the nation was no longer at war, and soldiers had ample 
opportunity to buy cigarettes out of their own pockets due to advances in modern battlefield 
logistics and the close proximity of supply points. Therefore, there was no reason for the 
taxpayer, through the federal government, to continue providing “free cigarettes” to soldiers.5  
Interestingly, Bennett’s chief concern in this initial inquiry expressed his desire to “know 
what the cost of these [government rationed] cigarettes may be” to the taxpayer, rather than the 
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detrimental effects cigarette smoking had on soldiers’ health and combat readiness.6 As a 
member of Congress, and in accordance with the US Constitution, Bennett’s job was to exercise 
oversight of the federal purse.7 As a public servant, his primary concern with health policy was 
grounded in his duty to monitor the expenditure of public funds. However, in addition to 
Bennett’s primary fiscal justification for removing cigarettes from field rations, Bennett, like 
Lucy Paige Gaston and the Progressives of the early twentieth century, added a moral 
justification.  
Lucy Paige Gaston was the cigarette industry’s chief opponent before WWI and 
established the anti-cigarette league of America in 1899. Her organization swelled to 300,000 
members during the years prior to the Great War. She argued cigarettes were hazardous to 
health, particularly threatening to the young, and were a springboard to other social ills such as 
gambling, alcoholism, prostitution, and crime. Her movement was ultimately unsuccessful as 
Progressives lost interest when the Volstead Act was passed (Prohibition). Adding to the demise 
of the movement was the popularity of the cigarette among the soldiers in WWI, a popularity 
that followed them home and influenced American smoking culture.8 By 1973, Gaston’s 
progressive anti-cigarette torch, once bright, was now barely visible. However, Bennett picked 
up where Gaston left off with his assertion that the cigarette ration was a moral contradiction. He 
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argued it was objectionable to force the “taxpayer to pay for free distribution to soldiers of 
something which the Surgeon General has found to be injurious to human health.”9 
The end of the cigarette ration came rather quickly. On March 21, 1973, the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Major General George J. Hays, responded to Bennett’s 
inquiry and confirmed the DoD does indeed still carry the requirement to buy cigarettes for 
soldiers. He justified the continuation of this policy, describing it as a program designed to “ease 
the logistics burden” on the Army. This rationing program ensured that small packages of 
cigarettes were supplied in each individual ration with no concern as to whether the soldier 
smoked or not. Additionally General Hays included the cost figure of 2 ½ cents per cigarette.10 
Not satisfied with this response from the military, Bennett contacted the Surgeon General’s 
office and “pitted [the SG] in the debate against DoD.”11  
On April 30, 1973, acting Surgeon General S. Paul Ehrlich responded to Congressman 
Bennett’s request, stating he “share[d] your concern about routine indiscriminate distribution of 
cigarettes” to soldiers. He agreed with Bennett’s assertion that providing free cigarettes to 
soldiers was irresponsible, stating the “evidence of the serious health consequences of smoking 
continues to accumulate.” Where Bennett was most concerned with the cost, Ehrlich was most 
concerned with “distribution of cigarettes to non-smokers,” stating the current policy was 
“certainly undesirable.” Like a true and seasoned bureaucrat, Ehrlich recommended further study 
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of the DoD’s cigarette rationing policy. He urged the DoD to weigh any rationing policy against 
the “costs of making it easy for non-smokers to begin to develop the habit.”12  
Bennett forwarded his March 6 memo, along with General Hays’s and Surgeon General 
Ehrlich’s response to Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson on May 2, 1973 and requested 
Richardson to provide his “thoughts on the matter.”13 On May 17, 1973, the Secretary of 
Defense’s office took action in response to Congressmen Bennett’s inquiry. Assistant Secretary 
of Defense Paul H. Riley informed Bennett he did “agree that it is time the Department of 
Defense finds a better way to distribute cigarettes to smokers.” Further, he indicated he had 
asked each of the armed services to comment on his plan to remove cigarettes from combat meal 
rations.  
In a memo dated the same day to each of the armed services, Riley laid out his case for 
removing the cigarettes. First, he addressed the reason for the congressional inquiry, stating the 
cost of the cigarette rationing program, estimated at $682,000 for Fiscal Year 1973, was no 
longer an acceptable expense. Addressing the health issue second, along with the Surgeon 
General’s concerns regarding nonsmokers, Riley stated that “with our present national effort to 
reduce smoking, it is inappropriate for DoD even to appear to be in the position of encouraging 
smoking by the indiscriminate distribution of cigarettes to nonsmokers.”14 This statement 
regarding nonsmokers, along with Ehrlich’s previous statement, placed substantial weight behind 
the argument that the Army, through its nearly 50 year program of supplying cigarettes to non-
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smoking soldiers, had, without knowing, created a vast number of smokers for the cigarette 
industry. 
Riley received no substantial objections from the services, and on June 6, 1973, he 
informed Congressman Bennett “the requirement for cigarettes [was] deleted from the 
specification and from the procurement” of combat rations.15 With that, the nature of the 
relationship between the soldier and the cigarette took a sharp turn. The military’s policy of 
supplying free, rationed cigarettes to soldiers, established 55 years earlier by General Peyton 
March during WWI, came to an end.  
In a press release dated June 6, 1973, Congressman Bennett announced the demise of the 
rationed cigarette program, permanently altering the relationship between the soldier and the 
cigarette. Bennett repeated his reasoning that an end of combat operations in Vietnam and 
soldiers’ more than adequate access to cheap cigarettes in their post exchanges signaled the end 
of the government’s requirement to provide cigarettes. Bennett insisted it was time to stop 
forcing taxpayers to subsidize cigarettes for soldiers, a requirement that had cost them millions 
of dollars over the decades since they were first saddled with this fiscal responsibility in WWI.16 
The removal of the cigarette ration was largely a quiet affair achieved through a running 
conversation between Bennett and mid-level DoD officials. It was never raised as an issue on the 
floor of Congress and never put to a debate. In the future, Congressmen seeking to unhinge or 
limit the long standing soldier-cigarette relationship even further would find themselves blocked 
at every turn by a powerful cigarette enterprise determined to prolong the soldier-cigarette bond.   
AVF Sticker Shock 
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Post-war defense cuts and the enormous personnel costs associated with plans to replace 
draftees with long-service professionals ensured close scrutiny of all military budgets. Many 
sought to rein in the profligate spending long the norm during a decade of war. Bennett was a 
seasoned legislative veteran and ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee and 
was painfully aware of the budget battles looming on the horizon. One of the major reasons why 
Congress had voted to continue the draft year after year was because it was relatively 
inexpensive. In The Draft, historian George Flynn argues that the draft was advertised as a low-
cost alternative to a large, garrisoned, long-service professional Army because it “simply taxed 
young men a service time in exchange for the security that had been bought by earlier 
generations of males.”17 As America wrestled with ending the draft and replacing it with a 
system structured around an AVF, there were grave fiscal concerns.18 Bennett was able to 
address some of the fiscal concerns associated with this transition by removing the cigarette 
ration. Yet the savings this generated were a mere pittance compared to the enormous cost of 
fielding a volunteer force—an endeavor that turned out to require the “outlay of bewildering 
sums of money.”19 
When Dwight Elliot Stone reported for training at Fort Polk, Louisiana, in July 1973, he 
entered a military establishment in transition. The removal of cigarettes from combat rations was 
just one of many drastic changes the military faced over the next decade. Principal among these 
changes was the implementation of the AVF. In 1969, America took its first earnest steps toward 
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an AVF. President Richard Nixon appointed Thomas Gates to chair a commission to study the 
prospects for ending the draft, as well as the feasibility of a volunteer force. Gates was the 
former Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration and was intimately familiar with 
the draft as well as calls to end it.  
Two driving factors were behind Nixon’s AVF push: politics and class considerations. 
Nixon had made a campaign pledge to end the draft, and with the next presidential election just 
around the corner, he had to take action.20 At the height of the Vietnam War, many Americans 
were increasingly disturbed by the perceived class inequities of the draft system. The deferment 
criterion had become large and unwieldy, exempting nearly everyone except for working class 
poor and minorities who could not afford to go to college, had no inside connections with state 
National Guard units, or could not afford to fund an extended trip to Canada even if they wanted 
to dodge the draft.21  
In short, the draft was “an unfair tax on young men which could no longer be rationalized 
on military, political, or economic grounds.”22 Charles Moskos, the leading scholar and 
sociologist of the AVF and the American enlisted force, provides the most concise assessment 
that combines both the political and class features of Nixon’s AVF policy. He argues that 
America’s move to the AVF was not grounded in military grand strategy “aimed at improving 
the nation’s future capabilities vis-à-vis the Soviet Union or its clients. Essentially, the decision 
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was political: Washington’s response to growing middle-class reaction to Selective Service and 
the past burdens of war itself.”23  
After years of debate, President Nixon determined to end the draft, effective the first day 
of July 1973. However Nixon’s decision was not a slam dunk. There were many who doubted 
the move to a volunteer force, and their chief concern was expense. An entire chorus of 
government officials argued that a volunteer force was prohibitively expensive. As early as 1966, 
Thomas D. Morris, Democrat from New Mexico, argued in Congress it would take an additional 
$17 billion and a 280 percent increase in military pay in order to compete with the civilian labor 
market and transition to an AVF.24 Other officials began denouncing the entire philosophy 
behind an AVF driven by free market economics and vague funding strategies.  
The editor of Army Magazine, L. James Bender, led this vocal opposition to the AVF 
philosophy, saying it “translated military service into a marketable commodity” and that 
assumptions regarding young Americans’ eagerness to enlist in an incentive-ridden, cash-happy 
AVF were “hogwash.”25 In 1967, the House Armed Services Committee’s Civilian Advisory 
Panel on Military Manpower Procurement advised that an AVF was “exorbitantly expensive” 
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and generated fears the defense of the nation would be left up to “mercenaries.”26 The Gates 
Commission actively worked to refute these claims regarding the tremendous expense of a 
volunteer force. The Commission instead argued a modest increase of $4 billion in defense 
appropriations was sufficient.27 They were wildly inaccurate with their predictions.  
The Commission derived its cost projection figures from economist Milton Friedman. 
Friedman argued the military could meet recruiting quotas by utilizing “traditional market 
incentives,” an argument that made him the antithesis to popular New Deal economist John 
Maynard Keynes. Keynesian economics ascribes to the hypothesis that free markets are not 
structured to provide full employment, and large-scale government intervention in the economy 
is required in modern economies. Keynesian thought prevailed after the Great Depression, when 
the precedent for large scale and sustained economic intervention by the federal government was 
established and then normalized in the decades since.  
As time passed, a reformative correction to Keynesian theory was inevitable as well as a 
call to return to classic laissez-faire economics. A proponent of Adam Smith’s free market, 
Friedman wanted to use a combination of market forces, economic incentives, and young 
Americans’ innate sense of patriotism to underpin a volunteer force. Between 1950 and 1980, 
when America was in the midst of an intense debate over the Draft and funding a volunteer 
force, Friedman was the leading economist calling for a return to classic free market economics, 
advocating for a “broad . . . rollback of Keynesian heresy.”28 However, Friedman was not 
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immune from criticism. His market-driven recruitment scheme drew fire from many 
traditionalists, like Charles Moskos, who were suspicious of Friedman’s business case:  
The difficulties of the all-volunteer force do not originate in the death of conscription or in the efforts of 
service recruiters. The crucial flaw has been an informal redefinition since 1971 by Congress (informed by 
Friedman’s theories) . . . of military service as a function of “supply and demand variables” as a “job” to be 
filled through “market incentive” . . . in the final analysis, reliance on the market system is not the way to 
recruit or sustain an all-volunteer force, nor is it the way to strengthen the armed services for increasingly 
complex and demanding tasks on behalf of the larger society.29 
 
Regardless of such critiques in terms of both theory and expense, Freidman’s market 
driven concepts were the guiding light for AVF policy during this period. The central tenet in 
Freidman’s economic policy involved “what he considered the uselessness and 
counterproductive nature of most government regulation.” Freidman was a firm believer that the 
military-industrial complex could run by itself, generating recruits without massive government 
intervention or subsidy. He insisted that if “a money tax rather than a physical tax (conscription) 
was spread throughout the population, enough money was available to raise military pay to a 
level competitive with the private sector.” With conflicting data represented in a myriad of 
government studies about America’s ability to “buy an alternative to the draft,” it was left to 
Congress to wade through the figures and determine the best course of action.30 In many ways, 
Congress’ decision, regardless of the recommendation of the Gates Commission, was determined 
before the commission even convened—America, led by President Nixon, was moving to an 
AVF no matter what, even if it “bankrupt[ed] the country.”31 
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The Gates Commission’s final report was heavily influenced by Freidman’s economic 
theories, projecting a relatively meager $2.7 billion a year in additional appropriations.32 This 
estimate is incredible considering the mounting evidence of an enormously expensive AVF. As 
many predicted, the report was overly optimistic on many levels, and expenses began 
accumulating. Over three decades, the Army had grown used to a steady stream of draftees 
filling the ranks; the military enterprise had a seemingly limitless supply of soldiers. Moreover, 
drafted soldiers were easy to train and easy to replace.33 Now the Army had to attract recruits in 
a post-Vietnam America that harbored negative perceptions about military service. A soldiering 
career was often looked down upon, and more extreme elements of American society even 
considered such employment criminal.  
The repeal of the draft turned the Army’s recruiting operations into a sales pitch fraught 
with expenses and newfound challenges.  To meet these challenges, a wave of newly minted 
Army recruiters armed with bonuses and benefits waded into a hostile environment in an all-out 
effort to fill the ranks of the new AVF.34 Some worried about the future of an Army marketed as 
a job choice as opposed to a noble act of service. According to historian David R. Segal, the 
repeal “dealt a mortal wound to the principle of obligation by explicitly identifying financial 
inducements as the major incentive for voluntarism.”35 Americans paid a hefty price to recruit 
and retain its service personnel after 1973, and the Army had to rely on expensive monetary 
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inducements, bonuses, expanded benefits packages, and costly advertising campaigns to meet 
yearly quotas throughout the 1970s.  
This resulted in exponential increases to recruiting budgets, a line item the Army was 
forced to increase by 600 percent during the 1970s.36 Despite spending billions to recruit quality 
volunteers and assumptions by the Gates Commission that longer term enlistments would save 
money, it did not work as predicted. Partly due to demographics, societal reaction to the Vietnam 
debacle, and the period’s teen culture, all beyond the scope of this study, the military found it 
very difficult to attract and retain quality recruits. Compared to pre-Vietnam figures, the 
desertion rate doubled during the first decade of the AVF. During the draft, roughly 20 percent of 
all draftees failed to complete their first year. By the late 1970s, that number had doubled. An 
astounding 600,000 were discharged for misconduct or other various reasons, and over 20 
percent of the force admitted to using drugs at least once a month. The Army reported that 
16,000 soldiers were admitted to alcohol abuse programs in 1979, and another 24,000 in 1980.  
During the same time period, the number of Army soldiers incarcerated increased by 47 
percent.37 The Army also had to spend large sums of money and time on remedial courses to 
bring vast portions of the AVF recruits up to speed: nearly 25 percent of all Army recruits in 
1977 read at or below the sixth grade level.38 Though the long term healthcare savings derived 
from smoking cessation would eventually become substantial, in 1979 the million dollars 
Bennett saved by removing cigarettes from soldiers’ rations seemed a trivial sum when 
compared to the multi-billion dollar price tag of recruiting and retaining the new AVF. And 
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recruiting and retention expenses were just beginning to amass. By the end of the decade, a 
whole portfolio of additional expenses emerged and continued to grow. 
From 1967 to 1975, military pay was increased by 87 percent, with the bulk of the 
increase occurring when the draft ended in 1973. Military pay expressed as a percentage of total 
defense spending rose from 34 percent in 1964 to 40 percent in 1973. By 1974, the military was 
spending 56 percent of its budget on manpower costs alone. In the Army, for example, 
manpower costs had increased by 30 percent, despite the size of the force decreasing by 37 
percent during the same period. In 1978, the Carter Administration added another 11.7 percent 
pay raise to shore up a string of recruiting shortages. Reagan added 11.1 percent in 1981 and 14.3 
percent in 1982. These “catch-up raises” were effective (military pay was raised by roughly one-
third) but again, were expensive.39 Cortright, a scholar and critic of US defense policy, argues 
that the AVF “created an unprecedented crisis in the defense budget and . . . contributed to 
severe manpower difficulties . . . fail[ing] to attract a sufficient volume of recruits to maintain 
force strengths.”40  
The AVF also brought a relatively new conundrum appropriators had to face: In buying 
an AVF, the government bought not only the soldier, but his or her dependents as well. The 
drafted force was an overwhelmingly single force. During the draft era, social and cultural 
patterns dictated that young men completed their obligation of military service and then returned 
home to settle down, start a family, and pursue a life in the civilian sector. Though the draft 
affected many areas of American social life, to include “the caliber of major league baseball . . . 
the survival of liberal arts colleges [and] the rate of procreation of American males,” the 
institution of marriage and family were largely left untouched by the draft boards. Due to a 
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deferment system reflecting America’s social and cultural values, single men were called first, 
and husbands and fathers were given a pass. It was felt that in the “American patriarchal home,” 
married men were the “bedrock of the Republic” providing “moral leadership and protection.”41  
Friedman had argued a volunteer force would rid the nation once and for all of the class 
distinctions and deferment controversies inherent in an armed force that exempted husbands, 
fathers, students, and preachers from duty obligations. He posited the draft and associated 
deferment inequities were “un-American and wasteful” as they “jam colleges, raise the birth rate 
and fuel the divorce courts.”42 He was sure the AVF would attract quality recruits and give lower 
classes a chance for social uplift, an assumption that proved correct over time. However, this 
quality volunteer force emerged as an overwhelmingly married force with expensive healthcare 
needs, which was yet another expense associated with the AVF. 
Gates and Freidman considered a quality recruit as someone looking for a “career” and 
envisioned a new Army comprised of long-term professionals.43 However career men were 
married men that came with a hefty bill in the form of dependents and long-term health care 
liabilities. These cost factors were not significant in the drafted force, as it was largely comprised 
of short-service, single males. From a rate of near zero during WWII, the marriage rate had 
increased to 33 percent in 1953. The numbers steadily increased throughout the transition to the 
AVF, and by the late 1970s, 60 percent of all military members were married and had families.44  
With the shift from a drafted to a volunteer force, as with any major policy change of this 
magnitude, these unanticipated second- and third-order effects were sure to materialize. However 
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the drastic increase in dependents was a substantial development with manifold policy 
implications. Moskos comments, “One unanticipated consequence of the shift to an all-volunteer 
force—and higher pay—has been a marked increase in marriage among the junior enlisted 
ranks.”45 These married AVF soldiers came with dependents, or quickly produced dependents 
while in the service, and dependents required care at the government’s expense. By 1979, the 
Army had to account for the evacuation of 160,000 wives and children in case of a Soviet attack 
in West Germany. Moskos cites personal experience in his comment that the orderly room 
“babysitter” was a common sight throughout his tours of Army units in Germany during this 
period.46 The costs associated with dependent care, especially as it relates to the healthcare of a 
cigarette smoking AVF, became an increasingly expensive endeavor in the future. This issue is 
discussed in greater detail in the following chapters.  
In addition to these possibly more obvious expenses associated with fielding a 
professional volunteer Army, there were also the not-so-obvious. One rather substantial example 
is the proliferation of civilian contractors in the post-draft Army. Since professional soldiers 
were no longer required to do the menial work associated with service in the drafted force, the 
Army had to add expanded contracting services to its budget requirement. Soldier-led kitchen 
patrol, latrine duty, and grounds maintenance tasks were a thing of the past. The pickle suit 
potato peeler was replaced with a kitchen services technician; the latrine private was swapped 
for the sanitary engineer. Professional soldiers who volunteered for service, the rationale went, 
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needed to spend time in more efficient ways by training to do their jobs and learning how to 
operate the new, expensive weapons of war—not peeling potatoes or scrubbing toilet bowls.47 
As a result of all these additional expenses, elected officials experienced sticker shock. 
Congressmen weary of the AVF’s price tag talked openly about “unacceptable cuts in the 
Defense program” to fund the AVF. They feared the AVF was impossible without “causing a big 
deficit or higher taxes.” In short, they argued the Gates Commission had “seriously 
miscalculated” the cost of the AVF.48 And they were right. In 1978, the Government Accounting 
Office (GAO) reported the AVF cost the government $18 billion more than a drafted force of the 
same size would have cost.49  
When combined, the issues of pay, bonuses, incentive money, dependent obligations, 
recruiting budgets, contractors, advertising expenses, desertion wastage, and a myriad of other 
expenses created formidable challenges for appropriators tasked with funding America’s military 
enterprise.50 Yet astonishingly, despite the billions of dollars they carved out to fund the force, 
the Army was still missing recruiting goals. An Army recruiter in Massachusetts offered a 
$1,500 bonus for each enlistment contract. Even with the local paper misprinting the 
advertisement as a $15,000 bonus, not a single recruit darkened the door.51 In 1974, the Army 
                                                          
47
 Bailey, America’s Army, 57,62. 
 
48
 Flynn, The Draft, 270. 
 
49
 Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam, 69. 
 
50
 Moskos, “The All-Volunteer Force,” 138. Moskos comments that “post-entry disillusionment relates 
directly to the extremely high rate of attritions (wastage) in the all-volunteer force. Since 1973, more than one in 
three recruits have failed to complete their initial enlistments: they were discharged for disciplinary reasons, 
personality disorders, or job inaptitude.” Further, “the desertion rate in the all-volunteer force is twice as high as that 
in the pre-Vietnam period—17.8 [percent] per thousand enlisted personnel in 1977 compared to 7.9 percent in 1964. 
What makes the current desertion figures especially troublesome, of course, is that they occur on top of the high 
attrition rates.” 
 
51
 Flynn, The Draft, 271. 
 
162 
 
 
was short again despite spending an additional $68 million, a price tag that produced only 63 
percent of their recruiting goal.52 Even more shocking, despite the billions spent during the 1970s 
on the AVF, in 1979 Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer dropped a bombshell when 
he informed Congress that the force it had bought was not the professional, quality force 
Congressmen thought they were getting—to the contrary, it was a “hollow” force.53 
In Prodigal Soldiers, a book describing the difficulties of the post-Vietnam military, 
author James Kitfield offers a telling account of Army Chief of Staff’s admission to the Armed 
Service Committee that the Army was a broken force. General Meyer described how the Army 
could not meet its mission requirement to have ten reinforcing divisions deployed to Europe 
within fourteen days. He told the President that the Army could barely muster four divisions to 
support this requirement. Meyer also informed the President of failures to successfully 
incorporate the Reserves and National Guard into the active Army (Total Force concept), the 
chronic drug and alcohol problems in the Army, as well as the low numbers of high school 
graduates entering the force. Kitfield describes the dramatic close to General Myers’s testimony. 
“Mr. President,” Meyer summarized after glancing in the direction of Secretary of Defense 
Harold Brown, “what we have is a hollow Army.”54 The bloated military budgets associated with 
the hollow force of the early-to-mid 1970s were unique in American history because, “for the 
first time military spending increased at the conclusion of a major war.”55 This was an 
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unparalleled occurrence that bewildered many; the AVF, as opposed to Gates’ modest 
predictions, was an “immensely expensive proposition” with mounting costs.56 And one must not 
forget that as America was coming to grips with the proposition of buying an AVF, it was still 
footing the bill for the Republic of Vietnam’s Army to the tune of a billion dollars between 1971 
and 1972.57 As the costs associated with a professional volunteer force tasked to police the world 
and contain Communism spiraled out of control, Congress took notice. Many showed signs of 
buyer’s remorse and regretted purchasing an expensive Army where only 64 percent of its 
recruits made it through their initial enlistment.58 In 1979, Senator Sam Nunn summed it up best 
when he commented that the AVF was “a luxury the United States could no longer afford.”59 
Despite the talk of a professional force recruited from the best and brightest and paid “luxury” 
wages commiserate with civilian professionals, the Army was in near-crisis mode. As the Army 
started to comprehend the cost of recruiting the AVF and the short-term costs of meeting its 
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manpower goals, it also began to consider the long-term cost of the AVF. Many of these soldiers 
volunteered under the assumption, and indeed were encouraged, to make the military their 
profession and stay around for retirement. Unlike the drafted force, who did their hitch and then 
returned home to start families and take civilian jobs, the new Army was made up of career men. 
When the country transitioned from the draft to the AVF, the government bought, and now 
owned, several million young men and women, along with their families, their hopes, and their 
futures. Similar to real estate, extensive costs are associated with ownership, and America’s 
experience with the AVF proved that notion. As contentious as the AVF expenses were, 
ownership of a smoking AVF, along with the nature of the health care promise made to late 
draft-era and AVF soldiers, the majority of whom were smokers, was even more controversial. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SOLDIER STARTERS 
Can the Industry Afford Losing “Starters”?  
 Congress’s concerns about the costs associated with an AVF grew and soon 
included anxiety over the specter of a smoking, then retiring AVF; in North Carolina and 
other key tobacco states, the cigarette industry faced a related crisis. If the AVF was a 
luxury the nation could not afford, failing to recruit a steady stream of smoking starters, 
many of whom traditionally resided in the ranks of the Army, was a situation the cigarette 
industry could not afford. As a result of the 1964 Surgeon General’s Warning and 
subsequent efforts by the FTC to place warnings on cigarette packages, the industry was 
aware its acceptability margin was beginning to slip once again. The data was in: 1970 
saw the first ever drop reported in total manufactured cigarettes smoked by Americans.1  
Adding to the burgeoning crisis, while Congress was debating the merits versus 
the mounting cost of an AVF, Congressman Bennett had slipped in measures to remove 
the cigarette from soldier rations. Industry executives were concerned the cigarette 
enterprise was locked in an uphill battle against negative public opinion over the 
scientific data connecting cigarettes to various health hazards and diseases. If measures 
were not taken soon, movement up that hill would stall, and like an airplane that runs out 
of airspeed and altitude at the exact same moment, the industry would crash and burn. 
Four industry and advertising executives, or the firms they founded, played a key role in 
efforts to stabilize the cigarette industry’s position in America during this period: Burns 
Roper, Ted Bates, Fred Panzer, and Horace Kornegay.  
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Burns Roper was a decorated WWII veteran who piloted B-17 bomber aircraft 
over Germany during the Combined Bomber Offensive, racking up a total of thirty-five 
combat missions.2 After a particularly dangerous mission, he received an air medal for 
landing his heavily damaged aircraft operating on just one engine, back at his home base 
in England. After leaving the service, he returned home to Massachusetts and joined his 
father’s marketing research firm. The Roper Marketing Research Agency established an 
extensive affiliation with the cigarette industry. It conducted a total of eight separate 
survey-based studies over a thirty-year period to help the industry understand Americans’ 
smoking behaviors, lifestyle choices, and perceptions regarding smoking-related health 
hazards.3 The industry depended on marketing research from agencies like Roper & 
Associates to inform its long-term strategic assessments on which millions of dollars in 
advertising expenditures, as well as billions in profits, relied. 
Ted Bates was also an influential cigarette industry advertiser and is a member of 
the Advertising Hall of Fame. After graduating from Yale in 1924, Bates worked in the 
banking industry before forming his own ad agency in 1940. With initial clients like 
Colgate-Palmolive and Continental Baking, Bates was a leader in advertising innovation 
during the 1940s and 1950s. One of his groundbreaking advertising concepts involved 
development of a Unique Selling Position (USP) for each of the product brands the firm 
represented. A USP is used to identify a “unique feature of each product and connect it in 
the minds of consumers with the brand name.” When Ted Bates & Co., contracted with 
the cigarette industry to provide marketing research and advertising guidance, his firm 
                                                          
2
 Burns Roper Biographical Information, accessed November 1, 2013, 
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/center/bud_bio.html. 
  
3
 Proctor, Golden Holocaust, 313. 
167 
 
 
supplied a USP-based marketing plan to help the industry attract teens to smoking. This 
plan became a central piece in one of the industry’s most controversial and litigious 
marketing strategies.4  
Fred Panzer was the vice president of the Tobacco Institute from 1972–1980. 
Panzer played an important role in steering the cigarette industry through a time of 
increased pressure from anti-smoking groups both in government and the private sector. 
Characterized as eager, “highly intelligent,” and possibly a bit “insecure,” Panzer started 
out as a staff writer preparing tobacco histories in booklet form for each state that grew 
the golden leaves.5 These booklets stressed the historical importance of tobacco in 
America, as well as tobacco’s impact on the American economy. Both of these were key 
talking points for the tobacco industry and tobacco state politicians throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, and Panzer was at the center of this public relations strategy. Panzer soon 
expressed interest in legislative work and was promoted to liaison. In this capacity, he 
continued as a staunch promoter of tobacco interests on the floor of Congress. A bright 
and savvy power broker, Panzer was elevated to vice president of the Tobacco Institute in 
1972 and become one of the tobacco industry’s chief lobbyists. To the delight of many 
trial lawyers, Panzer also authored some of the industry’s most damning documents 
linking confidential and controversial industry marketing strategies to a wide cigarette 
industry audience.  
                                                          
4
 Tina Gant, “History of Bates Worldwide,” International Directory of Company Histories 
(Detroit, Michigan: St. James Press, 2000), vol. 33, accessed November 22, 2013, 
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/bates-worldwide-inc-history/. 
 
5
 “Deposition of Horace Kornegay,” Norma R. Broin v. Phillip Morris Companies, Inc., 91-49738 
CA (22), (11th Cir., 1994), accessed January 27, 2015, http://www.legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ckz75a00. In 
a deposition taken in Greensboro, North Carolina, by lawyers representing Norma R. Broin, Kornegay 
attempts to distance himself from Panzer and the Roper Memo in order to limit his personal liability for 
participating in the highly litigious marketing program outlined in the Roper Memo.  
168 
 
 
Finally, Horace Kornegay was also heavily involved in the tobacco lobby and was 
the colorful and engaging president of the Tobacco Institute from 1970 to 1981, and the 
Chairman from 1981 to 1987. He interrupted his law school education at Wake Forest in 
1942 to enlist in the Army, served as a machine gunner in France, and was awarded the 
Purple Heart. He was elected as a North Carolina Democrat to Congress in 1961, and 
represented his district’s tobacco farmers for four consecutive terms. After leaving 
Congress, he joined the Tobacco Institute as legal counsel in 1969 and became president 
of that organization in 1970.6 Kornegay was an ardent supporter of tobacco farmers and 
used his contacts in Congress to ensure the cigarette industry was well represented in the 
halls of government during his tenure as president of the institute.  
The controversial plans and strategies these advertising and cigarette industry 
executives developed to address public perception issues and the starter crises were 
grounded in extensive market research and expert observations by industry insiders. Their 
ideas, research, and marketing strategies eventually made their way into fundamental 
cigarette industry documents. These documents were part of an enterprise-wide strategy 
to orient marketing efforts on the three things the cigarette industry must create if it was 
to survive the crisis: notions of smokers’ rights, doubt, and new starters. 
Smokers’ Rights and Doubt 
For years, industry advertising had focused on the pleasure, and even the health 
benefits derived from smoking cigarettes. In the 1930s, government-funded researchers 
began to dismantle these myths with early experiments showing inhaled smoke and 
cigarette tar caused cancer in and on mice and rabbits. During this period, Adolph Hitler 
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was actually a leading proponent of cigarette research owing to his interest in propagating 
a healthy master race. Smoking in Nazi Germany, at least according to Hitler and his 
sycophants, was “a violation of National Socialist ethics . . . one’s ‘duty [was] to be 
healthy’ and to serve the nation and its Fuhrer.”7 In America, the Medical College of 
Virginia was an early leader in tobacco experimentation but acted largely as an organ for 
the tobacco industry. Proctor comments their collaboration with the industry was “so 
deep, and so all-encompassing, that it is sometimes hard even to find a clear line dividing 
the work of the college from the business of defending cigarettes.”8 
However, the landmark year for definitive scientific data that linked cigarette 
smoking with lung cancer was 1950, the year Ernst Wynder concluded research that 
made the lethal connection. Wynder’s research was published in the Journal of American 
Medicine, and once his research was socialized among the public health, medical, and 
scientific communities, it led to a reassessment of the relationship between cigarette 
smoke and disease. As a result, a host of agencies, including the American Cancer 
Society, the British Medical Research Council, the American Heart Association, and a 
litany of leading medical schools, all came to understand and support the conclusions of 
Wynder’s groundbreaking study—smoking is deadly.9  
The industry was no longer able to simply look the other way or quietly deflect 
attention away from harmful scientific evidence. Their initial response to these reports 
was to dig in and deny. Moreover, to present a façade of concern and customer 
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stewardship, the industry encouraged objective scientific inquiry into environmental 
hazards that could plausibly cause the problems scientists were now connecting to 
smoking. Accordingly, in a bold move to gain control of the conversation, the industry 
contracted with public relations firm Hill & Knowlton (H&K) to fight back. In what 
Robert Proctor describes as the “magna carta of the American [cigarette] industry’s 
conspiracy to deny any evidence of tobacco harms” and the “most widely publicized—
and expensive—advertisement . . . in human history,” the cigarette enterprise began its 
earnest campaign to foment doubt and spread the discourse of personal choice.10  
The “Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers” appeared in 448 major newspapers 
on January 4, 1954, and “sought to establish the industry as reliable, responsible, and 
fully committed to the public’s interest . . . reassure[ing] smokers by promising them that 
the industry was absolutely committed to their good health.”11 The Frank Statement 
strategy was guided by the industry’s new research arm and mouthpiece—the Tobacco 
Industry Research Council (TIRC).12 Though the TIRC was initially seen by the industry 
as a temporary measure, by 1958 it was apparent the enterprise was in for what would 
become a sustained effort to monitor and control cigarette messaging, research, and 
negative press. The enterprise soon discovered the TIRC was not sufficient to manage 
both the scientific research and public relations aspects of this now long-term, industry-
wide campaign.  
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This revelation resulted in the formation of the Tobacco Institute in 1958. The 
Institute assumed the industry’s public relations and lobbying functions, and the TIRC 
was reformed as the Council for Tobacco Research (CTR).13 The CTR, now under the 
umbrella of the Tobacco Institute, continued the TIRC’s core mission to provide funding 
for scientific research.14 The TIRC, and then the Tobacco Institute, was relatively 
successful in overcoming the initial flurry of negative anti-smoking press. Throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, one out of two Americans chose to continue smoking cigarettes. 
Despite the data arrayed against it, these statistics tell the story of an enterprise that 
mastered the narrative and dodged negative press unfriendly to the cigarette agenda.15 
However, in the wake of the 1964 Surgeon General’s Report warning Americans about 
the dangers of cigarette smoking, the enterprise swung into action. By the late 60s, they 
were once again in a fight to control negative press and stave off efforts by the FTC to 
regulate the industry.  
In a memo between highly placed executives within cigarette firm Brown & 
Williamson (B&W) dated August 21, 1969, the industry acknowledged its continued 
commitment to a doubt strategy. Generated in the aftermath of renewed negative 
perceptions about cigarettes, smoking, and the industry, the memo relayed the bleak 
reality:  
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Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with the body of fact that exists in the 
mind of the general public. It is also the means of establishing that there is a controversy. If we, 
B&W, are successful in establishing a controversy at the public level, then there is an opportunity 
to put across the real facts about smoking.16 
 
This basic doubt scheme was integral to the Tobacco Institute’s core mission and 
by 1970, some cigarette industry executives began to feel the institute, especially its 
research arm, needed extra prodding to focus efforts on this mission to reassure smokers 
and create doubt. Helmut Wakeham, Vice President and Director of Research and 
Development for Philip Morris, suggested that the Tobacco Institute needed reminding 
that “the industry publicly and frequently denied what others find as ‘truth.’” He went on 
to warn the industry and anyone lobbying or researching on their behalf need to “face it, 
we are interested in evidence which we believe denies the allegation that cigarette 
smoking causes disease.” The industry, through membership fees, was paying the 
Tobacco Institute and its CTR research arm handsomely to prove the safety of cigarette 
smoking, or at least create enough doubt that such research would yield the same result: a 
continuation of cigarette smoking in America. Wakeham suggested that if the CTR could 
not deliver on this “truth” regarding the industry’s interests, they should be “terminated” 
and denied any more funds from industry giants like Phillip Morris.17  
As a result, the Tobacco Institute renewed efforts to advance the industry’s 
interests in an environment apparently growing steadily averse to cigarette consumption. 
All of this was occurring during the pivotal years when America was tinkering with the 
way it recruited and retained soldiers in its armed service. Subsequent efforts to retain 
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smokers and starters in the AVF were essentially a continuation of a much larger program 
to keep America smoking. This program was initiated back in 1954 with the Frank 
Statement and continued through 1958 with the formation of the TI. Evidence of the 
program to create doubt, retain smokers, and recruit starters, is found in documents such 
as B&W’s 1969 Doubt is Our Product memo, and PM’s 1970 Let’s Face It memo. To 
these, the industry would add the 1972 Roper Proposal and the 1975 Bates Memo. Both 
of these documents, and the on-going, industry-wide strategy they represented, had a 
direct impact on the military smoking market and guided strategies the enterprise pursued 
in the 1980s as elements within the DoD and Congress attempted to unhinge the soldier-
cigarette relationship. 
With this foundation in place, Kornegay and Panzer developed several new 
initiatives to address the core elements of the crisis surrounding smokers’ rights and 
doubt between 1972 and 1975. Roper & Associates’ April 1970 Study 53-0414 played a 
key role during this period. 18 Study 53-0414, a groundbreaking marketing research 
project, uncovered several useful attitudinal aspects involved in cigarette consumption 
and starter decisions. Grounded in this study’s findings, the TI initiated an enhanced 
doubt and smokers’ rights program. Set forth in a memo from Panzer to Kornegay dated 
May 1, 1972 (The Roper Proposal), Panzer argued the industry was losing the war for 
public opinion and had to make substantial changes to address the key issues of smokers’ 
rights and doubt. Panzer frankly admitted the industry’s long-standing commitment to the 
doubt and smokers’ rights scheme and that they had worked “brilliantly.” However, he 
opined that these schemes were only part of what amounted to a holding strategy. Panzer 
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reasoned that the time was right to develop a plan for victory in the “twenty year war 
against the tobacco industry.” 19  
Despite the two decades of turbulent struggle between the industry, anti-smoking 
groups, and unfriendly elements on Capitol Hill, Panzer expressed that lobbying efforts 
linking cigarettes to the American values of rights, liberty, and freedom of choice were 
achieving results. After all, during this period roughly half of all American men and one 
out of every three women were still smokers.20 He was supportive of the industry’s 
consistent message regarding objective research, and was quick to juxtapose the 
industry’s enlightened concern for their customers’ health and their rights against the 
government’s subjective un-scientific research and intrusive policies.21 Panzer advised 
that this responsible research and rights smoke screen should continue as planned, and 
were even subject to expansion.  
However, in the area of “create[ing] doubt about the health charge without 
actually denying it,” Panzer posited there was room for improvement. He argued that 
despite the statistical success in terms of profits and cigarette consumption during the two 
decades since the Frank Statement, the industry was still employing a holding strategy 
that could not last forever. Similar to military strategy, the industry dug in and was 
positioned to hold ground, but it was not actively engaging in measures to take new 
ground. In such an attrition oriented strategy, Panzer reasoned the industry could never 
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win. He argued for new plans to move the industry from a status quo holding position to a 
winning one.22  
Using a Vietnam War example to provide additional clarity, Panzer observed that 
America’s Vietnam experience proved it was not possible to hold US public opinion on a 
middle course for any length of time. Just as President Johnson found it increasingly 
difficult to pursue a holding strategy to maintain public approval for the Vietnam War 
after 1968, Panzer reasoned the industry could not count on public favor much longer if 
adjustments were not made to enhance the enterprise’s public image. Panzer argued that 
an increasing number of Americans were no longer willing to look the other way when 
confronted with the overwhelming scientific data linking cigarette smoking to health 
problems. He felt it was crucial to influence the public to an even greater extent than 
previous decades when branding and product differentiation were the main focus, not 
issues involving the acceptability of smoking and moral perceptions about a consumer 
product that appeared to cause bodily harm. Panzer was concerned that the public not 
only represented potential smokers, it represented a potential jurors. In this frank 
observation, Panzer saw the writing on the wall: the industry must prepare for war in the 
courts.  
Panzer argued that up to that point, and despite its success, the existing doubt 
strategies still lacked a necessary focus and grounding in a modern understanding of 
marketing and consumption psychology. It provided smokers with “too little in the way 
of ready-made credible alternatives” that would “sustain their opinions that smoking may 
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not be the causal factor” in smoking related illness.23 (Italics mine.) These were not the 
same smokers who four decades earlier had made brand decisions based on the kind of 
cigarettes their doctors smoked. This was an informed public increasingly looking to the 
federal government for research, statistics, welfare, and well-being. The old rules were 
gone. However Panzer advised there was still opportunity to capitalize on smokers’ 
lingering reservations regarding smoking. The enterprise now had to go about this 
mission in a smarter manner.  
 Against all odds, the data appeared to support Panzer and Kornegay’s plan to 
capitalize on the public’s still enduring doubt regarding the hazards of smoking. Despite 
decades of scholarship to the contrary, Roper’s April 1970 survey based Study 53-5414 
showed that doubt lingered. It found that “a majority (52 percent) believed that cigarettes 
are only one of the many causes of smokers having more illness.” Further, half of those 
surveyed believed smokers were somehow genetically different than non-smokers and 
that “heredity” could largely explain lung cancer and other health issues.24 The enterprise 
only needed to continue to feed smokers the alternatives they needed to help justify their 
smoking habit. As opposed to the stable of blunt tactics the industry had employed for 
decades (including categorical denial and general doubt tactics), it needed credible 
alternatives that were sharp and addressed the information-rich environment in which 
consumers lived. In 1975, Ted Bates & Co., supplied the industry with the razor sharp 
plan it needed to give the industry the edge it sought. The Bates Memo helped the 
enterprise articulate a plan to keep veteran smokers smoking and attract new smokers by 
positing: 
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Smoking is, in a way, a very strange human activity, a very strange habit. This is one of the very 
few things that people who do it are fully aware of its negative value, are not really happy with it, 
not really proud of it, do not see much good in it, perhaps even hate it—but still do it . . . [smokers 
are] very stupid. . . illogical, irrational people [that] find it hard to go throughout life with such 
negative presentation and evaluation of self . . . [their] saviors are rationalization and repression.25  
 
The industry aimed to provide just enough of this rationalization and repression 
for the smokers to continue to indulge in what it labeled a “stupid” habit which made the 
industry billions. Bates also encouraged the enterprise to remember “smokers don't like to 
be reminded of the fact that they are illogical and irrational . . . they don't want to be 
reminded by either direct or indirect manner.” Certainly the enterprise had to act; 
however it had to creatively find ways to attract smokers through advertising without 
reminding them constantly of their “illogical” habit. Under the auspices of this new and 
improved doubt strategy, the alternatives offered were packaged as the Constitutional and 
Multi-factorial Hypotheses.26  
The Constitutional Hypothesis gave voice to controversial data supporting a 
“constitutional makeup” alternative linking smoking illness with genetics. This portion of 
the new doubt strategy never gained much traction, and was kept quietly tucked away. 
However, the Multi-factorial Hypothesis was proudly rolled out for the entire world to 
see. This theory suggested smokers and non-smokers alike should consider the cigarette 
industry’s position that “as science advances, more and more factors come under 
suspicion as contributing to illness for which smoking is blamed—air pollution, viruses, 
food additives, occupational hazards, stresses,” as well as industrial work conditions, air 
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conditioning units, and asbestos.27 Bringing the Roper Proposal from 1972 full circle, 
Panzer advised the enterprise to redouble efforts to provide “objective scientific research” 
to support the Multi-factorial Hypothesis. Panzer frankly postulated that “best of all, it 
[the objective scientific research] would only have to be seen—not read—to be 
believed.”28 The industry only needed to develop, coordinate, and execute an enhanced 
doubt strategy loosely based on science that provided smokers with a small measure of 
reassurance. In the end, if the enterprise wanted to survive, it had to help existing 
smokers comfortably rationalize their choice to continue smoking. 
Armed with this bold new plan to win tobacco’s image war, the enterprise rapidly 
adopted the smokers’ rights and renewed doubt strategies in its public statements. The 
cigarette enterprise soon thereafter began offering a series of strategically targeted 
propositions to the consumer public. These messages were designed to stir up the 
smoking and non-smoking public’s angst against the intrusive federal government big 
brothers whom the cigarette enterprise claimed was watching their every move. In 
statements often transmitted through tobacco state politicians on the floor of Congress, 
the enterprise asked Americans if they needed the federal government to intrude in their 
personal lives. Executing the core tenets of the Roper-Bates enhanced doubt strategy, 
politicians asked if they need the government to make smoking decisions for them—
especially considering the subjective nature of the government’s “faulty scientific data.” 
Did Americans need a “brass nanny” to watch over them and dictate what was or was not 
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healthy?29 If the government banned cigarettes, what was next—air conditioning, 
industrial factories, fiberglass insulation, and French fry grease? Was not smoking a 
matter of personal choice?  
Appealing to emotion and patriotism, they asked the American public if this is 
what their forefathers intended—a state denying its citizens individual freedom and the 
right to pursue happiness.30 These messages were powerful and effective, capitalized on 
long-standing doubt strategies, and enabled the cigarette enterprise to develop a culture of 
smokers’ rights. It provided reasonable alternatives to government science linking 
cigarettes to disease. Moreover, the enterprise firmly linked smoking to freedom. This 
part of the strategy directly informed industry efforts to latch on to soldiers as cigarette 
puffing freedom fighters, a maneuver it had perfected during previous wars. This angle 
required perfection again if the enterprise was to retain the solder-cigarette relationship so 
vital to the industry’s bottom line. However, in order to address the long-term survival of 
the cigarette enterprise, the enterprise had to address a much larger issue as well: starters.  
Starters 
In addition to providing the industry with Study 53-0414 in 1970 which was 
instrumental in helping Panzer and Kornegay develop the enhanced doubt campaign, 
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Roper & Associates also supplied Philip Morris with the 1970 Benchmark Study. This 
study, similar to Study 53-0414, focused on smokers’ attitudes towards brands and 
smoking in general. However, PM was not completely satisfied with the marketing 
research presented in this rather extensive report. They were concerned the data upon 
which they were basing important and far-reaching advertising and investment decisions 
was missing one key element: the teenage starter.  
The industry was keenly aware that smoking and brand decisions were made by 
the age of eighteen. During the 1970s and 80s, the issue of attracting and retaining brand-
loyal young adult smokers was a major, if veiled, component of industry marketing 
strategies. For example, a management summary created by industry leader R.J. 
Reynolds to guide development of marketing campaigns directly addressed this crucial, 
industry-wide issue: 
Younger adult smokers have been the critical factor in the growth and decline of every major 
brand and company over the last 50 years. They will continue to be just as important to brands in 
the future for [the] simple reason . . . The renewal of the market stems almost entirely from 18-
year-old smokers. No more than 5 percent of smokers start after age 24 . . . Younger adult smokers 
are critical to RJR’s long-term performance and profitability. Therefore, RJR should make a 
substantial long term commitment of manpower and money dedicated to younger adult smoker 
programs. An unusually strong commitment from Executive Management will be necessary 
[because] younger adult smokers are the only source of replacement smokers.31  
 
With so many brands from which to choose, and the American public increasingly aware 
of the dangers of smoking, the industry had to take decisive action to address teen 
smokers, a segment of the population it referred to as starters. If the industry was to 
survive, much less achieve market differentiation among the brands, cigarette companies 
needed to know how to attract and retain teen smokers. With these issues in mind, PM, 
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makers of the popular Marlboro brand, queried Roper about the prospects of successfully 
addressing this gap in the marketing research.  
Sensing PM’s desire to move quickly on this issue, Roper & Associates wasted no 
time in responding to PM’s query regarding young teen smokers. Roper suggested a 
wide-ranging effort that leveraged Roper’s access to three key markets: college students, 
early-teens, and young military members. Regarding college students, Roper opined that 
PM should wait until the fall to start doing conclusive survey work on campus since 
summer students were not a good sample. However, he did provide some optimism with 
his suggestion that his firm could “take some immediate steps that will provide some 
fairly good indications” of the success of PM products on campus by positioning Roper 
agents at tobacco outlets near campus to do initial marketing interviews.32  
In terms of the early-teen market, Roper voiced a shocking revelation that became 
a bane for the industry and a boon for litigators. Roper advised PM to give careful and 
sustained attention to market “share among 14–17-year-old teenagers not covered” in the 
original Roper study. In a humorous yet damning exchange, Roper recommends a 
strategy to access the 14–17 year old market by: 
interviewing young people at summer recreation centers (at beaches, public schools, lakes, etc.). 
This will provide a projectable sample of people in this age group, and it has several advantages. 
The low at-homeness of this group combined with their incidence in households would make 
house-to-house interviewing quite expensive. In addition, true answers on smoking habits might 
be difficult to elicit in the presence of parents . . . we suggest having interviewers obtain 
interviews with those who appear to be between the ages of 14 and 21 . . . we would have 
interviewers ask the age of the respondent, but if she disagrees or thinks the reported age is too 
high, we would have her record her guess as to correct age.33  
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In addition to gaining access to college kids and young teens, Roper planned to obtain 
data from the military by “stationing interviewers near high traffic areas for military 
personnel near military bases (bus stations, airports, etc.) [at] places where large military 
bases are located.”34  
These statements regarding starters and many more comprise a body of 
documents linking the industry to teen and young adult smoking. The industry’s military 
and teen programs in general, and the young teen agenda specifically, indicate the drastic 
measures taken to ensure the survival of the highly profitable cigarette business and 
smoking in America. Since the military was largely comprised of the teens and young 
adults the industry so desperately needed, the soldier-cigarette relationship would play a 
key role in this survival strategy.  
Soldiers Starters 
By the mid-1970s, the Marlboro Man had become an icon of the cigarette 
industry. Ironically, Marlboro cigarettes were positioned as a cigarette for women in the 
years leading up to 1955 when the Marlboro Man was introduced to the world. Before the 
Marlboro Man, the Marlboro was marketed as “mild as May” and capped with “ivory tips 
to protect the lips.” The Marlboro Man was something completely different—an image 
that appealed to young men and soldiers. Whereas Winston Salem’s wildly successful Joe 
Camel campaign of the late 1980s was directed toward young men seeking to appear 
“urban, easy, funny, wild, partying, and non-threatening,” Phillip Morris’ Marlboro Man 
dominated the market during the 50s, 60s, and 70s with a completely different set of 
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images.35 Marlboro Men were “hard, serious, outdoors, the best—only a select few, 
handsome, respect[ed], long lasting, and married.” If the Joe Camel image was 
represented by “Mickey Rourke, Dana Carvey, . . . and Mick Jagger,” the Marlboro Man 
ideal was found in characters like “John Wayne, Charles Bronson, Clint Eastwood, 
Chuck Norris, and Steven Segal.”36 With the Marlboro Man cult leading the way, PM’s 
Marlboro cigarette experienced “the most spectacular rise of a single brand in cigarette 
history” from 1965 to 1976. On the back of the Marlboro Man, Marlboro brand cigarettes 
had surpassed Winston by 1976 to become America’s “most popular cigarette” and soon 
vaulted to top position as the world’s “number one brand.”37  
It is not important to this study the brand of cigarettes that soldiers chose, or the 
fact that during the period when America was fielding a volunteer force, Marlboro 
became the world’s top selling cigarette brand. There is no relation between these two 
events. What is important is the perception of smoking and masculinity in America 
during this period, a period when young men were choosing to join a volunteer Army 
with thoughts of staying, and smoking, for a career. Both of these choices, staying and 
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of Marlboro is due to freebasing and how much to the sophisticated marketing of Marlboro Country and the 
Marlboro Man.” 
184 
 
 
smoking, were expensive endeavors individually. However, as discussed in the next 
chapter, when combined they are exponentially more expensive.  
The imagery represented by the iconic, horse-bound, leathery Marlboro Man did 
much to drive home the message of rugged independence and carefree virility that were 
hallmarks of the young adult market and smoking in general. What would Charles 
Bronson or John Wayne do? They would join the volunteer Army and smoke cigarettes. 
Therefore, this Marlboro Man message supplemented the familiar figure of the cigarette-
wielding American soldier that had existed in American culture for decades. Together, 
these images had immense influence on the young soldiers who formed a significant 
portion of the industry’s client base during this period—a base the industry fought to 
retain.  
The industry was ready and willing to exploit this young military client base, and 
the images to which they were attracted. The nature of this exploitation, and to what 
extent it directly targeted young Americans whether soldiers or civilians, is a 
controversial issue at the center of countless lawsuits and public policy debates. In the 
early 1980s, journalists, trial lawyers, and public health officials began to put the pieces 
together: the industry was courting young starters. In an investigative report by staff 
writer Mike King, a journalist with Louisville, Kentucky’s Courier Journal, King posed 
the question, “Is the industry aiming its message at teens?” After examining evidence 
pertaining to the industry’s marketing practices, King was intrigued that, despite the 
plethora of negative information available about the dangers of cigarette smoke, teen 
smoking rates had begun to increase again after a marked decline in the mid-1970s. 
Though it was difficult to find an airtight smoking gun at the time, King had a hunch that, 
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despite the industry’s protestations to the contrary, somehow it was behind this marked 
increase in teen starters. Historical data and industry archives reveal King was right in his 
speculation.38  
Smoking, Machismo, and the AVF  
According to data maintained by the National Institute on Drug Abuse, if young 
people do not make their decision to start smoking by 18, they will likely never begin 
smoking. Additionally, the likelihood of an adult choosing to smoke after the age of 25 is 
near zero. Therefore marketing researchers argued the window to influence the smoking 
decision was the 17–19-year-old age group. If teens fail to choose smoking by 18, then 
the industry faced the grim reality of a dwindling market as the current smoker group 
aged out and died.39 The cigarette industry was keenly aware of this statistic and had 
initiated research to confirm the smoking decision window and develop strategies to 
influence young smokers to start smoking. As seen in Roper’s study proposal for PM in 
June 1970, they were not afraid to go as low as 14 to influence this decision.  
In 1975, cigarette manufacturer Brown & Williamson (B&W), maker of popular 
brands Lucky Strike and Kool menthol cigarettes, joined PM and confidently waded into 
the young adult and teen research markets as well. They contracted with Ted Bates & 
Co., to provide youth marketing strategies for the launch of the firm’s Viceroy brand. In a 
March 1975 document referred to as the Bates Memo among litigation circles, Ted Bates 
presented B&W with a marketing strategy to reach new smokers.40 B&W subsequently 
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used this information to create marketing concepts for their Viceroy line of cigarettes. 
Continuing with the overall assessment laid out in the Roper Proposal, the marketing 
plans outlined in the Bates Memo ceded that the industry was fighting a “losing war” in 
the battle against negative public perception.41 Just as the Roper Proposal had, the Bates 
Memo advised the industry to take greater, more aggressive measures to reach the young 
smoking market, and more importantly, create new smokers.  
The Bates Memo insisted the industry had to implement a plan to attract these 
new smokers in spite of and in response to the growing anti-smoking environment 
gripping the nation. A marketing strategy moving young people from the non-smoker to 
“starter” category was of greatest necessity.42 Citing well-known industry and 
government data, as well as proprietary industry research, the Bates team reasoned the 
choice of whether to smoke or not happened at the same time a young person attempted 
to make a declaratory statement about independence and self-identity. This activity 
happened when a young person was transitioning from teen to adult. With this in mind, 
Bates suggested a four-part strategy.  
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First, advertisers should present smoking as one of the few initiations into the 
adult world. The industry countered charges that it was marketing to minors by claiming 
it only used adults in their commercials; this is exactly what the Bates strategy 
encouraged the industry to do. Young teens who see glamorous, sexy, confident adults 
smoking will indeed see smoking as a gateway to adulthood. Bates challenged the 
industry to ask the philosophical, age-old question: what makes a man a man—or a 
woman a woman? If it could connect industry products with the answer to this age-old 
question, it could unlock the young adult market.  
Second, the industry must connect smoking with maturity and success. Again, this 
form of advertising forced industry officials to think deeply about the youth of America 
and the generation coming of age in the late 70s and early 80s. If the industry could 
decipher what teens wanted and experiences they valued, it could design advertising 
strategies to address these needs. Bates envisioned a strategy that accounted for: how 
young American adults felt about the world around them, their place in that world, their 
status in society, and how they signaled their status in American society. In short, Bates 
wanted to access and address teen mentalité.    
Third, Bates told B&W executives if they wanted “starters” to buy Viceroys, or 
non-smokers to become “starters,” they needed to relate their products to other perceived 
adult activities like sex and drinking alcohol, thus reinforcing the first part of the strategy. 
Finally, in conformance with tenants of the Roper Proposal, Bates suggested the industry 
not try to fight the “cigarettes are bad for you” argument, because it was a “losing war.” 
Similar to Roper’s suggestion to create doubt about anti-smoking data without ever 
actually denying it, Bates told the industry to “skirt the issue” by providing other positive 
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reasons for smoking such as “social acceptance, positive self-image, and maturity.” In 
fact, Bates suggested the industry must completely and deliberately avoid any reference 
to health or health-related activities. Essentially, and in line with prevailing cultural 
attitudes of the time, Bates suggested a self-gratification campaign projecting the 
message: if it feels good, do it.43  
Enterprise strategies presented in Roper and Bates’ confidential industry 
documents and marketing studies make it clear the industry was aware the youthful 
American soldiers of the AVF were prime starter candidates. In a memorandum from 
Lorillard, an American cigarette company, its marketing team highlights the importance 
of the military market. Lorillard produced the Newport brand and their marketing team 
insisted that targeting the soldier market was required because: 
. . . the plums are here to be plucked. The military approximates the size of New York, yet our 
marketing effort in the military is only a fraction of what we put behind the Brand in Region #2. 
Our cost per thousand cigarettes, and our cost per thousand targets reached in the “Military City” 
has got to be dramatically lower than any other market in the country. And there isn’t a market in 
the country that has the sales potential for Newport like the military market.44 
  
In a capitalistic business world focused on the bottom line, this statement provides a 
concise assessment of the calculus behind the industry’s attraction to the AVF: easy and 
cheap access to a young soldier market where there is unmatched bang for the buck.  
This was not rocket science. The manufactured cigarette already had a rich, 
established relationship with the American soldier dating to the trenches of the Western 
Front during WWI. This heritage was reinforced by images of the Marlboro Man and the 
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grizzled, chain-smoking veteran. American soldiers entering the AVF met the prime 
profile for the starter category. On average they were 17–19 years old and leaving home 
for the first time. They were looking to define themselves in the world as they 
transitioned from teen to adult. Young soldiers were extremely susceptible to the peer 
pressures associated with barracks life and time in the field with the boys. Bates 
recognized the power of the cult and argued that “with only very few exceptions, young 
people start to smoke because of their peer group . . . almost every young smoker started 
his smoking life by bumming cigarettes from friends prior to starting to buy his/her 
own.”45  
Further, a young soldier wanted his peers to think of him as rugged and self-
sufficient. In a military environment where Army recruits were subjected to social 
leveling, forced removal of personal identity, and a culture of strict adherence to orders, 
soldiers sought small ways to exercise agency and display their macho identity. In the 
Marlboro Man’s cigarette, they found this agency and macho identity. If the 
manufactured cigarette was primarily comfort and solace to the trench-dwelling 
Doughboy of WWI, it was macho status and cult acceptance to the modern volunteer 
soldier.46  
Long aware of this connection between smoking cigarettes and soldierly 
masculinity, the industry developed extensive marketing programs and promotions to 
continue attracting the military market and further entrench the soldier with the cigarette. 
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However, since cigarettes were removed from field rations in 1973, and the smoking 
culture in general had come under renewed attack during this period, the industry had to 
redouble its efforts to initiate soldiers to smoking. The enterprise had to find ways to turn 
soldiers from green horns into starters who would hopefully become the chain smoking, 
grizzled non-commissioned officers (NCOs) the industry coveted. These experienced 
soldier-smokers not only formed a substantial customer base for the industry, as primary 
group leaders wielding considerable influence, they also propagated the military smoking 
culture. 
It is abundantly clear from confidential industry documents that the starter 
campaigns during this period placed great reliance on youth smokers, and by extension, 
the young soldiers that comprised the AVF. For decades, the soldier market had provided 
the industry with a steady stream of fresh recruits and potential starters who were 
profoundly influenced by the masculinity, independence, and freedom represented in 
manufactured cigarettes. The cigarette enterprise was dogged in its determination to hang 
on to this lucrative market, initiate starters in the military, and preserve the culture of 
doubt in America. This commitment would have profound political, economic, and health 
related implications and play a decisive role in debates over cigarette consumption in the 
AVF.47  
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Both sides of the cigarette debate were soon engaged in a running fight that 
eventually spilled over onto the floors of Congress. Just as they had to confront the 
potential dangers of an American public averse to cigarette smoking, politicians were 
beginning to deal with the expense of the AVF, and more specific to this study, a 
smoking AVF. In order to pay for the technologically advanced equipment entering the 
military arsenal in the decades after Vietnam and the professional long-service volunteers 
required to operate and maintain it, Congress took a hard look at military spending and 
engaged in contentious cost-cutting measures.48 When Congressmen and DoD officials 
mounted efforts to sever the expensive relationship between the soldier, the cigarette, and 
expensive government health care liabilities, the enterprise assumed battle stations in a 
last ditch, all-out effort to sustain its most reliable source for cigarette starters. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
smoking enterprise, and despite the dogged determination of the cigarette enterprise, the consumption rate 
dropped by 300 billion over the next two decades. As of 2010, the per capita consumption dropped back to 
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CHAPTER VIII 
HEALTH CARE AND THE AVF 
In 1980, soldier health care expenses, once a sacred cow, were uncovered as 
debatable policy issues. No longer considered off-limits in budget drills, it was only a 
matter of time before certain Congressmen and federal officials linked cigarette smoking 
among the AVF with significant physical and fiscal liabilities. When the cost of a chain-
smoking AVF ran up against the interests of the cigarette enterprise, a legendary 
Congressional struggled ensued, revealing the true nature of an American political 
economy grounded in corporatocracy.  
Before discussing this unique political economy as it pertains to the soldier and 
the cigarette, the scope of the health care promise made to late-draft era and AVF military 
professionals must be addressed. This health care pledge was and is a hotly debated issue 
and is crucial to understanding the soldier-cigarette saga because it sheds light on the 
mentalité of fiscally conservative Congressmen concerned with the cost liabilities 
represented by a cigarette-smoking AVF. In the early 1980s, several elected officials 
added the fiscal millstone represented by an AVF hooked on manufactured cigarettes to a 
list of variables contributing to rising military health care costs. Even the most 
elementary of actuarial drills informed their argument that the costs of an unhealthy AVF, 
both in the short-term as active-duty soldiers and the long-term as they transitioned to 
military retiree status, were unsustainable. Moreover, this cost liability was not just the 
smoking habit of the member, but his or her dependents as well.  
Though the cigarette ration was removed in 1973, the Army was doing little to 
discourage the cigarette smoking culture or prevent industry access to young soldiers. 
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Furthering entrenchment, Congress continued subsidizing cigarettes in the PX and 
commissary as part of the military compensation package. This program enabled soldiers 
to conveniently obtain cigarettes in bulk at half the cost. To comprehend the liabilities 
presented by the specter of a chain-smoking AVF, one must access several debates 
regarding the modern military health care system. As was the case with the Doughboys’ 
rejection of the Y Man in WWI, the truth regarding the size, scope, and nature of 
Congress’ health care commitment to the modern soldier, dependent, and retiree is buried 
somewhere between fact, fiction, and grim reality. Further, the truth is frequently 
wrapped in an emotional myth regarding veterans’ rights, and well-intentioned, but often 
ill-informed rhetoric. An understanding of this debate informs the current discussion on 
the potential health care and financial liabilities associated with a smoking AVF. 
Moreover, it also enlightens subsequent discussions about the cigarette enterprise’s 
strategy to manipulate patriotic sentiment and veterans issues in response to Army 
programs implemented to unhinge the soldier-cigarette relationship during the decade of 
the 1980s.  
Soaring AVF Health Care Costs & Problems with the Delivery of Benefits 
By 1985, Congress and the DoD had maintained a near-constant 30-year-long 
conversation regarding strategies to “contain . . . costs” associated with the military 
health care program, as well as the best way to deliver benefits. The tone of this 
conversation ranged from legislators gently encouraging to aggressively directing the 
DoD to take action on soaring health care costs and an apparent breakdown in delivery of 
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benefits.1 During the 1980s, the cost of American health care in general increased across 
the board, not just in the military health care system.2  
However, Congress and military appropriators began to perceive a “dramatic 
increase” in medical budgets over and above this general, across-the-board increase. 
Modern military readiness is costly in terms of equipment and personnel. In 1985, the 
DoD asked for Congress for over $9.6 billion for “military medical operations” which 
represented a “sizeable increase over previous years.”3 The hefty defense bills associated 
with the transition to the AVF in the 70s and Reagan’s massive defense build-up in the 
80s had once again given Congress sticker shock. As the full extent of the Reagan’s 
proliferation was digested, many gasped at the seemingly endless spiral of deficit 
spending and sought solutions to contain costs. The medical readiness price tag was 
particularly alarming—a price tag the DoD referred to as “an impressive sum of money.”4 
For example, Congress was asked to absorb a 25 percent increase in the military’s 
medical readiness and personnel accounts, and stomach a medical operation and 
maintenance budget that doubled during this period. The DoD asked Congress for an 
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additional $500 million in medical readiness funding in 1985 and was forced that same 
year to pull $2 billion from other programs to support medical readiness shortfalls 
projected through 1990.5  
Further, the runaway costs were not just a result of fielding and servicing a 
credible, capable active force; a substantial portion of military health care costs were 
shifting to retirees and dependents. These costs increased by 150 percent, and by the end 
of the decade, costs associated with retirees and dependents consumed half of all the 
military’s medical expenditures.6 In his closing statement to the Investigations 
Subcommittee, the Honorable William Mayer, M.D., Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Health Affairs) provided even further bad news regarding not only the military dual 
mission of readiness and benefits, but also the growing expense of the contract care 
initiatives. Despite the additional appropriations to defense in general and to military 
medical readiness specifically through 1985, Mayer concluded the DoD and the services 
were still struggling to meet the dual nature of the military health care mission: 
One thing that has become clear to me is that our reliance on our direct care system [MTF] to 
accomplish both our wartime readiness and our mandated peacetime benefit mission has placed 
significant strains on our ability to accomplish either one of those missions effectively. Pressed by 
a demand to provide comprehensive health care to some 10 million beneficiaries, we have not 
been able to assure top priority to wartime readiness . . . and . . . our civilian care services, such as 
CHAMPUS, are too costly.7 
 
In addition to the soaring costs, Congressmen were also alarmed at what they 
perceived as a rapid deterioration in the quality, competency, and availability of military 
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health care.8 Even more dreadful, this deterioration had a tremendous price tag and 
several in Congress were exasperated about what the bloated military health care budget 
had actually bought them. From 1974 to 1986, Congressmen, government officials, and 
concerned citizens flocked to hearings to express frustration, anger, fear, and resentment 
over the perceived and real failures in military health care.9 Congressmen read letters 
from veterans and retirees deprived of medical treatment, stripped of dignity, or told they 
did not qualify for the benefits they felt they had earned. Military spouses and retired 
officers relayed horror stories involving long lines, broken promises, diminished access, 
and increased costs. It certainly appeared something was gravely wrong with the whole 
system. 
In these hearings, statements by concerned legislators and citizens contained a 
variety of words and statements to describe the apparent “breakdown.” Representative 
Charles Rose from North Carolina complained that he had retirees in his district who 
were “slowly and surely [being] cut off from military medical attention” and that he 
feared “an impending breakdown of military medical care.” Rose was so perplexed that 
he was ready to institute a draft for good doctors since the system was in such a “mess.”10 
                                                          
8
 Military Health Care Delivery System: Hearings on H.R. 5195 (H.R. 5235) Before the Military 
Compensation Committee, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, June and September 1979), see 
opening statements, and following statements by Panetta, Rose, and Nichols for example. 
 
9
 Specific hearings referenced for this chapter contained extensive information on this topic: 
Military Health Care Delivery System: Hearings on H.R. 5195 (H.R. 5235) Before the Military 
Compensation Committee; Medical Readiness of the Armed Services: Hearings Before the Subcommittee 
on Manpower and Personnel; Readiness of Military Medicine: Hearing Before the Investigations 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services; Military Medical Care: Hearings Before the Military 
Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee (Washington: US Government Printing Office, July, 
September, and October 1987). 
 
10
 Military Health Care Delivery System: Hearings on H.R. 5195 (H.R. 5235) Before the Military 
Compensation Committee, 334, 335; Military Medical Care: Hearings Before the Military Personnel and 
Compensation Subcommittee, 153.  
 
197 
 
 
To a great extent, the discourse of discontent centered on a running dialogue regarding 
“broken promises” and “breach of trust.”11 Senator Fritz Hollings of South Carolina even 
called the Reagan Administration “first class liars” for failing to provide the health 
benefits soldiers, veterans, and their dependents were promised.12 One retired Lieutenant 
Colonel expressed the feelings of many when he voiced his desire to: 
go on record as one who feels that . . . promises have been broken . . . promises were made. I think 
the most important one was the promise of medical care for that member and his family as long as 
he lived . . . I stayed in the service for one reason: medical care for my family and myself. The 
Armed Forces constantly tell us about the benefits of making a career in the service . . . the 
medical care is paramount in their campaign to keep people in the service, in the all-voluntary 
service. I think it behooves the Congress and the President to live up to these promises and 
expectations.13  
 
Congressmen were quick to pick up on the emotional “broken promise” theme in the 
discourse. Regarding the nature of the “promise” made to soldiers and their families, 
Representative H. Martin Lancaster of North Carolina stated that military health care 
was: 
taken for granted for so long as part of the bargain they made when they decided to devote their 
lives to serve the United States of America. Some 45 years ago there were names like Normandy, 
Anzio, Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and Midway. Young men in their early 20s scrambled into the surf 
from landing barges, squeezed into cramped, tail gunner nests of bombers, advanced at the wave 
of a hand into lethal machine gun fire. They left their homes and families to defend this nation 
knowing full well that a large part of their number would never return at all. These brave fighting 
men, plus many more who served with distinction in Korea and Vietnam, are now being turned 
away . . . along with their dependents, and the dependents of those who serve on active duty . . . 
When you ask a young man to step from a landing barge into the face of enemy fire, to stick to his 
guns when his ship has taken a hit, to build a bridge with mosquitoes and dive bombers vying for 
his attention, or even to be a clerk in some lonely, cheerless foreign place, a debt is incurred.14 
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Lancaster added that this seemingly pathetic situation had “generated . . . pain and 
bewilderment” beyond comprehension.15 Representative Arthur Ravenel, Jr., of South 
Carolina used his personal experience as a Marine grunt in WWII to add to the emotional 
debate: 
Well . . . all of us old Marines were told that when you join the Service, the health care needs of 
you and your family are going to be met. After you retire, if you put in the required number of 
years, you will be taken care of until you go to your reward in the sky, and also the dependents 
who survive you.16 
 
To a casual observer, it appeared the American taxpayers were taken for a ride 
and sold an expensive military health care system that was inefficient, broke, bleeding 
out, and robbing soldiers, veterans, and dependents of dignity. However one must dig 
deeper in order to access truth and gain an appreciation for the problems inherent in a 
modern military health care system. Especially a system that had experienced nearly 
exponential growth in terms of size, complexity, and cost since it was first conceived in 
the waning years of WWII.  
The History of Veterans Benefits and Modern Military Health Care 
American historiography contains rich literature on the topic of veterans, their 
relationship to the federal government, and benefits. Several historians connect the 
growth of federal government during the twentieth century to the expansion of veterans’ 
benefits after the Civil War. In This Republic of Suffering, Drew Gilpin Faust argues the 
seeds of federal expansion are found in the government’s response to death and 
dismemberment during and after the Civil War. The government entered the Civil War 
with no plan to respond to the thousands of dead bodies strewn across the broken 
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landscape of battlefields, nor the families they represented. Awakened by the news of 
haphazard burial details and devastation wrought by the loss of thousands of fathers, 
husbands, and sons, the federal apparatus eventually swung into action. By the end of the 
war, the government had created various commissions and agencies to spend 
appropriated money to gather bodies, build mass cemeteries, purchase prosthetic limbs, 
fund pensions, and build memorials. As the federal government made provisions for the 
thousands of families affected by death, disease, dislocation, and dismemberment caused 
by the war, the bureaucratic scaffolding of a modern federal government was erected.17  
            In Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in 
United States, Theda Skokpol discusses this theme of federal expansion and looks at the 
exponential growth in Union pensions in the decades after the Civil War. Veterans’ 
groups such as the Grand Army of the Republic were extremely influential during this 
period. At one point late in the nineteenth century, pension payments consumed greater 
than 40 percent of all federal receipts, demonstrating the size and impact of such groups. 
Skokpol argues the greatly expanded pension program was the foundation of a social 
welfare state in America that predated the New Deal and Europe’s embrace of federal 
social welfare by decades. Progressives and muckrakers weary of government pension 
and patronage corruption eventually put an end to what had become a corrupt, free-
wheeling veterans’ pension racket in some areas of government. 18 Regardless, the 
foundation for federal government expansion was already in place. To a great extent, its 
cornerstone was comprised of the war veterans, the interests they represented, and the 
                                                          
17
 Drew Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008). 
 
18
 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: the political origins of social policy in the 
United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992), 107–115. 
 
200 
 
 
debts accrued to them when they served the Republic as uniformed members of the 
armed service.  
In Doughboys: the Great War and the Remaking of America, historian Jennifer 
Keene argues that the millions of conscripted soldiers who served the Republic during 
WWI continued this tradition and created a massive, vocal, national constituency, the 
likes of which the nation had never seen. Legislators took notice of this large group of 
voters and accommodated veterans’ interest groups with expansionist federal programs, a 
Bonus Bill, and the continuation of taxpayer funded pensions.19 Most significantly, 
Keene shows how a generation of WWI soldiers paved the way for the GI Bill and made 
the WWII generation the most privileged veteran generation in American history. The 
WWI generation laid the foundation for the modern US Army, a service increasingly 
concerned with soldier welfare and morale in addition to the core mission of combat 
effectiveness. 
Thus a close reading of Faust, Skokpol, Keene, and many other scholars of 
modern US history reveals that many of the social welfare institutions and federal 
programs associated with the modern American Republic are rooted in expansive 
veterans’ benefits programs.20 These health care benefits grew to become a substantial 
and costly component of Congress’ funding requirements after WWII. Whereas the 
pension debate dominated the veterans’ discourse between the Civil War and WWII, the 
health care debate dominated in post-WWII America.  
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Comprehensive health care for soldiers, dependents, and retirees as a benefit of 
uniformed service to the Republic is a relatively modern occurrence. Older than the 
nation itself, the Army Medical Corps was conceived during the Revolutionary War and 
was rather limited in scope.21 Whether on or off the battlefield, regimental surgeons cared 
for soldiers assigned to their units, offering limited, organic services, comprising the 
extent of soldiers’ health care benefits during America’s first century. In 1884, as part of 
legislative appropriations funding Army operations, Congress mandated “the medical 
officers of the Army and contract surgeons shall whenever practicable attend the families 
of the officers and soldiers free of charge.”22 This was the general extent of guidance 
Congress provided to the Services on soldier and dependent health care and remained the 
accepted interpretation for decades.  
WWII changed the nature and scope of this relationship. Even before the war 
ended, Congress had already addressed issues regarding the health and welfare of the 
returning soldiers by passing the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944. Easing the 
transition from soldier to civilian, the act formed a baseline philosophical relationship 
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between the modern soldier and the state, establishing the “principle that entitlement to 
benefits could be achieved through service to the nation, not merely through cash 
contributions.”23 After an initial drawdown at the close of WWII, the Truman 
Administration, followed by the Eisenhower Administration, steadily grew the size and 
capabilities of the military in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union. As the 
draft and massive defense budgets increased the size of the Army, the responsibilities of 
Congress to provide for the health, welfare, readiness, and morale of the force, in addition 
to the well-being of dependents and retirees, experienced parallel growth.  
The baseline size, scope, and nature of Congressional responsibilities to soldiers, 
veterans, retirees, and dependents emerged as a hot topic during the AVF transition 
period. This discussion was of utmost importance to many legislators weary of the high 
price tag of the AVF, Reagan’s defense build-up, runaway costs associated with soldier 
health care, and the apparent breakdown in delivery services. In 1979, a panel of experts 
convened on Capitol Hill and attempted to push through the emotion and drama that had 
come to characterize the acidic discourse on fiscal issues associated with the AVF. 
According to this panel, the health care benefit proved an especially sensitive issue. Their 
mission was to arrive at an understanding of what the baseline health benefit actually was 
so Congress and DoD officials could engage in discussion about fiscal stewardship rooted 
in fact rather than emotionally charged distractions.24  
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In general, Chapter 55, Title 10, USC, Sections 1071–1087 states that Congress 
shall establish a military health care system with the purpose to “maintain high morale     
. . . by providing medical care for members and certain former members of . . . services, 
and their dependents.”25 The statute is clear; however, the details of implementation 
proved difficult to say the least. The first statute since 1884 to specifically address 
dependent and retiree health benefits did not come until 1956. As big business boomed in 
post-WWII America, major American firms started offering comprehensive health care 
plans for employees and dependents in order to attract quality talent. In accordance with 
this trend, the military followed suit as it too sought to attract the best and brightest. The 
Dependent Medical Care Act of 1956 was Congress’s initial attempt to close the gap 
between the health care benefits available to service members as compared to their 
civilian counterparts.26 This act was crucial to deciphering the true costs associated with 
military health care since, for the first time, Congress had provided statutory, specific, 
funded guidance regarding dependent and retiree health benefits. 
Based upon existing Army regulations and customs circa 1956, as well as this 
Dependent Medical Care Act, the 1979 Congressional panel was able to establish a 
baseline understanding of eligibility for this long-standing, often misunderstood 
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“promise” in the benefits discourse: 1) Active duty soldiers; 2) The spouse or child of an 
active duty member, or a Reservist on 30 day orders; 3) Retirees of the uniformed service 
and their living spouse or child, and 4) The survivor(s) of a person who died on active 
duty or was a retiree of uniformed service. For purposes of continuity, this group (1 
through 4) was collectively referred to as the “beneficiaries.”27  
The initial baseline excluded nonmilitary male spouses of servicewomen who 
could not prove that they were at least 50 percent dependent on their spouse for support. 
Initially, no provision was made for divorce; if a female spouse divorced her male active 
duty service member husband, she did not receive any accrued health care benefits, 
regardless of how long they were married.28 Also of note, the initial baseline only 
included provisions for care at the on-post Military Treatment Facility (MTF) for all 
beneficiaries, with uniform members receiving priority and the rest given access to care 
on a Space Available (Space-A) basis. Finally, the baseline included off-post, contract 
civilian care for uniformed members only on a very limited and needs-specific basis, and 
included no such provision for dependents and retirees.  
After sifting through thousands of documents, reports, studies, and sworn 
testimony, the panel concluded that the only real guarantee ever made to retirees and 
dependents was access to care.29 The promise of “free health care for life” was never 
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made for any of the beneficiary groups listed above—there was no “broken promise.”30 
The fact that the health care benefit was initially structured around access to the MTF 
was often the source of the “broken promise” narrative that emerged along with the AVF. 
When soldiers and retirees first started taking advantage of the provisions of the 1956 act, 
they and their family members received care on post nearly 100 percent of the time. It 
was generally not a problem to acquire Space-A appointments in those days. The 
perception of a “lifetime access” guarantee to free MTF health care services was not a de 
facto guarantee based in federal law; it was instead a de jure proposition based in 
practice.31 Senator Floyd V. Hicks, in testimony given just a year after the 
implementation of the AVF, commented that “while it may not be legally accurate, all 
retirees . . . are absolutely convinced that they were promised as a benefit for serving in 
the military until retirement age, medical care at military installations . . . the promises 
offered them as inducements to serve are being whittled away.”32  
He is correct in stating that many of the aspects of the promise myth were not 
grounded in legal accuracy. If anything, they were rooted in long-established Army 
custom and the fact that in the late 1950s, the population of actual Army retirees and 
dependents was quite small. In a November 1957 report given to conferees at the 
American Public Health Association at the Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting, Army Major 
General Paul I. Robinson, Executive Director of the Army’s Dependents' Medical Care 
Program, reported that after a year’s experience with the new 1956 provisions, there were 
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only 800,000 eligible dependents and retirees from all Services in the program.33 With a 
pool of this size, giving everyone who needed health care benefits access to free MTF 
services was quite feasible, subject of course to stipulations and coverage categories in 
the 1956 legislation. However this was never a guaranteed service. That beneficiaries 
could access free MTF coverage was merely a product of demographics, the nature of the 
draft, and the fact that many did not stay around for retirement. The nature of the draft 
was particularly important because, as discussed, the drafted force consisted of single 
males who did not stay long and had few, if any, dependents.  
As the list of services, treatment options, and the pool of eligible beneficiaries 
grew exponentially over the next two decades, the military health care system was 
eventually overwhelmed. The MTF system simply could not keep up with demand. Due 
to this proliferation of beneficiaries and services, followed by diminished access to care 
on post, beneficiaries in and out of uniform began to perceive an “erosion of benefits” 
and a “breaking of faith.”34 In reality, they were stuck in a system that was unable to keep 
up with exponential growth.  
Beneficiary, Services, and Cost Creep (1956-1986) 
After the 1956 baseline was established, the pool of eligible beneficiaries had 
grown steadily throughout the 1960s and 70s. By the late 1980s, the pool had ballooned 
from the initial 800,000 Major General Robinson had identified to 9 million eligible 
beneficiaries!35 Several reasons existed for this remarkable growth. First, as the military 
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transitioned from a drafted force to a long-service volunteer force, more soldiers made a 
career out of the military—a career that typically involved marriage and children as 
previously discussed. Adding to this demographic phenomenon was that in general, 
people were living longer. Whereas average life expectancy for white males was 61 in 
1935 when the old-age insurance program was established, by 1985 that number had 
increased to 75 for the male, female, white, and black beneficiaries in the military health 
care system.36 The net effect was predictable: more long-term service members, with 
more dependents, who became retirees with dependents, and were all living longer, 
equaled a drastic increase in the beneficiary pool. 
In addition to growth of this nature, the extent of services offered grew as well. 
Before Vietnam, the major concern in the military health care system was trauma and 
wounds on the battlefield, as well as sickness and disease among the force. Essentially, 
surgeons and the medical staff were concerned more about soldiers fighting on the 
battlefield, in maneuvers, or bivouacking than with servicing their families’ needs. The 
dependent beneficiary mission was a distant secondary mission. With the experience of 
Vietnam and the subsequent creation of the AVF, the scope of the health care mission 
expanded considerably. For example, the requirements grew to include Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder, drug and alcohol addiction (of both active duty and dependents), family 
practices services associated with the married volunteer soldier, unique female health 
care services, HIV/AIDS, and other treatment and service options.37 
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Ironically, whereas the Army was concerned with soldiers’ underweight condition 
and supplying them with cigarettes during WWII, in the post-Vietnam AVF they became 
increasingly alarmed with the overweight condition of soldiers as well as the adverse 
effects of excessive cigarette smoking. If a soldier was slightly soft upon arrival at basic 
training during WWII, a rare occurrence, it was assumed his training experience would 
get him in shape. No body weight standard for basic training even existed until 1960 and 
no weight standard for retention until 1976.38 However with the AVF, issues of weight 
and health were much more important than they were with the WWII conscripts or the 
Cold War draftees. As the Army settled in with the AVF, they were deprived of the “use 
and discard” options they exercised with draft era soldiers.39 The modern volunteer force 
presented a much greater challenge in terms of health and readiness: they required 
treatment, longevity, and a quick returned to service in the field.  
As the WWII generation grew in maturity and influence, both in Congress and 
among the electorate, and as the nation grappled with the political challenges of the 
Vietnam War, the door was flung wide open to a much more expansive and inclusive 
military health care system. The most dramatic example of this growth is found in the 
Military Medical Benefits Amendments of 1966. This act was an extension of the 1956 
legislation and brought the entire military health care system under the umbrella of a 
program called the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services 
(CHAMPUS). After the 1956 legislation, the CHAMPUS legislation represents the next 
major step in the growth of the military health care system. As with other issues 
regarding the military health benefit, the CHAMPUS program, and its TRICARE follow-
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on, is the subject of much scrutiny, conjecture, confusion, and misunderstanding. One 
report described CHAMPUS as a “Rosetta Stone” of complexity. It was intricate in 
language and scope, but also offered government administrators who could master the 
language a prism that might finally translate the complex military health conundrum into 
a workable benefit system: 
Much controversy exists regarding the intent of CHAMPUS legislation—whether it is a 
supplement to or a substitute for the direct military health care system . . . [finding the truth] seems 
akin to the discovery and application of the meaning of the Rosetta Stone. It is presumed that 
when the fundamental truths are understood they will be the key to determining the ‘one best way’ 
of administering CHAMPUS.40  
 
Despite the confusion, CHAMPUS’s initial mandate is rather basic and can be 
discerned through a close reading of the initial legislation. Simply stated, the 1966 
CHAMPUS expansion “broadened the authority of the military services to contract with 
civilian providers to supplement MTF health care [and] expanded the military health care 
benefit both in terms of eligibility and covered services.”41 Though it structurally 
recognized the MTF as the basic building block and delivery platform of the military 
health care system, the CHAMPUS expansion opened the door for beneficiaries, 
including retirees, to access a large network of civilian providers subject to a copay 
system. This copay device, designed initially to force beneficiaries to rely on the MTF 
and cut costs, eventually became the root of many cost overruns in the program. When 
the MTF was no longer able to handle the size of the beneficiary pool, the government 
was forced to rely on the contract feature of CHAMPUS and pay for beneficiary care off-
post. The copay system emerged as the go-to feature of the CHAMPUS benefit, and was 
also the root of the broken promise discourse. Copays and civilian contract care directly 
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conflicted with many retirees’ understanding of a free health care promise. However, the 
initial legislation clearly states that copays and contract care were organic to the 
CHAMPUS benefit from the start; they were “access” features—not “free health care” 
features.42  
Since 1966, Congress has amended the explanation of services covered by 
CHAMPUS on many occasions. These changes have “tended to expand rather than limit 
the level of services covered.” Examples of this expansion between 1966 and 1986 
include inpatient care for all beneficiary categories, outpatient hospital-based services, 
acute care physician services, obstetrics, mental health, diagnostic tests and services, 
ambulance services, durable medical equipment such as oxygen therapy, medically 
necessary dental care, physical exams, pharmacy benefits, family planning, and elective 
reconstructive surgery.43 
If the details and nuance regarding coverage, copays, intent, and broken promises 
are debated, the fact that CHAMPUS greatly influenced the size and cost of the military 
health benefit is not debated. One major study of the military health care program 
concluded that the greatest source of expense in the entire history of the military health 
program was the extension of CHAMPUS coverage to retirees in 1966. By the 1980s, this 
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extension in coverage was consuming upwards of two-thirds of the entire CHAMPUS bill 
charged to Congress every year.44 In order to further understand the mentalité of 
Congressmen as they addressed smoking-related expenses associated with the AVF in the 
1980s, a deeper understanding of the nature of this CHAMPUS bill is required. 
The CHAMPUS Bill  
Congress became painfully aware of CHAMPUS’s immense growth in terms of 
size and cost in 1976. The next 25 years saw near constant hearings on Capitol Hill in an 
ongoing effort to control spiraling CHAMPUS expenditures and budget requests.45 In 
1979, then-Congressman from California and future Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta 
said retirees were forced onto CHAMPUS due to lack of space in the MTF had a 
“tremendous cost” to the taxpayer and the government.46 Other Congressmen lamented 
the “very high cost” of the CHAMPUS program; they were largely responding to the 
reports showing that the “largest percentage of growth” in Defense-related health care 
costs “has occurred in CHAMPUS.”47 Making matters worse, Congressmen realized that 
the cause of this proliferation was not just the 1966 CHAMPUS expansion or the growth 
of the retirement population in general. In addition to these, it was also the product of an 
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expanded AVF and their dependents crowding MTFs after 1973.48 This combined growth 
presented Congress and the Army with a difficult, multifaceted problem. 
An example of the difficulty military officials faced in controlling CHAMPUS 
costs after just a decade with the AVF is found in what military health professionals 
described as the “CHAMPUS Opportunity Cost” conundrum.49 Responding to growing 
costs, by the mid-1980s Congress had taken responsibility for CHAMPUS away from the 
DoD and placed it squarely in the lap of the services—the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
(Marines depend on the Navy for their medical services). This move was informed by the 
bureaucratic dictum stating that an organization forced to pay for a program with funds 
organic to that organization is more likely to control and monitor their program costs. If 
the source of funds is external to the organization, like the DoD, organizations tend to 
exercise much looser cost control measures. This is known as the OPM concept: other 
people’s money.  
After Congress implemented these cost control measures, services were forced to 
take CHAMPUS cost overruns out of hide. This meant that the Army would have to shift 
money from other funding streams or accounting lines to cover unbudgeted cost overruns 
associated with dependent and retiree non-MTF medical bills. It was quite possible that 
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an Army appropriator would have to choose between elements of operational mission 
readiness (such as fuel and bullets) and funding CHAMPUS cost overruns. By the mid-
80s, these out of hide charges had grown so large, the services could no longer simply 
shift money or absorb them without seriously affecting mission accomplishment and 
combat readiness. With bills from unbudgeted cost overruns running as high as $525 
million in some years, Congress grew alarmed at the unfunded liability bills the military 
services were presenting in the form of unpaid, unbudgeted CHAMPUS cost overruns.50 
This was the nature of the CHAMPUS cost.  
However, the CHAMPUS opportunity cost resulted from the blowback. Congress, 
weary of these out-of-budget bills, pushed back on the Services and forced them to 
develop allocation schemes that gave rise to an opportunity cost mechanism. For 
example, the Army’s primary medical mission is the readiness of the active duty soldier, 
with the benefits mission running a close second.51 In order to give Army medics and 
doctors relevant experience to enhance and enable the primary mission, the Army 
Medical Corps needed to move doctors, or deploy them from time to time, to give them 
exposure to the field conditions, wounds, and operations tempo they could expect in a 
combat zone. However, the benefits of such operational experiences had to be weighed 
against the monetary costs in terms of CHAMPUS assignments. If an Army doctor was 
not available at the MTF (i.e., he was in the field or training), the CHAMPUS beneficiary 
(dependents, retirees, etc.) received care off-post, resulting in a charge to the CHAMPUS 
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budget. In the end these enhancement missions associated with combat and medical 
readiness were often sacrificed for the secondary mission of beneficiary services in 
efforts to avoid CHAMPUS “opportunity costs.” 52  
Ironically, retaining good Army doctors in an environment where they were 
denied relevant field experience became very difficult. As many doctors left the service 
after their mandatory terms, they still drove up the CHAMPUS opportunity cost, as their 
absence forced a mountain of CHAMPUS assignments. Many reasoned they would rather 
make better money in the civilian sector than as managed care providers in uniform. Thus 
the gaping hole at the MTF created the CHAMPUS opportunity cost after all. In addition 
to this, by 1979 Congress was forced to enact very expensive measures to keep doctors in 
the service through bonus money and other programs. In another bit of irony, Congress 
ultimately had to spend money in order to avoid losing money to the potential budget 
draining CHAMPUS opportunity cost scenario. One wonders if it was really a wash in 
the end.53 
The Reality of a Smoking AVF 
By the early 1980s, Congress was acutely aware of the mounting bills associated 
with AVF health care and the CHAMPUS program. The air was thick with cost-cutting 
schemes. This cost-averse, budget-sensitive environment influenced the mindset of 
military and government appropriators as they addressed the reality of rising military 
health care costs in general, and health-related expenses associated with a cigarette 
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smoking AVF specifically. The proposition of a cigarette smoking AVF was a 
particularly grim reality that made their task all the more daunting. Once legislators 
parsed fact from fiction in terms of the baseline health care requirement for military 
beneficiaries, reality emerged: this was a large, growing, and expensive pool that was 
guaranteed access to a great variety of services and benefits both on- and off-post.54  
Additionally, many were aware the typical smoke-and-mirror games involving 
slick accounting schemes and bureaucratic efficiencies would not work in this case. The 
1978 Finneran Study had informed them the administration of CHAMPUS was as good 
as it would ever be; there simply were no administrative fixes, fat-trimming exercises, or 
operational maneuvers that could stop the bleeding or yield substantial cost savings. If the 
CHAMPUS program was expensive, it was due to a glaring reality: the growth in 
throughput and eligible beneficiaries had outpaced Congressional efforts to keep up with 
demand.55 
As a result, Congress was faced with a bleak proposition: if the health care bill of 
the AVF and the retiree force of the mid 1980s appeared unsustainable, how much more 
so would they be in the mid-1990s when the first wave of the AVF started to retire? Even 
more daunting, they had to consider the fact that if nothing changed, at minimum 52 
percent of these future Army retirees would be smokers who spent the majority of their 
career smoking cigarettes subsidized by Congress, sold in bulk at half-price or less on 
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post, or given to them free of charge in ration packs or at military hospitals.56 If this 
beneficiary pool created a $525 million cost overrun during the mid-1980s, how would 
the overrun look in the mid-1990s when a massive group of chain smoking military 
retirees entered the CHAMPUS system? Leon Panetta saw this conundrum when he said 
in 1979 that the retiree population was outgrowing the capabilities of the military health 
care system.57 Panetta was soon joined by a cabal of fiscal conservatives concerned about 
spiraling costs, and more specifically, a host of costs associated with the problem of a 
smoking, soon retiring AVF. 
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CHAPTER IX 
CAP, JOE, AND THE JESSE HELMS CREW GO TO WAR 
 If Rome was not built in a day, neither was the soldier-cigarette bond that 
produced the AVF starters and chain smokers of such great concern for Carter-Reagan 
Era legislators and defense appropriators. The entrenchment of the soldier and the 
cigarette occurred over six decades within a military-industrial-political culture that 
nursed the manly, rugged, financially lucrative, and politically expedient connection 
between soldiering and smoking. The cigarette enterprise’s extended battle to keep 
Americans, and by extension soldier-starters, hinged to smoking and the federal 
bureaucracy’s efforts to unhinge these bonds eventually came into direct conflict. What 
had started as low-level wrangling grew into small scale skirmishes and further escalated: 
by the mid-1970s, the battle over cigarettes in America ballooned to full-scale war.  
Like all wars, the cigarette wars had battle lines, strategic plans, and battlefield 
commanders. The battlefield was the Beltway, the strategic plans were developed by 
lobbyists and politicians on both sides of the cigarette debate, and the great commanders 
were Casper “Cap” Weinberger, Jesse Helms, and Joe Califano. The story of these great 
captains of the cigarette war not only sets up a final discussion of the demise of the 
soldier-cigarette bond, it further exposes an American corporatocracy linking highly 
placed government and industrial officials with powerful special interests.  
 When Casper Weinberger stood for nomination as Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) in 1981, he was a veteran infantryman, a cost-cutting budgeter, a seasoned 
bureaucrat, a big business “ladle,” and a powerful corporate lawyer all in one.1 All his 
                                                          
1
 Edward M. “Ted” Kennedy and Casper W. Weinberger, “Political Debate,” (C-SPAN video, 
March 14, 1986), 1:03:38, accessed December 31, 2014, www.c-spanvideo.org/program/PoliticalDebate. In 
218 
 
 
varied experiences informed his leadership of the DoD and the way he approached the 
problems associated with chain smoking soldiers during the 1980s. Weinberger 
considered himself a soldier’s soldier. Four decades before he assumed the helm at DoD, 
Weinberger had finished Harvard Law School and promptly enlisted in the Army as an 
infantryman. Later in life, he commented: “The infantry was, in my mind, the most 
honorable way to serve, a sentiment which I suppose came particularly from my mother’s 
New England heritage and the ethic that only the most difficult, disagreeable path was 
morally right and that anything enjoyable must be wrong.2” 
Weinberger was proud that he knew the life of the grunt, how to look after the 
men under his charge, and that he had served in his generation’s great war. Once when 
listening to President Reagan quote from a WWI infantryman’s journal during a speech, 
Weinberger said that he “knew again that kinship I always felt for the infantry and the 
pride I had served in it so long ago.”3 He knew the distinction of being an infantryman; 
however, he also knew the hardships associated with the infantryman’s troglodyte 
existence. Reporting to Camp Roberts, California, for basic training during WWII, he, 
along with a group of college and graduate degree recruits, were given their first military 
assignment: “digging sewers under the main parade ground.” Weinberger commented 
that in the mud, muck, and ditches of Camp Roberts, he first learned how vital morale 
was to the enlisted man, commenting he “got a good idea of what is important to enlisted 
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men and their morale,” knowledge he felt proved “invaluable when I became Secretary of 
Defense.”4 As SECDEF, he would find out how important cigarettes were to the morale 
of the force and the enterprise’s bottom line.  
 Weinberger’s life as an infantryman was a valuable and rewarding experience, but 
not his life’s work. Instead, he lived a life of service in high-placed positions in and out 
of government—not digging slit trenches, directing enfilading fire, or performing the 
monotonous duties of an Army staff officer. Though not in the trench, whether serving at 
the state, federal, or corporate level, Weinberger was always in the arena. After cutting 
his teeth as a lawyer and serving as California’s state finance and budget director, 
Weinberger saw his first federal posting when elevated as the Commissioner of the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1969. According to President Nixon, he wanted 
Weinberger “to clean [the FTC] up.”5  When appointed, newspapers reported the “FTC 
was buffeted and embattled when President Nixon appointed California’s aggressive and 
knowledgeable Cap Weinberger to take charge and straighten things out.”6 What needed 
cleaning, and why did the FTC feel “buffeted” by Cap’s arrival? As Weinberger soon 
discovered, the cigarette enterprise had much to say about these questions. 
At the FTC, Weinberger spent much of his time in direct confrontation with the 
enterprise. He found that the “heavy criticism the agency was receiving” was to a great 
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degree generated from the propagandists and pundits associated with the cigarette 
enterprise. The industry was livid over the FTC’s cigarette warning labels and 
interference with Americans’ smoking behaviors.7 FTC interference started in 1964 in 
response to the Surgeon General’s Warning, and continued through 1969 with 
Congressional and FTC mandated restrictions on cigarette advertising, as well as 
mandatory labeling regulations.8 Subsequently, the enterprise proved extremely interested 
in and committed to getting the federal government out of the smoking regulation 
business. 
To some extent, the developing cigarette controversy in the Beltway and the 
immense power of the enterprise took Weinberger by surprise. Leaving California, he 
commented, “Reporters’ questions in Sacramento showed genuine interest in government 
and in establishing facts about a policy.” However, by the time he entered Washington, 
DC, he found the questions changed. Questions about general policy turned to “questions 
. . . designed to elicit controversy” and were questions “particularly interested in my 
views on smoking and tobacco policy.”9 Many on both sides of the smoking issue were 
interested in his views on cigarettes and health. During Senate Commerce Committee 
confirmation hearings, Weinberger was consistently grilled about his position on 
cigarettes. One particular Senator came right to the point, asking Weinberger whether or 
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not he would “strive diligently to protect the American people against hazards of 
cigarette smoking.” Weinberger responded:  
Yes Senator . . . once it is established that there are, for example, health hazards involved in 
cigarette smoking . . . it seems to me entirely appropriate that a label that states that be included, as 
it is at the present time . . . this is again a simple matter of basically truth in labeling and truth in 
advertising. This is the way I feel about it.10  
 
With this statement, Weinberger made one of his earliest official statements 
regarding his position on smoking in America. His statement was and should be 
interpreted as exposing his core belief that smoking was a habit requiring regulation, to 
some degree or another, by the federal government. Considering his controversial stance 
on smoking, it was not surprising for Weinberger to discover that some in the media 
“appeared to be quite gleeful when I said I did not smoke.”11 The press knew there was a 
Beltway bonanza of juicy news in the making when a California-based, non-smoking, 
bourgeoisie moderate ran up against the conservative, Southern-based good ol’ boy 
tobacco coalition. Given time and enough baiting questions, the stories would practically 
write themselves.  
Thus, when Cap Weinberger took the reins at the FTC, he became the chief target 
of a force relentless in its efforts to undermine the regulatory power of the federal 
apparatus in relation to cigarette smoking. The FTC was established in 1914 as the 
“capstone of over thirty years of progressive government” during a period which saw the 
enactment of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1890 and the emergence of Progressive Era 
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lightning rod Teddy Roosevelt in 1901.12 The enterprise had largely avoided the 
meddling hand of the FTC during the Commission’s first 50 years; this string of success 
came to an end after the 1964 Surgeon General’s Warning. When the industry and others 
interested in rolling back the power of the FTC fought back, they quickly noted the FTC 
was historically a waste dump of lawyers, “the little old lady of Pennsylvania Avenue.”13 
When Weinberger took over in 1969, the FTC had over 400 lawyers on its payroll who 
litigated a mere 23 cases the previous year. The cigarette enterprise used the perception 
of waste and unwarranted brass nanny meddling as a rallying cry against Weinberger’s 
FTC. For the next two decades, Weinberger was destined to develop intimate familiarity 
with this brass nanny rallying cry during subsequent postings at the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and DoD.  
To some degree however, Weinberger sympathized with those critical of the FTC. 
As a veteran budget cutter from California, where he was instrumental in pushing through 
Governor Reagan’s austerity measures, he felt that the FTC budget was a bit bloated. He 
recalled, “I fully agreed that our budget was much too big and should be cut.” He added 
that this confused many of the Beltway insiders and “caused quite a stir . . . Congress had 
never had anyone ask for a budget reduction.”14 Weinberger trimming budgets and asking 
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for spending reductions would prove incredibly ironic for a man who, as SECDEF, drove 
defense spending to a stratosphere many had never fathomed.15  
Further, he felt some of the FTC programs were slightly intrusive or badly 
botched. For example, he lamented the Commission had spent “about seven years to 
determine whether Listerine really freshened your breath and whether the advertising was 
truthful.” Additionally, he poked fun at the FTC directed label “do not wash on one side, 
and do not dry clean on the other.”16 However, austere budgets, good breath, and silly 
garment labels were one thing; smoking dangers and lung cancer were another. 
Throughout his time at the FTC and other postings leading to his appointment as 
SECDEF, Weinberger consistently believed the public required warning about potentially 
dangerous, unhealthy behaviors so “they could make more informed decisions.”17  
As an executive in the federal government, Weinberger strove to place cigarette 
production and consumption under the all-seeing eye of big government. Particularly 
striking about Weinberger’s odyssey into anti-smoking zealotry was his determination to 
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make it an overtly personal odyssey. Regarding the personal nature of this foray, 
Weinberger commented:  
I personally was convinced of the need to protect the public from the perils of smoking, but my 
opinion had been formed long before and was based on much less erudite reasoning. When I was 
four years old, I had found a half-smoked, still burning cigar on the street near our home in San 
Francisco, and naturally I tried to smoke it as I had seen others do. I still remember how ill it made 
me, and I never touched tobacco again. More important, I felt the dangers of smoking were an 
important consumer issue.18 
 
Stridently opposed to the enterprise, he took the rather controversial stance that the FTC 
should implement and orchestrate all forms of cigarette warning, including advertising 
and media, and not just recently approved FTC package labels.19 He wanted to 
substantially strengthen warnings on cigarette packs and advertisements to include, 
ironically, a frank statement warning consumers about what he felt were scientifically 
proven dangers inherent in smoking.20 He also wanted to address the dangers of 
secondhand smoke, an issue that was just beginning to rear its head in the 1970s.21  
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“WARNING: Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease,” “WARNING: Smoking during pregnancy can 
harm your baby,” “WARNING: Smoking can kill you,” “WARNING: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung 
disease in nonsmokers,” and “WARNING: Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your 
health.”  
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Regarding these aggressive anti-smoking policies, Weinberger reasoned the 
enterprise and associated advertisers had comfortably survived the tranche of labeling 
requirements and advertising restrictions that came into effect in the 1960s. As a man 
who would grow comfortable navigating the waters between industry and government, 
board and bureaucracy, Weinberger felt cigarette production should continue as a very 
profitable private venture, albeit with some responsible government oversight. However, 
he personally hoped “many American people survive too, thanks to the dangers of 
smoking” which the federal government had endeavored to make clear to them. These 
comments and policy positions were infuriating to an enterprise increasingly alarmed by 
the maverick anti-smoking bureaucrat from the West Coast.22  
 After a stint at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) where he again 
angered Beltway bureaucrats with his penchant for impounding appropriated funds and 
trimming budgets to unsustainable levels, President Nixon elevated Weinberger to the 
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helm of the HEW.23 From a position with moderate impact on smoking and cigarette 
policies at FTC, at HEW Weinberger was placed in the center of the ring. As Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, Weinberger would directly influence everything from 
the funding of smoking-related health research, to anti-smoking education initiatives, to a 
myriad of health and welfare issues as they pertained to an American population that 
included millions of dedicated cigarette smokers.  
 Consistent with his time at FTC, at HEW Weinberger went out of his way to 
highlight his personal aversion to cigarette smoking and the importance of federal 
intervention. In a radio interview given during this period, when asked about his desire to 
ban high-tar cigarettes, Weinberger responded: 
Well, it is a personal suggestion and recommendation that I have made to the Congress [regarding] 
the effects of smoking on the nonsmoker who breathes in the smoke . . . We have found . . . that 
this is a very major public health hazard and that it has a high toll in illness and premature deaths, 
and it’s totally needless and it’s preventable. And we suggested that the—I did—suggested that 
the Congress should regulate the levels of the tar and nicotine and these hazardous ingredients that 
are in cigarettes.24 
 
When asked if he felt this demand for a ban on high-tar cigarettes would lead to an 
across-the-board ban on the manufacture of cigarettes in America, Weinberger responded 
that he did not “think that there’s any suggestion of that at this point . . .”25 Words are 
important, and the fact that Weinberger had consistently supported a ban on high-tar 
cigarettes and was against a total ban of cigarettes, but only “at this point,” were not 
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words missed by powerful forces in the cigarette enterprise. Indeed they were interpreted 
as an existential threat to the entire American cigarette enterprise.  
Jesse Helms to the breech! 
As tensions mounted between pro and anti-cigarette factions in and out of 
government, it was only a matter of time before the key elements of the enterprise’s 
strategy to make war on anti-smoking zealots appeared on the floors of Congress.26 As 
previously demonstrated, this strategy was tethered to a program of denial, deflection, 
smokers’ rights, and doubt. As an end state, the enterprise’s grand plan was oriented on 
three mutually supporting outcomes. First, it would position the industry to degrade the 
federal government’s ability to legislate against smoking. Second, the plan would allow 
the industry to attract new smokers—many of whom were soldiers, and nearly all voters. 
Third, it would aid in the retention of committed, experienced smokers (also voters) by 
giving them a measure of confidence in their choice to continue enjoying cigarettes. 
Influential tobacco state politicians were deeply involved in executing plans associated 
with these outcomes. They stood to benefit economically if government efforts to 
regulate cigarette smoking were obstructed, and politically if they were seen as guarding 
smoker-voter rights.  
However before Jesse Helms entered the breech to join the enterprise’s battle 
against anti-smoking zealotry, Senator Marlow W. Cook laid a strong foundation, 
masterfully employing enterprise strategies in the halls of Congress. Cook was a senator 
from Kentucky and a vociferous defender of tobaccoland America. He was also a 
distinguished military veteran who entered the United States Navy at 17 and served in the 
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submarine fleet during WWII. After graduating from the University of Louisville Law 
School in 1950, Cook practiced law and worked his way up through the Kentucky State 
House of Representatives, eventually winning election to the US Senate as a Republican 
in 1968.27 On February 7, 1973, Cook stepped to the podium on the Senate floor and 
waged a verbal war against the anti-smoking elements who, in his opinion, were invading 
the halls of Congress and the many corridors of the federal government.28 By this date, 
Weinberger had already accrued his anti-smoking bona fides during his posts at FTC and 
OMB and had made anti-smoking waves during his confirmation hearings for his new 
posting at HEW. The occasion for Cook’s tirade was the sixth annual release of HEW’s 
report alerting Congress to the health risks associated with smoking. Cook’s timing was 
not by chance; he wanted to welcome the incoming HEW secretary with a penchant for 
meddling in America’s smoking habits with a shot across the bow.  
In a speech replete with martial overtones, Cook began by lamenting that the 
nation had recently extracted itself from an unpopular and costly insurgent war in 
Southeast Asia, only to find the homeland under attack by elements of the federal 
government. This “winter offensive” against the fifty million American citizens who 
chose to smoke was, in Cook’s estimation, preceded by a “bombardment” campaign 
masquerading itself as “scientific data.” Cook claimed the propaganda and deception 
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strategies of the Viet Cong were leveraged by the US government in a program to employ 
false data and unsupported accusations aimed at social engineering and mind control. 
While real soldiers fought in jungles and rice paddies, federal bureaucrats, like 
Weinberger, were “entrenched in the dark nooks and crannies of the federal 
establishment” cranking out propaganda in their ongoing war against the cigarette 
industry. Cook labeled the anti-smoking elements of the HEW office as “closed-minded 
crusaders” plotting a sneak attack against smoking in a disgusting war against the 
American tobacco farmer. Cook concluded his emotional speech in support of the 
cigarette industry and smokers’ rights with a quote from a recent Supreme Court ruling: 
“Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded 
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, 
well-meaning but without understanding.”29  
Cook’s oration displayed nearly every aspect of the enterprise’s Roper strategy. 
He brilliantly combined the plan’s key tenets as he invoked language regarding rights, 
freedom, federal cronyism, questionable scientific data, and patriotic fervor. Cook ended 
with a warning to Cap Weinberger: rein in the “smoke fighters” and entrenched 
government bureaucrats at the HEW.30 He demanded that Weinberger instead steer the 
Department toward fair and objective reporting about the supposed health risks 
associated with smoking. Weinberger took office less than a week later on February 12, 
1973; however, only time would tell if the new HEW Secretary, and future Defense 
Secretary, was listening.  
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If Weinberger was not listening to Cook, a newly elected senator from North 
Carolina was determined to make sure Weinberger paid attention to him. Senator Jesse 
Helms appeared in full armor on the Beltway battlefield in 1973. Helms soon thereafter 
responded in force at various and sundry times over the next two decades to any threat to 
the cigarette enterprise. HEW Secretary Weinberger, with his prolonged, zealous, and in 
Helm’s eyes, malicious actions against the cigarette enterprise, was made a key target of 
Helm’s counterassault. Hailing from North Carolina, Helms was the first Republican 
Senator from that state since the end of Reconstruction. He gained popularity among 
North Carolina’s grassroots tobacco community as a radio personality and conservative 
editorialist on the Tobacco Radio Network, a conglomeration of AM and FM stations that 
served as the conservative voice of rural Carolina.  
To say Helms was a staunch supporter of the cigarette enterprise is an 
understatement; he was at once foot soldier, field commander, and grand strategist. In 
short, Helms was the cigarette industry’s best friend in Congress and Weinberger’s worst 
enemy.31 Both Helms and Weinberger, and the interest groups they represented, were 
soon engaged in a high-visibility war. Despite the tradition that freshmen Senators were 
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to be seen and not heard, Helms had quickly joined the fight. Helms lasted only eight 
days under this restrictive tradition before he rose to make an impassioned speech in 
defense of tobacco price supports.32 By 1975, he had grown in confidence and was a 
regular on the Senate floor exuberantly defending enterprise interests. If Cook welcomed 
Weinberger to his post at HEW in 1973, Helms delivered Weinberger a parting shot 
when Cap left office in August 1975 to return to the corporate arena. Similar to Cook, 
Helms took to the Senate floor on the occasion of the HEW’s annual release of their 
report to Congress on the dangers of cigarette smoking. In a report “financed by 
taxpayers,” Helms declared Casper Weinberger had “done it again,” exposing the rest of 
the world to his annual “tizzy” over smoking and providing Congress with unproven, 
debatable “science” regarding the supposed dangers of cigarette smoking.  
Though much of Helms’ vitriol and rhetoric tracked closely with the key points of 
the Roper Proposal, the conservative tobacco state politician tended not to concern 
himself with status quo. Helms wanted to take the discourse to an entirely new level. 
Rather than continuing with his own words as Cook had done, Helms chose to insert the 
words of Tobacco Institute President, close personal friend, and former North Carolina 
Congressman Horace Kornegay into the official Senate transcript. If Cook’s words were 
a subtle yet stern warning against government interference in the cigarette industry, 
Kornegay’s speech, defiantly placed by Helms in the official Senate transcript, was an 
outright battle cry.  
The words Helms co-opted were originally spoken by Kornegay at the annual 
Tobacco Growers Convention in Wilmington, North Carolina, two months earlier on 
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June 16, 1975. He conjured up military terms and rhetoric long associated with the Civil 
War’s Lost Cause and Dunning Schools of interpretation. 33 He also skillfully capitalized 
on the fact that he was speaking at the Blockade Runner Hotel to a crowd of Southern 
sympathizers. Seizing the emotion of the moment, and the regionally divided political 
environment in America at that time, Kornegay raged against the anti-cigarette forces 
amassed in opposition to the industry: 
As a son of North Carolina, and a soldier in what can properly be called “The Twenty-Year War 
of Anti-Tobacco Aggression,” I feel it is especially fitting to speak to you tonight . . . for it is no 
exaggeration to say that our industry is under siege . . . we are sustaining a blockade by an enemy 
bound and determined to cut the right of the American people who smoke . . . we are determined 
to break that blockade . . . [and] express the pursuit of happiness through the simple pleasure of 
smoking tobacco. 34 
 
In referencing the “Twenty Year War,” Kornegay dated the tobacco war to the 
release of Ernst Wynder’s definitive 1950 study forcefully linking cigarette smoking with 
lung cancer. By referring to the “War of Anti-Tobacco Aggression,” he alluded to the 
controversial name for the Civil War more familiar to his audience: The War of Northern 
Aggression. By evoking this aggression imagery, Kornegay expressed the sentiments of 
many tobacco growers and smokers across the nation, and certainly the South: smoking 
was under attack by fanatic, anti-smoking abolitionists. 
Bruce Schulman, historian of the “rise of the Sun Belt and the reddening of 
America,” describes how, during the 1970s, the South, as well as the Southwest, arose 
and became a formidable region in Republican Party politics—a party that was fast 
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becoming the home of white, former Democrats. No longer the sleepy, backwards South, 
politicians and party bosses were forced to look to the Sun Belt if they wanted to gain 
electoral office in the Executive Branch. This paradigm shift formed the heart of Nixon’s 
Southern Strategy and was instrumental in returning the Republicans to office in 1972. 
When Kornegay made this speech pitting Southern “Rednecks” against DC 
“abolitionists,” his defiance was not fringe or seen as a voice in the wilderness. Indeed, as 
Schulman argues, it was to the contrary: “by the mid-1970s . . . a number of Northern 
leaders awoke to this alliance between government action and Sunbelt boosterism and 
began worrying about increasing Southern power in national affairs. Their fears were 
well founded.”35 In the end, as inflammatory and divisive as Kornegay’s words were, he 
knew he was speaking from a position of power, fueled by the will of the people 
represented by those in his audience. 
Kornegay adhered to the key aspects of the Roper doubt strategy and discussed 
the environmental factors that cause poor health. He argued these factors were much 
more likely to cause lung cancer than cigarette smoke. He suggested Americans could not 
be tricked anymore into blaming cigarettes for poor lung health over more plausible 
causes like coal dust, asbestos, chemicals, air pollution, genetics, and even certain dietary 
habits. He postulated smoking was an easy target for (Yankee) industrialists who wanted 
to divert attention from the real causes of illness. This line of argumentation was soaked 
in the Dunning School approach to the New South, an interpretation that placed the 
South’s problems squarely in the lap of evil, money-grubbing Northern industrialists. 
Kornegay cited supposed government reports showing that death and disease were higher 
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in industrial counties, as opposed to suburban counties void of pollution generating 
factories. He reasoned that an average person with “eyes, and ears, and brains” could 
easily determine it was not tobacco smoke causing illness. Referring to the simmering 
debate over secondhand smoke, Kornegay opined that areas drawing their drinking water 
from polluted rivers and life-sustaining oxygen from air contaminated by auto emissions 
knew better than to blame their health problems on “someone smoking in a restaurant.”36  
In this speech, Kornegay introduced yet another aspect of the tobacco industry 
defense strategy: taxes. Cigarette industry apologists had long argued the benefits of 
tobacco and cigarette sales as a lucrative tax source for federal and state governments. In 
the same vein, they also railed against federal government waste represented by what 
they saw as excessive kowtowing to the anti-cigarette lobby. Government at all levels 
took in over $5.7 billion in tobacco-related tax revenue in 1975 alone. This fact by itself 
supported the industry’s assertion that it was a lavish contributor to the federal purse.37  
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Additionally, Kornegay took a swipe at federal government waste with his 
accusation that American’s hard-earned tax dollars were funding what he considered 
phony research and exorbitant anti-smoking conventions. He chastised the HEW for its 
sponsorship of the American Cancer Society and other anti-smoking agencies. At 
taxpayer expense, Kornegay accused these phony organizations of convening at various 
cushy locations to discuss the elimination of every American’s right to enjoy a good 
cigarette. A prime example was the World Conference on Smoking and Health, which 
had recently gathered at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York. Kornegay lamented that 
anti-smoking zealots from all over the world were bankrolled by the American taxpayers 
in this extravagant conference. His agenda was quite clear: if the government could not 
be trusted with tax dollars, how could it be trusted to provide accurate, objective 
scientific data regarding the dangers of smoking? 
However in the interest of full disclosure, Kornegay failed to mention the $23 
million a year the federal government provided in tobacco crop subsidies and price 
supports during this period.38 Nor did he mention the $400 million a year the industry 
spent on advertising, as opposed to the $1 million the HEW budgeted for direct anti-
cigarette promotions. The $23 million price support figure is particularly ironic 
considering the budget for the HEW Office on Smoking Health was exactly $23 million 
as well.39 In a story rife with paradoxes, this is one of many: the government was paying 
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tobacco farmers $23 million to support prices with one hand and then paying various 
HEW sponsored groups $23 million to stop Americans from smoking with the other.40  
Helms and Kornegay’s opponents viewed the price support program, a hallmark 
of FDR’s New Deal legislative agenda, as an even greater example of irresponsible 
federal spending. The issues of price supports and federal government largess in the form 
of massive federal farm bill legislation were constant problems for Helms. They allowed 
his opponents and anti-smoking groups to paint him as a walking, flame-throwing 
contradiction. On one hand, Helms was one of the most vocal and determined opponents 
of the federal food stamp program. However, as a Senator from North Carolina and the 
Chairman of the Agriculture Committee, Helms was one of the most determined and 
vocal proponents of the tobacco support program. Many of his critics felt crop supports 
were nothing more than food stamps for tobacco farmers in the form of millions in cash 
payments. His position on federal price supports for tobacco also flew in the face of his 
staunch belief that “government should stay out of relations between the private 
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entrepreneur and the free market.” Additionally, his tobacco policies were at odds with 
his position on government waste and the need for conservative fiscal policies.41  
In James C. Cobb’s classic work on Southern identity, The Most Southern Place 
on Earth, he paints a clear picture of this paradox. Cobb describes the irony of Southern 
planter inconsistency: they register “objections to ‘wasteful’ and ‘unnecessary’ 
antipoverty efforts” and then eagerly accept “huge federal subsidy checks.” Cobb 
excoriates Mississippi’s Congressman Whitten, who would play a significant role in the 
struggle over cigarette subsidies in the 1980s while he was Chairman of the House 
Appropriations Committee. Cobb points out how Whitten bristled at the food stamp 
program, arguing that “when you start giving people something for nothing . . . I wonder 
if you don’t destroy character more than you might improve nutrition.” However, Cobb 
also notes that Whitten “expressed no such concerns . . . about the effects of government 
farm payments on the character of their already well-heeled recipients.” Cobb reserves 
the final word on this Southern “paradoxical phenomenon” to Walker Percy, who said 
that over the span of thirty years, “planters who were going broke on ten cent cotton 
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voted for Roosevelt, took federal money, got rich, lived to hate Kennedy and Johnson and 
vote for Goldwater–while still taking federal money.”42    
In reality, Weinberger, Helms, Whitten, and a majority of the characters 
associated with the story of the soldier and the cigarette are paradoxical figures 
representing the warp and woof of a modern federal corporatocracy which attempts to 
weave together various, oft opposing interests. Weinberger first exemplified this with his 
pernicious budget slashing on one hand, only to become a legendary ladle for the defense 
and international construction industry on the other. Jesse Helms fell right in line with his 
tirades against government assistance on one hand, and his dogged support of tobacco 
price supports and allotments on the other. Both present a classic case study in 
contradiction. In Smoking and Politics, Fritschler and Hoefler explain the often 
“perfidious” behavior of Helms and other tobacco state politicians:  
The beneficiaries of the multibillion-dollar tobacco industry work hard to discourage reductions in 
the tobacco regulatory programs which benefit the industry, while arguing forcefully against big 
government and government intervention in the economy. The only possible explanation for this 
perfidious behavior was offered by Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina). Reacting to proposals 
to eliminate the tobacco program . . . the Senator said, “In North Carolina, tobacco isn’t a 
commodity, it’s a religion.”43 
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Historian Joseph Ellis, in his biography of Thomas Jefferson, the hero of classic 
liberals like Helms and Kornegay, notes contradictory behavior was something the great 
Jefferson bequeathed to his nation. Ellis concludes his biography by stating Jefferson was 
“America’s Everyman” and that his great gift to America was “an American political 
culture . . . based on the capacity to rest comfortably with contradictions.”44 However, as 
Kornegay concluded his speech, he called upon Jefferson’s memory as an agrarian 
populist and ardent defender of the “pursuits of happiness” as opposed to Jefferson’s 
apparent penchant for contradiction. He closed with the standard patriotic plea that surely 
jolted the farmers to their feet: 
All these scarce government funds to blend foreign zealotry with the domestic variety in a frantic 
effort to destroy the product that saved the Jamestown colony . . . that financed the war that freed 
us from the British Empire . . . and without which there may have been no reason to have a 
Bicentennial, much less celebrate one.45  
 
These strong words contained an interesting Populist reinterpretation of American 
history. In essence, Kornegay and Helms argue that America would not exist as a free 
nation if it was not for agrarian interests and hardworking tobacco farmers. Americans 
are not wrong to appreciate the place of agriculture in the nation’s history; well into the 
twentieth century America was still a rural, agricultural nation. However, Kornegay was 
on shaky grounds with such straight line, ahistoric logic. These accusations and apparent 
contradictions aside, Helms was more than happy to insert Kornegay’s speech into the 
official Senate Record in order to reinforce his position regarding the cigarette enterprise. 
Their rhetoric forcefully asserted the enterprise argument that federal meddling in an 
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American pastime that generated billions of dollars in tax receipts and sustained 
thousands of farm families, industry jobs, and subsidiary commerce, was not in the best 
interest of the American people. 
When Helms yielded his time on the Senate floor that day, August 1, 1975, he 
hoped his words traveled further than the wood-paneled halls of Congress.46 He wanted 
the entire federal government to notice he was speaking on behalf of millions of 
American smokers, of whom large portions were American military personnel. By the 
mid-1970s, 54 million Americans were still avid cigarette smokers who generated the 
industry $14 billion a year in profits.47 The vast majority of all soldiers then in uniform 
were smokers. The industry was still several years from reaching its nadir in terms of 
production and sales. Helms and tobaccoland politicians represented a politically active 
constituency of smokers that included soldiers, retirees, veterans, and tobaccoland 
farmers who would play a major role in the smoking debate. Armed with the power 
represented in these, the sublime smokers, and the cash-happy cigarette industry, Helms 
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had risen to defend freedom of choice, personal responsibility, freedom of commerce, 
and their Jeffersonian rights to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”48  
However, Weinberger seemed to have rained on Helm’s parade. Did Weinberger 
not have the last laugh? His last official act at HEW, and his parting shot against Helms, 
was, after all, the issuance of the annual report that Helms was so incensed about in the 
first place. Yet on the other hand, Weinberger may not have had the last laugh after all. 
Before Weinberger had even finished his post-Beltway vacation, Helms and the 
enterprise displayed their power over and access to the very top echelons of the federal 
government. When President Ford discovered Weinberger’s anti-smoking swan song, he 
quickly jotted a personal note to Helms regarding the personal nature of Weinberger’s 
comments:  
As you know, Secretary Weinberger sent to Congress the 1975 Annual Report on the Health 
Consequences of Smoking which recommended legislation to provide authority to set maximum 
permissible levels of hazardous ingredients in cigarettes. As the Secretary has indicated, the views 
expressed in the transmittal letter are his own. They are not intended to represent the 
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Administration's views on federal regulation of cigarettes. The Administration has not proposed 
legislation on this subject.49 
 
With these words, President Ford essentially threw Secretary Weinberger, and the 
entire anti-smoking establishment, under the bus and reset the clock back to the status 
quo situation that had welcomed Weinberger to the HEW in 1973.50 The letter also 
displayed another stark reality: a first-term Senator with only two years’ experience 
commands much respect when he is backed by the powerful, enormously wealthy 
cigarette enterprise. When Weinberger did finish his vacation, he reported to San 
Francisco where he had been lavishly recruited as legal counsel and Vice President of 
Bechtel Corporation. He was more than happy to leave behind Helms and the imbroglio 
that saw Nixon fall and Ford ascend. If he only knew the future, he might not have 
written off the vexatious Helms or the problems of the Republican Party so quickly. 
Weinberger was subsequently replaced at HEW by President Ford’s man, Forrest 
David Matthews. When Ford lost the election to Jimmy Carter in 1976, Carter called on 
long time Democratic operative and LBJ Great Society man Joseph Califano to serve as 
the new HEW chief. Califano, like Weinberger, was a seasoned bureaucrat with extensive 
experience in Beltway politics, big business, and high-powered DC legal firms, who also 
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had an anti-smoking pedigree. Like Weinberger, he quickly came under the wrath of 
Helms. However, as opposed to Weinberger, Califano had been an avid smoker for most 
of his adult life. Like many before and after, Califano was challenged to set aside his 
many connections with big business and his personal vices as he pursued his public duties 
at HEW.  
When Joseph Califano was sworn in as the twelfth Secretary of the HEW in 
January 1977, he brought with him extensive experience as a Democratic Party operative, 
federal executive, Defense Department insider, and Beltway lawyer. Helms and the 
Southern Conservatives had grave concerns about his liberal policies and what they felt 
was a dangerous fascination with social welfare; after all, he was the architect and 
executor of LBJ’s Great Society. However, even more disconcerting to them was 
Califano’s comfort with the anti-smoking agenda and his apparent desire to expand 
federal regulatory powers. If his smoking habit and background as a big-business 
Beltway lawyer (a vice and an occupation many in the enterprise were personally familiar 
with) made some cautiously optimistic, by the middle of his stay at HEW the enterprise 
had abandoned any veiled optimism, instead digging in for another round of trench 
warfare. 
In Califano, an anti-enterprise HEW chief with extensive connections in big 
business and big money who was himself struggling to quit smoking, one finds yet 
another paradoxical character in the tale of the soldier and the cigarette. Like Weinberger, 
Califano was a Harvard Law School graduate that donned the uniform immediately after 
graduation. He was exempted from the Korean War due to his status as a student but was 
eligible for the draft in 1955. Like many young American men in this predicament, he 
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chose to control his own destiny and signed up for Navy Officer Candidate School 
(OCS). After a May graduation from Harvard, he took and passed the New York State 
Bar exam on July 1, was married on July 4, and left for Navy Officers Candidate School 
on July 11, 1955. For a man of Califano’s energy and drive, this was all in a week’s 
work. Offering evidence of his future talent as a litigator, his most notable experience 
during his time in uniform was suing the Navy. Using hair splitting legal maneuvering, 
Califano received credit for his time in law school as part of his military service. He was 
subsequently granted remedy through a step in rank and an award of $1,700. It is ironic 
that Califano, one who would make a career out of either serving as a federal bureaucrat 
or as a lawyer representing clients who thrived on federal largesse, started his 
professional career by bringing suit against the federal government.51  
After honorably separating from the service, Califano eventually joined Secretary 
Robert McNamara’s Whiz Kids at the Pentagon. His most notable achievement in 
McNamara’s inner circle was his work to secure legal support to justify McNamara’s 
program of expanding DoD powers over the armed services.52 After success in the 
highest levels of the Pentagon bureaucracy, his talents were recognized and rewarded 
when he was hand-picked by President Johnson as his Domestic Policy Advisor. 
Essentially, Califano became Johnson’s Great Society ramrod. Not only was he tasked 
with crafting social welfare legislation, he had to find ways to ensure said legislation 
passed in Congress.53  
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It was in this capacity that Califano first came in contact with tobaccoland 
politicians, the power of the enterprise, and the electoral and political perils of any anti-
smoking agenda. During the 1966 midterm elections, President Johnson was furious that 
key Southern states had reacted to his Great Society anti-segregation and shared-wealth 
programs by electing anti-administration Republicans.54 He subsequently called a 
meeting of Southern governors at his ranch in Texas. When recalling this meeting, 
Califano said Johnson was extremely aggravated that these men thought they could come 
into his ranch fomenting rhetoric laced with “Niggah! Niggah! Niggah!” especially 
considering the pork-barrel politics Johnson had leveraged to prop up the solid South.55 
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He felt these men and their constituents had turned their back on him, which in effect is 
exactly what they had done.56  
In an attempt to focus the President on his domestic policy agenda for the coming 
legislative season, Califano, possibly underestimating the immense power of the 
enterprise, suggested that the President confront the Southern caucus and speak to them 
about FTC cigarette labeling initiatives. As it turns out, this was the last thing Johnson 
wanted to do considering the situation. Califano reasoned that in response to the 1964 
Surgeon General’s report on smoking, the President should focus on labeling as a key 
domestic policy initiative during the second half of his term. He expected the President 
would see the wisdom of a labeling regimen as Johnson had suffered a near fatal heart 
attack and was forced to quit smoking under doctor’s orders in 1955, a feat Califano 
himself struggled to achieve. Johnson, aware of Califano’s four-pack-a-day habit, told 
him that he would send his bill to Congress when Califano quit. Johnson knew Califano 
could never quit, especially considering the pressure he was under as his domestic policy 
advisor, so he was comfortable making such a wager.  
In a frankness for which Johnson is legendary, he also told Califano that he’d 
rather have his “pecker cut off” than completely quit smoking, adding that he would 
resume smoking the day he left the White House.57 This (resuming smoking) was a 
promise he fulfilled aboard Air Force One on January 20, 1969, on his way to retirement 
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at his Texas ranch.58 Personal addictions aside, Johnson quickly dispatched with 
Califano’s anti-smoking policy agenda and reoriented him on the true issue at hand. 
Johnson said these “Niggah” shouting governors of the South proved once again the 
administration was “at war with the old Confederacy over desegregation,” and since he 
was determined to move aggressively on civil rights, “he would not further alienate 
Senators and Representatives from states like Virginia, North Carolina, and Kentucky” 
with anti-smoking rhetoric or policies. Further, and most telling, Johnson did not want to 
risk “driving all the tobacco money to the side of the segregationists and against civil 
rights.”  
The power of the enterprise and tobacco money, as already demonstrated, was a 
major factor for which politicians and anti-smoking activists would have to account 
throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Recognizing the nature of this on-
going battle, Johnson concluded that “the public battle against smoking was for another 
president and another day.” Califano had “no idea that a decade later” it would become 
his battle.59  
However before Califano could go head to head with the enterprise under another 
president on another day, his career directed him down other paths. Similar to 
Weinberger, Califano moved freely in and out of federal service. After his time as 
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domestic policy advisor to Johnson, Califano was recruited to work for the powerful 
Washington law firm of Arnold and Porter. Unable to completely leave politics behind, 
Califano was happy when he was retained as the General Counsel to the Democratic 
National Committee. Further demonstrating that enterprise executives like Horace 
Kornegay and other former government appointed and elected officials were not the only 
ones that could represent powerful industrial interests (e.g., big tobacco), Califano as well 
became known for his talents in the realm of industrial-government relations, also known 
as lobbying. Califano said that despite his intentions to devote his time to litigating after 
leaving the federal government, he “soon learned that corporate clients were more 
interested in my ability to negotiate the treacherous rapids of Capitol Hill than in my 
largely untested courtroom talents.”60  
This pattern, right or wrong, is very often the way of the modern federal 
corporatocracy. Officials, whether Kornegay, Califano, or Weinberger, generally leave 
federal service for lucrative jobs utilizing their extensive contacts and perks to attract 
government business, or as in the case of the enterprise, thwart government oversight. 
Califano’s post-federal government career included, among other ventures, work for the 
large pharmaceutical firm Hoffman-La Roche in the highly profitable business of 
marketing anti-anxiety drugs, to work advising manufacturing interests including the 
Chrysler Corporation, to lobbying for the oil industry.61 These big-business endeavors 
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and the work he performed for industry giants required strong inside rapport with key 
government oversight agencies and congressional appropriators—rapport Califano had 
and rapport many were willing to pay for. 
However, the grittiness of lobbying for big business and the plutocratic nature of 
such endeavors soon began to wear on Califano. Though he was lavishly compensated 
and “enjoy[ed] the excitement and rewards of being a Washington lawyer . . . prowling 
the corridors of power,” he said the “pressures to use skills honed in public service to 
lobby for private interests—and the need to bend my personal views to a large 
partnership” combined to encourage a return to federal service.62 That opportunity soon 
came when Democrats took back the office of President and newly-elected Jimmy Carter 
nominated Califano as his Secretary of the HEW. It had been almost exactly ten years to 
the day since Johnson had predicted that the cigarette fight was for another president and 
another day. The President was Carter, the ramrod was Califano, and the day had indeed 
arrived.  
The Washington Post was quick to point out that Califano “will now have to run 
programs that he had much to do with creating when he was President Lyndon Johnson’s 
top man for domestic affairs.”63 As it was during his time with Johnson a decade earlier, 
the programs and issues involving federal regulation of the cigarette enterprise continued 
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as contentious and hotly debated aspects of Califano’s time at HEW where smoking 
policy and other health issues were foremost on his slate. If there was irony in Califano’s 
mandate to implement many of the programs he had created a decade earlier, the 
enterprise was alas denied the irony of an active chain smoking HEW chief. What it 
acquired was a recovering chain smoker.  
After years of dealing with stress in and out of federal service through a 
vociferous habit of nicotine relief, Califano had finally quit smoking just one year prior to 
his installation at HEW. On October 27, 1975, upon the request of his 11-year-old son 
who wanted him to quit as a birthday present, Califano had smoked his last cigarette.64 
Though he said he didn’t think much about kicking the habit at the time, if he thought he 
had seen the last of the cigarette, either personally or professionally, he found he was 
greatly mistaken. The cigarette issue would come to define his time as HEW Chief. If 
Califano was Johnson’s Great Society ramrod, he became known to the enterprise as 
Carter’s Great Smoke-Out ramrod. Yet it remained to be seen if Carter, who hailed from 
the tobacco and peanut country in the plains of Georgia, and Califano, with his 
background in corporate capitalism, could hold fast against the powerful cigarette 
enterprise. 
Califano did not waste any time in going after the enterprise once installed at 
HEW. Based on HEW survey data which revealed “virtually every addicted adult smoker 
first lit up and was hooked as a teen, well before reaching the age of twenty-one, and that 
most had tried to quit in the last year,” Califano announced his multi-million dollar anti-
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cigarette campaign in January 1978.65 He even initiated plans to install an additional tax 
on cigarettes to encourage smokers to stop smoking, a practice that became the standard 
in many states. He enraged Helms and the enterprise by calling cigarettes “America’s 
most important public health enemy” and “public health enemy No. 1.” Helms responded 
by calling Califano and his smoking program “absurd.” He described Califano as a 
“bureaucratic monster” and called for him to resign.66  
Helms’ war against Califano was by no means a small affair. He was joined by a 
host of Congressional colleagues, grassroots tobaccoland constituents, cigarette state 
legislatures, and enterprise executives. RJR Chief Executive Officer William D. Hobbs 
compared Califano to an out-of-control carnival ringmaster playing to the emotions of 
those in the cheap bleacher seats—the media in this case.67 Thousands of Southerners 
affixed “Califano is dangerous for your health” bumper stickers to their vehicles. The 
Kentucky State Legislature called for Califano’s impeachment. Leveraging the discourse 
of the Iranian crisis, a situation that would eventually lead to the Iran hostage crisis, the 
enterprise dubbed Califano “Ayatollah Califano.” One journalist even dubbed him 
“Smokey Joe Califano: The Political Hustler as Imperial Secretary.”68 
On the electoral front, the enterprise warned Carter that he could not win any 
tobacco states in 1980 if he did not control his HEW chief; embarrassing the South on 
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racial issues was one thing, crushing its cigarette economy was another. In one of the 
more dramatic episodes of this story, powerful Massachusetts Congressman and Speaker 
of the House Tip O’Neal warned Califano that if he did not back down, the industry was 
“capable of hiring a hit man to kill” him. Besides Califano’s life being in danger, the 
ambitious Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy also pointed out what the enterprise 
already knew—Califano’s anti-smoking campaign was going to destroy Carter’s chances 
for reelection.69 
Carter eventually caved. Under pressure from Southerners, Conservatives, 
tobaccoland politicians, and voters unhappy with the ailing Carter Administration, Carter 
relieved Califano of his duties at HEW in July 1979. The entire event was quickly passed 
off by Carter aides and staffers as the proverbial “someone had to go” scenario, and not 
much more was said. Califano felt that in respect to his anti-smoking campaign, he was 
muzzled by Carter’s “politically driven staffers . . . who tried to stop [him] from acting.” 
With this in mind, Califano speculated that he had brought his firing upon himself 
because of his stance on issues like smoking—issues that did not sit well with the 
tobaccoland powers that had put Carter in office. Though he could not substantiate it at 
the time, Califano was sure that his speaking out on issues like his anti-smoking 
campaign ensured he would not be around for “the final 18 months of [Carter’s] term.”70 
However, years later Carter had the final say on the whole affair. The next time Califano 
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saw Carter over a decade later at a dinner gala, Carter pulled Califano aside, shook his 
hand, and said “Joe, about smoking. You were right and I was wrong.”71  
Califano left his job at HEW with a profound and tragic appreciation of “the 
growing power of special interests” and a thorough understanding of “how locked into 
special interests the Democratic congressmen and Democratic Party were.” He further 
said he was “disturbed by the power of special interests, especially those with big 
political bucks . . . who exact undue control over congressional committees and 
subcommittees.”72 Chief among these was the cigarette enterprise, a special interest that 
would play an even more direct role in the soldier-cigarette debate in the following 
decade as it struggled against DoD and Congressional efforts to curb smoking among the 
enterprise’s most loyal source for starters.  
Jesse Helms was the face of the cigarette juggernaut. After just six years in 
Congress, Helms had made a blistering impression. Senator Alan Cranston from 
California said Helms’s war against anti-smoking federal bureaucrats during this period 
was so vitriolic that there was a “meanness in the Senate now that I don’t think has been 
seen since the days of Joe McCarthy.”73 If Red Scare communism was the issue fueling 
McCarthy’s great terror, the debate over cigarettes and federal oversight were the issues 
fueling Helms’s.  
 At this point, the Weinberger-Califano-Helms cigarette war spilled over into the 
1980s. The battle had become a back-and-forth affair; both sides had taken ground and 
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then lost it, retreating back to their respective trench lines. Weinberger had made waves 
at the FTC and the HEW, and then had retreated and left in disgust. Califano came to 
power and implemented the most aggressive federal anti-smoking program to date, only 
to be fired in disgrace by a president weary of the electoral power of the tobaccoland and 
the enterprise. It seemed Helms held the field as the decade of the 70s ended. However, 
Weinberger and Califano would soon return to the field of battle, and the soldier-cigarette 
relationship, mounting health care costs, and the cost of a chain-smoking AVF would 
finally motivate powerful anti-smoking fiscal conservatives and concerned DoD officials 
to action.  
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CHAPTER X 
THE CIGARETTE SNOWBALL 
If Leon Panetta and other fiscally conservative legislators were concerned about 
skyrocketing health care costs in America, a great source of that concern stemmed from 
the smoking habits of the 1980s era active duty and retired military forces. After multiple 
panels, Congressional investigators and military health care teams published their results 
and the facts became quite clear: the mixture of soldiering, smoking, and subsidized 
cigarettes were not policy positions, nor habits, conducive to the health of the soldier or 
the defense medical budget. Congress had bought and paid for an AVF. To ensure its 
success, soldiers required higher pay and increased benefits in an effort to motivate them 
to career-length service. The majority of soldiers, dependents, and retirees were smokers 
and together created a tobacco-stained health care snowball growing to epic proportions. 
Yet a solution remained unclear for this massive unfunded liability. However, by the 
mid-1980s, a powerful anti-smoking lobby emerged. As much as the enterprise said about 
smoking and freedom, this resurgent anti-smoking lobby matched it at every turn. And 
when it did, this lobby had much to declare regarding the solution to the fiscal liabilities 
inherent in a career-oriented volunteer force hooked on smoking cheap, government-
subsidized cigarettes.  
The year 1980 was the apex of American cigarette consumption. In that year 
alone, Americans consumed a record-breaking 632 billion cigarettes.1 The men and 
women in uniform were doing their part to contribute to this smoking record. In terms of 
demographics, the data is revealing. Researchers reported that during this period, 52.2 
percent of uniformed personnel under age 20 smoked compared to 21.2 percent of high 
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school seniors.2 In the Army, 63 percent of non-commissioned officers smoked, and 57 
percent of junior enlisted soldiers were avid smokers.3 The polling data proved out the 
veracity of the old cultural symbol: soldiers were, and continued as, Marlboro Men, and 
women now, in green.  
The number of cigarettes soldiers bought at subsidized prices in the early 1980s 
matched this level of smoking found in the demographic polling data. In 1982 uniformed 
service personnel, retirees, and dependents purchased “127 million cartons of cigarettes 
costing $572 million from military commissaries, post exchanges, and clubs.”4 Not 
including cartons purchased off-base, these figures equate to 25.4 billion cigarettes 
purchased in the singular year 1982 on military instillations and presumably smoked. 
Comprising ten percent of all purchases at military commissaries and exchanges, these 
consumption levels represented a significant sales figure for the military resale system. In 
addition to sales volume, these purchases also denote a noteworthy investment of 
discretionary income by service members and retirees. With such a substantial 
investment, these soldier-smokers were understandably attracted to the boon of on-base 
cigarette purchases. In addition to the convenience, the government subsidies allowed 
them to save as much as 76 percent off per carton when compared to off-base prices.5  
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However, to fully grasp the high number of soldier-smokers for whom the 
government was responsible for health care during this period, one must also account for 
the number of military retirees who smoked. Given those in the retirement system in the 
1980s entered military service during the 1950s and 60s when a majority of adult males 
in America smoked, finding that these retirees smoked was unsurprising. A team of 
researchers conducting surveys at VA clinics reported at the Denver, Colorado, clinic the 
smoking rate among veterans in 1986 was 64 percent. Their research also showed that 
smoking prevalence among inpatient veterans was twice that of the American population 
as a whole. 6  
Another similar study of the VA clinic in New Orleans from 1974 to 1978 found 
that 70 percent of veteran inpatients were smokers. The results of one 26-year study 
found that smoking-related malignant lung cancers were the most common malignancy 
among veterans during the period after 1970. This mountain of data allowed the 
researchers to conclude the “high prevalence of smoking among veterans places a large 
disease burden on the VA health system.”7 The majority of these smokers were on fixed 
incomes, and they enjoyed cheap cigarettes available through the military resale system. 
In reality they relied on these subsidized cigarettes as a function of monthly budget 
planning and allocation of their scarce resources.8  
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All of these statistics, whether quantity of cigarettes purchased through the 
military resale system or percentages of active and retired members who were avid 
smokers, only have meaning when connected to costs. In this case, the old adage proves 
correct: money talks. In 1985, the Coalition on Smoking or Health made it clear to 
Congress their position that “smoking prevalence data and reports from medical 
personnel indicate that the costs [of soldier-smokers] are substantial.”9 Indeed it was hard 
for anyone to miss their message regarding smoking, soldiering, and health—they 
announced their campaign from Capitol Hill with 1984 American League MVP and 
future Baseball Hall of Fame member Cal Ripken as their guest speaker!  
When the DoD eventually released the Report on Smoking and Health in the 
Military in 1986, the financial impact of Americans’ consumption of cigarettes on health 
care costs were described as much more than just substantial. The report estimated the 
financial impact of smoking-related diseases in America was $20.3 billion in 1975 and 
$42.2 billion in 1980. The report also cited data showing smokers cost employers 
between $400 and $800 in “excess cost” when compared to non-smoking employees, and 
that these same smokers had “33 percent to 45 percent excess absenteeism compared to 
their nonsmoking counterparts.”10 
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The facts and data presented in this report made their way into speeches presented 
in Congress from legislators angry over the high costs associated with military smokers. 
Though the report estimated the bill for military smoking was $209.9 million, a number 
that had already made its way to the floor of Congress, an Army Times writer reported 
that one doctor saw the figure as much higher: closer to $2 billion in 1984 alone! If this 
number was correct, then it represented a substantial part of the overall $7.5 billion 
defense medical budget in 1985. This same reporter also relayed that the VA estimated it 
paid $180 million a year to 42,000 veterans with smoking-related illness.11 
This expensive, smoke-filled room was the venue Casper Weinberger and Joe 
Califano chose for their reappearance in the cigarette war. With careers spanning three 
decades, Weinberger and Califano proved they were comfortable challenging the 
cigarette enterprise, as well as moving in and out of various bureaucratic assignments in 
defense, health and welfare, budgeting, and domestic policy.12 They also spent 
considerable time in powerful firms representing everything from oil barons to mega 
military-industrial contractors to powerful pharmaceuticals. From their first days as 
public servants, both were outspoken in their criticism of and activism against cigarette 
smoking. Their powerful blend of executive experience in the federal government as well 
as their skills as cunning litigators, corporate counselors, and anti-smoking activists, 
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made them formidable foes for powerful tobaccoland boosters like Jesse Helms, 
Congressman Dan Daniel from Virginia, and a host of other tobacco state politicians.  
In the early 1980s, Weinberger and Califano emerged as the de facto faces of the 
federal government’s efforts to curb smoking in America. They were soon joined by a 
group of anti-smoking executives and elected officials including Surgeon General C. 
Everett Koop and United States Senators including Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), David Boren 
(D-Oklahoma), and Jeff Bingaman (D-New Mexico).13 Together, these captains of the 
cigarette war, along with a throng of characters from the DoD and other federal agencies, 
were an interesting mix of corporate-bureaucrats, capitalists, lobbyists, government 
executives, and legislators locked in a struggle over the most successful, highly-
engineered consumer product ever. Within the framework of modern economic 
arrangements, these groups blended issues of conscience, commerce, and personal 
freedom, with the needs of big business, taxpayers, industry, and the military-industrial 
complex. It was within this framework that the soldier and cigarette bond met its final 
demise in 1986. 
In retrospect, however, the demise in 1986 can be traced back to two seemingly 
random events in 1981. In 1981, both Weinberger and Califano, in a strange twist of fate, 
found themselves back in a familiar place: the forefront of the cigarette war. Weinberger 
returned to federal service as Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, and Califano, having left 
government work, emerged in Lee Iacocca’s Chrysler boardroom. When they entered 
their respective posts in the war room and the boardroom, these two powerful bureaucrats 
struggled to hold fast against a cigarette enterprise which had grown to hate them. 
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Weinberger’s Senate confirmation as candidate for Secretary of Defense in January 1981 
and Califano’s interview and appointment to Iacocca’s Chrysler board as chief health 
care expert in June 1981 together were key events in the unfolding saga. Their actions at 
these posts proved instrumental in guiding the government’s case for decreasing, if not 
eliminating, smoking rates among soldiers, and once again, placed them on a trajectory 
for conflict with the cigarette enterprise.  
SECDEF Confirmation Hearings  
 Students of United States diplomatic and political history will readily recall the 
strange events of Weinberger’s 1981 Senate confirmation hearing. President Reagan 
recently won a national election in a landslide against Democratic opponent Jimmy 
Carter. The Reagan Revolution was in full swing, and the Republicans were recipients of 
a clear mandate: bring America back! With this groundswell of support and a powerful 
mandate, President-elect Reagan began forming a cabinet. For Secretary of Defense, he 
nominated his old California friend and fellow conservative Republican Casper 
Weinberger. As stated, Cap was a seasoned executive with extensive experience in Belt 
Way bureaucratics, big business, and budgeting. He appeared the right man for the job, 
and nearly all agreed, except two Senators from the tobacco state of North Carolina.  
 When Weinberger came before the Senate for full confirmation, many were struck 
by the fact he only received two nay votes in his 97-2 confirmation, and these were from 
conservative members of his own party: North Carolina Senators Jesse Helms and John 
Porter East. In the aftermath, Helms’s and East’s rationale (which Weinberger believed) 
was that he “would not sufficiently pursue a hard line against the USSR and would not 
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spend enough on defense.”14 However, considering Weinberger’s high profile history 
with the tobacco enterprise, these statements require closer scrutiny.  
 Regarding Weinberger’s rejection by the entire North Carolina Senate delegation, 
several points are in order. As Weinberger stood for confirmation, he had a proven track 
record as one simultaneously committed to national defense, reducing cigarette 
consumption in America, and controlling exploding health care costs. First, and most 
relevant to his confirmation as Secretary of Defense, he had a strong, proven, verifiable 
reputation supporting national defense and defense spending going back to OMB days. 
At a speech he made to the conservative American Enterprise Institute as budget director 
under Nixon in October 1972, he said, “if our defense budget is inadequate, nothing else 
will be of much moment, and we will only know when it is too late.”15 In this speech, he 
also said: 
The sad fact is that there are still many points of contention between nations of the world. Many 
governments, including particularly the Soviet Union and China, maintain large and increasingly 
effective forces which they have shown a willingness to use when the occasion suits. For the 
foreseeable future, I do not anticipate the world situation or human nature changing so radically 
that we could plan on substantially reduced force structure.16 
 
It was abundantly clear at this early phase in Weinberger’s career that he was noticeably 
committed to the idea of a robust investment of national treasure to national defense.  
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Regarding the cost of funding a volunteer Army, his personal experience as 
budget director made him more than adequately aware of the fact the AVF was 
exceedingly expensive, yet absolutely required. Regarding the expense of the AVF, he 
was faced with the conundrum of overcoming inflation while simultaneously increasing 
military wages to meet the needs of the volunteer Army. The calculus he was forced to 
apply ended up consuming the entire peace dividend from the Vietnam War drawdown.17 
With so much spent on combating inflation and dramatic expansion of military benefits, 
it was only a matter of time, and only logical according to many, that post-war budgets 
would see some reductions in certain defense programs and new weapon systems. 
However as a whole, defense spending expanded after a major war for the first time in 
American history.18  
 Further, regarding the expense of the AVF, Weinberger recalls that he was 
opposed to going back to the draft, and that “the crucial element in this recovery of 
strength was our people . . . our most urgent task would be to address the needs of our 
uniformed men and women and to improve morale, thereby strengthening the volunteer 
system, which was failing badly.” He was also practical and realized that many elected 
officials, including Jesse Helms, would recoil when confronted with the levels of 
spending required to field a strong national defense capable of deterring the Soviet Union 
in 1981. Weinberger said, “dealing with Congress was, unfortunately, often 
contentious—especially because having a credible deterrent and the capability of 
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defending American interests around the world is expensive, and military spending in a 
democracy is never popular.”19 
If Helms and East were casting their votes against Weinberger because they 
thought he would be a miserly, weak spendthrift in regard to the Soviet Union and its 
brand of communism, it proved one of the most incorrect assertions in modern American 
history. A boon to the military-industrial complex, Weinberger was famous for his 
declaration that cost would not be a consideration in his plans for a defense build-up. He 
saw cost aversion as akin to a form of moral weakness. To be an effective military 
commander or planner under his leadership, Weinberger required dispatching with both 
thrift and timidity. He felt fears over cost or sticker shock would corrupt the “military 
judgment of the effectiveness of the armed forces,” according to Weinberger scholar 
Robert Howard Wieland.20  
With this budget-busting determinism, Weinberger subsequently presided over 
the most prolific peacetime military build-up in American history.21 From the very start, 
budget planning for FY 82 involved dramatic increases in spending. Outgoing Secretary 
of Defense Harold Brown had already expanded defense spending for 1982 by $26.4 
billion during his last five days in office. Weinberger then requested an additional $32.6 
billion on top of Brown’s submission. Ultimately, Weinberger requested and received a 
colossal $237.3 billion defense budget for 1982, with only a billion cut away by a cost-
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conscious Congress. By 1985 the defense budget had exploded to a figure incredible for 
its time: $297 billion.22 
Weinberger, in another story rife with irony, was himself faced with a Congress 
that eventually proved happy to engage in his old budget trick: impounding of 
appropriated funds. Some on Capitol Hill balked at what they felt was an egregious price 
tag to bring America back. These fiscal conservatives came under the ire of Weinberger 
and other defense hawks. The Washington Post was swift to cover this paradoxical story, 
noting how Weinberger the impounder from OMB days played the hypocrite by telling a 
Congress determined to cut off the spigot to “forget about the overall ceiling and pump 
out the money the Pentagon wants.” He was lampooned by the post for urging them to 
“ignore the ceiling and avoid any reductions in Reagan’s defense hike.”23 This had no 
effect on Weinberger, and during his first five years at the helm of the Pentagon’s 
unprecedented military build-up, he presided over a 12 percent increase in military 
budgets that translated to an astounding $1.46 trillion in defense spending. David 
Stockman, Reagan’s OMB director and Weinberger’s successor by a decade, commented 
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that these numbers left the military-industrial complex “squealing with delight.”24 If the 
complex was squealing with delight, the cigarette enterprise would soon howl in pain as a 
result of Weinberger’s forthcoming measures to staunch the smoke ‘em if you’ve got ‘em 
culture in the military.  
Thus, here lay the real reason why Senators Helms and East cast their lone, 
dissenting votes against Casper Weinberger. It was not for any real or perceived fear that 
Weinberger would be a miser-like weakling on Communism. Their dissenting votes were 
informed by their tortured awareness of his background in opposition to the cigarette 
enterprise. Further, they knew he would be an activist for the anti-smoking agenda, 
committed to controlling spiraling military health care costs, and a proponent of 
preventative health care measures. These were all policy positions the enterprise knew 
threatened its continued existence, much less profitability. Marlow Cook had given HEW 
Secretary Weinberger the opening shot in 1973, with Helms delivering what he thought 
was the coup de grâce in 1975. However, Weinberger was before them once again. To 
the two hardcore tobacco men from North Carolina, a shot across the bow seemed an 
appropriate way to welcome their old foe back to the cigarette war.  
Califano Arrives in a Chrysler 
 After his abrupt firing as Carter’s HEW chief, largely as a result of his 
controversial opposition to the cigarette enterprise, Califano was once again a hot 
commodity and he quickly offered his services to corporate America. Before long, one of 
this period’s most bold corporate executives called: Lido Anthony Iacocca. Lee Iacocca 
was a career man at Ford, known for leading the rollout of the ever-popular Mustang line 
of cars. Over a career spanning 32 years, he worked his way to the top of the company 
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and had arrived as President of the Ford Motor Company in 1978. However, ironically, 
nearly a year to the day before Califano was fired by Carter, Iacocca was fired by Henry 
Ford II, on July 13, 1978, after years of infighting with the obstinate patriarch of the Ford 
family.25 Ford’s reasons for firing Iacocca were just as murky as Carter’s for firing 
Califano. The only explanation Ford gave was that “sometimes you just don’t like 
someone.”26 Within a year, Iacocca was snapped up by the ailing, nearly bankrupt 
Chrysler Corporation, who named him their president in 1979. 
As soon as Iacocca took over, he faced seemingly insurmountable problems 
involving debt, pathetic sales informed by equally pathetic automobile products, and 
daunting labor problems. In Iacocca’s eyes, all were dangerous, and failure in any one 
area would lead to the end of the Chrysler Corporation. Regarding the third problem, 
labor, Iacocca identified skyrocketing health care costs as an issue that would drive 
Chrysler to insolvency if not contained. He described the health care situation in his 
company, and in America, as a “mess” for which he and other industry executives were 
responsible.27 He lamented that auto industry executives were getting “killed” because of 
the dreadful mistake of promising “cradle to grave” medical and fringe benefits.28  
According to Iacocca, Blue Cross and Blue Shield was “billing us more than our 
suppliers of steel and rubber.” Further, “Chrysler, Ford, and GM were paying $3 billion a 
year just for hospital, medical, surgical, and dental, plus all pharmaceutical bills.” Iacocca 
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explained that at Chrysler, these benefits cost the company “$600 million or about $600 
per car” for a grand total of about “$1 million a day.” When Chrysler was finally able to 
secure a bailout from the government totaling $1.5 billion, the first of its kind in 
American history, Iacocca had to immediately allocate cash to pay off a massive benefits 
backlog that included $311 million to Prudential and Aetna for pensions, and $50 million 
to Blue Cross and Blue Shield to cover overdue health care premiums and medical bills.29  
Similar to the military medical benefits package that had grown steadily from an 
obscure line in a 1884 Congressional appropriations bill to the all-encompassing active 
duty-retiree-dependent stem-to-stern benefit Congress was struggling to fund at that very 
moment, Iacocca described Chrysler’s health care benefit package as a creeping monster: 
“Like every other benefit that management provides to labor, the medical plans began 
modestly. But over the years we’ve gone from paying no medical bills to the point where 
the company now pays for everything you can think of: dermatology, psychiatry, 
orthodontics—even eyeglasses.30” Not only was health care costing Chrysler more than 
half-a-billion dollars a year, Iacocca was exasperated that over $200 million of Chrysler’s 
payments to its suppliers were going to “cover their [the suppliers’] employees’ health 
insurance premiums.”31  
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With these problems in mind, in 1981 Iacocca called on former HEW Secretary 
Joe Califano. When Iacocca was fired by Henry Ford II, Califano reached out to 
encourage him that the firing may be “one of the best things that ever happened to you.”32 
When Carter fired Califano, Iacocca reached out to him and returned the favor, telling 
him that “you told me that being fired by Henry Ford could turn out to be one of the best 
things that ever happened to me. Well, let me tell you this. Getting fired by this guy 
Carter is the best thing that ever happened to you.”33  
Califano was a known expert in matters involving labor, health care, and 
government relations, and Iacocca was determined to have him on the new Chrysler 
board. While Weinberger was struggling through his confirmation hearings and his first 
months at Defense, Califano slipped away to a lunch meeting with Iacocca in his Waldorf 
Towers suite on March 23, 1981. Iacocca informed Califano he was recruiting him to 
help the company address their skyrocketing health care costs. Califano said of the 
meeting that Iacocca was “aghast at Chrysler’s health care costs” and that he was 
struggling to pay back the $1.5 billion debt load the company had taken from Carter to 
keep them afloat. While at HEW, Califano commented that he worked tirelessly to “alert 
American businesses to the dangers of rising health care costs,” but his admonitions were 
nothing more than “twigs snapping in an abandoned forest.” At this lunch meeting, he 
soon found out that “the [snapping] noise was deafening to Iacocca.”34  
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During their discussions, Iacocca told Califano that his Great Society policies, 
along with United Auto Workers President Doug Fraser’s aggressive union demands, had 
both done more than anyone or anything to create the health care benefits mess that was 
driving Chrysler to bankruptcy. Now, in an unprecedented move that raised eyebrows in 
and out of the auto industry, Iacocca, in a stroke of genius, invited the fox into the 
henhouse. He offered both Califano and Fraser an opportunity to join the Chrysler Board. 
Both accepted, and Califano was soon hard at work trying to solve Chrysler’s health care 
conundrum, and Fraser took on the not-so-popular job of convincing union labor to live 
with reduced benefits.  
As Califano assumed his duties at Chrysler headquarters in Detroit, he too was 
just as shocked as Iacocca to find that the company was “paying more for health care than 
for steel.”35 Like the DoD officials, Congressional investigators, and other research 
scientists who looked into skyrocketing military health care costs in the late 1970s, 
Califano also found that a major portion of Chrysler’s health care woes were attributable 
to cigarette-thumping employees and retirees. After studying the problem in depth, 
Califano determined that health care costs for Chrysler employees and retirees who 
smoked were on average “75 percent higher than for non-smokers.”36 In addition to other 
health care related cost-cutting measures, Califano immediately took the unprecedented 
act of launching a corporation-wide anti-smoking and smoking cessation campaign. It 
was one of the largest companywide smoke-outs in American history. However, Califano 
was soon topped in sheer size and audacity when Surgeon General C. Everett Koop and 
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Secretary of Defense Weinberger subsequently shook the cigarette enterprise to its core 
with their anti-cigarette vision. Califano attempted to stamp out smoking at one of the 
Big Three auto makers; Koop and Weinberger had a much bigger prize in mind: the 
entire nation and its uniformed, retired, and dependent military members.37  
Koop’s Campaign: SFA2000 
Before looking at Weinberger’s unprecedented measures to curb smoking in the 
military, a key event in 1984 requires discussion, as it substantially influenced his DoD 
health care policies. That event was a speech given by Reagan’s Surgeon General, C. 
Everett Koop, at a gathering of the American Lung Association in Miami, Florida, in 
May 1984. Koop used this occasion to launch his 1984 anti-smoking crusade. Koop’s 
crusade speech against smoking was the strongest statement a federal government official 
ever made against cigarette smoking in American history.  
The anti-cigarette movement experienced fits and starts ever since Dr. Luther 
Terry, Koop’s predecessor by two decades, had published the nation’s first definitive 
statement on the dangers of smoking back in 1964. If there were any starts, they were 
hastily stopped by fits from the enterprise and its powerful Congressional allies. 
However, health care policies regarding cigarettes and cigarette smoke, and the national 
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will to accept them, were changing. At the same time, leaders like Weinberger, Koop, 
and Califano were emerging as executives committed to preventative health care at the 
corporate and federal level, and they assumed highly influential positions both in and out 
of government during this period. With such polices and leaders in place, the industry had 
hard work to do if it was to continue thriving in America. 
 Even before his speech, Koop had already been marked by the industry after his 
first official act as Surgeon General: issuing the 1982 Surgeon General's Report on 
Smoking and Health. After Califano was ousted from the Carter Administration, Helms 
and the cigarette enterprise held command of the field, and they were cautiously 
optimistic, especially considering the record number of cigarettes smoked in 1980. 
However with Koop’s 1982 report, the most authoritative statement to date on the links 
between smoking and cancer of the lung, oral cavity, larynx, esophagus, stomach, 
bladder, pancreas, and kidneys, the pendulum began to swing.  
Later in 1982, Koop made more waves when he testified before Congress he was 
strongly in favor of continuing and even strengthening a series of rotating labels warning 
against the specific dangers of smoking. With this background, it seemed fitting for Koop 
to choose the year 1984 as the occasion to announce his major smoking news. Koop had 
specifically chosen 1984, the twentieth anniversary of US Surgeon General Luther L. 
Terry's Report on Smoking and Health, as the appropriate time to make a major 
announcement regarding the future of cigarette smoking in America.38 
In his May 1984 speech, Koop announced his new campaign entitled SFA2000. 
The campaign’s goal was a smoke-free American society by the year 2000. In addition to 
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a challenge to end smoking in America, Koop also advanced a host of other supporting 
objectives. He was critical of the industry’s expenditure of $4,000 on advertising for 
every one the government spent on warnings. He called for more resources dedicated to 
anti-smoking messages. He called for a ban on all tobacco advertising. He called for all 
physicians to demand their patients stop smoking, and for all children to insist their 
parents stop. He challenged all the youth of America and the YMCA (ironically) to 
mobilize against smoking. Like Califano at Chrysler, he also called for all employers to 
encourage employees to stop smoking and to give them access to the resources to do so.  
Moreover, in a call that directly affected subsequent DoD and Congressional 
actions to curb smoking in the military and contain smoking-related health care costs, 
Koop also demanded that all military bases cease providing low-cost, subsidized 
cigarettes to soldiers. And he called for all military hospitals and VA clinics to provide 
doctors and programs to help soldiers and veterans quit smoking. Regarding soldier-
smokers, he said “I don’t care what war you fought in—Vietnam or Spanish-American—
if you smoke, you should stop and you’ll be better for it.”39  
Additionally, similar to the efforts of Califano at the Chrysler Corporation, he 
related cigarette smoking to the dramatic increase in health care expenditures in America: 
The increasing cost for a pack of cigarettes has certainly had an effect on cigarette consumption. 
But also of great significance is the realization among consumers, insurers, and employers that 
cigarette smoking adds greatly to the health care costs of the individual and the nation. The effects 
of cigarette smoking are all too often manifested in long hospital stays and extended outpatient 
care for a variety of chronic problems that could have been avoided.40  
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Seeking to add to his cost argument, Koop quoted from a speech President Reagan 
previously made to the Health Insurance Association of America when Reagan offered a 
similar economic and financial justification for curbing smoking in America, “The illness 
resulting from smoking is costly both to the smoker and his or her boss. A helping hand 
to assist employees to break the habit might be a wise investment.”41 
For Koop, this was an all or nothing campaign; he was serious in his desire to end 
smoking in America. He chose to end his speech, which largely focused on the health 
hazards of smoking, with a plea to see cigarette smoking in America as a national 
economic issue: 
There is much for you and me to do. Let us do it together and make a smoke-free society by the 
year 2000 a reality that will eliminate a tremendous number of deaths . . . a great deal of suffering 
and disability . . . and an economic burden we can no longer bear.42  
 
These words from America’s top doctor regarding the expense of smoking, both 
physically and monetarily, became guiding principles for government appropriators, 
fiscally conservative congressmen, and DoD bean counters in the days, months, and years 
to come as they sought ways to reduce massive unfunded liabilities pertaining to the 
military health care system.  
When Koop finished his speech, he fundamentally changed the nature and scope 
of the cigarette war. Possibly learning from Califano’s experience in the Carter 
Administration, Koop was afraid that his SFA2000 message might meet opposition from 
his superiors in the Reagan Administration, so he discussed the speech’s contents with 
only a handful of trusted advisors. Few, if any, had any idea that Koop was about to 
deliver such an aggressive anti-smoking message, that if effective, would banish the very 
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lucrative American cigarette enterprise to the ash tray of history.43 When news of his 
SFA2000 initiative was made public it was, to say the least, a bombshell. Horace 
Kornegay, who had moved from President of the Tobacco Institute to Chairman, was 
particularly furious when he read news of the speech and Koop’s escalation of the 
cigarette war. In a speech delivered just eleven days after Koop’s bombshell, Chairman 
Kornegay, as he had a decade prior when Weinberger had released the HEW’s annual 
report on smoking in America in 1975, provided the enterprise response to the SFA2000 
Campaign. If he was aiming to match Koop’s audacity with his own brand of shocking 
rhetoric, Kornegay succeeded beyond imagination.  
Kornegay to the Breech  
 The occasion for Kornegay’s retaliatory speech was a gathering of the Burley 
Auction Warehouse Association in Ashville, North Carolina, on May 31, 1984, less than 
two weeks after Koop’s SFA2000 speech. Offering apologies that Dr. Koop was unable 
to sojourn among them that night, Kornegay offered a response to Koop’s plan to 
extinguish smoking in America. Connecting the dots between Califano’s federal anti-
smoking campaigns of the late 1970s, which had now become his corporate anti-smoking 
campaign at Chrysler, Kornegay commented that Koop had “out Califanoed-Califano” 
and that he had taken over Califano’s position as “National Antismoking Ayatollah 
Number One.”44  
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After placing Califano in proper conversation with Koop, the enterprise’s 
previous enemy number one, Kornegay, in a move to make Koop the new target, took the 
rhetoric to a place almost awkward to recount. Referring to Koop’s efforts to enlist 
children in the nation’s anti-smoking agenda, Kornegay compared Koop’s SFA2000 plan 
to Hitler’s Nazi Youth and the Chinese Red Guard. In a particularly vitriolic and 
unfortunate portion of his speech, Kornegay rhetorically asked whether or not Koop 
planned on a “final solution for the recalcitrant ones who refuse to obey your order to 
quit.” He wondered if cigarette smoking hold-outs would have to go into “exile” or face 
“deportation” or banishment to “concentration camps” or the cold fate of execution by 
“death squads?”45 Lobbying for a highly lucrative industry was one thing; comparing 
anti-smoking campaigns to the Holocaust and the extermination of the Jews was another. 
To make matters worse, later in the speech, Kornegay audaciously accused Koop of 
being “susceptible to a virus that causes antismoking agitation and violent rhetoric.”46 
The cigarette war surely took a dark turn.47 
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Leaving such emotional, irrational rhetoric for analysis of another sort, Kornegay 
next chose to match Koop’s policy discussion of smoking and health care economics with 
his own counter-assertion that the cigarette enterprise added $59 billion to America’s 
gross national product. With such massive impact on America’s economy as a substantial 
contributor to the nation’s bottom line, the enterprise was able to command considerable 
political influence on Capitol Hill. However, in what amounted to tortured logic, 
Kornegay opined that while cigarettes had contributed such vast treasure to America’s 
coffers, Koop and Califano’s programs had drained taxpayers of billions of dollars. Of 
course President Reagan and a host of military and civilian researchers already made the 
argument that smoking-related health care costs were indeed a substantial portion of the 
wasted expenditures to which Kornegay referred. 
Kornegay continued his speech with a litany of other accusations. He argued that 
smoking was not the threat to millions of Americans. It was actually Dr. Koop who was 
the real hazard, “representing a grave threat to millions of Americans.”48 He described 
discrimination against smokers as a situation akin to the Civil Rights struggle, 
commenting: “It is unfair that at this time in our country’s history when we have broken 
down the barriers that divide people on the basis of race, creed, color and gender, we are 
letting zealots erect new barriers to divide people on the basis of whether or not they 
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smoke.49” He persisted with the Civil Rights accusations, calling Koop’s agenda “anti-
smoking apartheid,” and arguing that cigarette smokers are mercilessly “relegated to the 
back of planes, trains, and buses” and are “segregated in factories, offices and public 
places” and “refused employment.”50 This strategy of relating the smoking issue to other 
emotional issues such as the Civil Rights Movement, South African apartheid, the 
holocaust, veteran’s benefits, soldiers, patriotism, and the Constitution, as previously 
discussed, became an industry mainstay for the remainder of the cigarette war.  
 And it became the mainstay for the remainder of his speech that night. After 
registering these arguments against Koop’s great smoke-out, mostly based in rhetoric and 
unfounded emotion, Kornegay ended his speech by cunningly co-opting a sensitive 
Veterans’ issue. Seeking to connect smoking with rights and freedoms won on foreign 
fields of battle, Kornegay recalled:  
On Memorial Day, they buried the unknown soldier of the Vietnam War in Arlington National 
Cemetery. He joins his fellow unknowns of WWI, WWII, and the Korean War. Of this unknown 
Vietnam War serviceman, the President said, ‘An American hero has returned home. God bless 
him. We may not know of this man’s life, but we know of his character. We may not know his 
name, but we know his courage. He is the heart, the soul and the spirit of America.’ And my 
question to the Surgeon General is this: Dr. Koop, what if he were a smoker? Would he be less a 
hero, would he have less character, less courage, be less of an American? I think we all know the 
right answer . . . but I would like to hear Dr. Koop’s answer.51 
 
 With that, the trench lines were dug even deeper. The great captains of the 
cigarette war had once again marshaled onto the field and were engaged in a struggle 
over the future of smoking and smoking policy in America. Some of the names, like 
Weinberger, Califano, Helms, and Kornegay, were familiar. Others, like Koop and 
Iacocca, were relatively new to the high-stakes cigarette war, and additional names would 
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soon join the ranks. Moreover in 1985, all these captains, as well as those new to the 
struggle, would become either directly or indirectly involved in the soldier-cigarette saga 
either through legislative action, policy formulation, or the appropriations process. The 
smoke had barely settled from the most recent skirmish of the war—the Koop-Kornegay 
exchange—when Casper Weinberger fired the next shot: a shot aimed at unhinging the 
soldier and the cigarette once and for all. 
1985: The Year of Transition 
By 1985, Congress’s ability to stomach such massive deficit-funded defense 
spending was about to end.52 The Weinberger defense era budgets were enormous. 
However these budgets, at least in theory, were underpinned by Reagan’s economic 
growth. With an economy that had expanded by one-third during his first term, a portion 
of this increase reaped the tax treasure that was earmarked to fund Weinberger’s military 
expansion.53 Whereas FDR and LBJ had dreamed of an American corporate welfare 
capitalism that funded social welfare programs and full-employment machinations, 
Reagan invested in a form of war-welfare capitalism which materialized as the largest 
peacetime expansion of the military in American history.54  
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Historian of the twentieth century James Patterson described this as the paradox 
associated with National Security Council Report-68 (NSC 68). A top-secret paper 
prepared for the Truman Administration in 1950, the document set forth an aggressive 
policy of a greatly expanded military-industrial complex, among other things. Patterson 
argues that the NSC 68 military-economic-policy consortium also envisioned more than 
just communist containment. This uniquely American consortium grandly expected a 
situation where an equally expanded American economy, along with the high-tech 
weapon systems churned out by this military-industrial complex, would fund both 
military and social welfare expansion and provide security without massive tax burdens 
on American citizens.55  
However, by 1985, according to a powerful group of fiscal conservatives, 
Patterson’s NSC-68 bank account was nearly dry. Weary of a slumping economy, five 
decades of unprecedented federal spending, and doubtful that America could continue 
such drunken forays into war and welfare capitalism, fiscally conservative Congressmen 
fought back.56 The Senate soon passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget 
Deficit Control Act of 1985, which bit into the largest budget deficit in US history.57 This 
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momentous legislation was a form of sequestration-oversight for reining in government 
spending of which defense was the most profligate.  
Most significant to the soldier-cigarette discussion, in this Gramm-Rudman spirit 
of austerity, some in Congress chose to directly focus their gaze on the costs arising from 
funding health care for military members, dependents, and retirees who were burning 
through more than 26 billion government-subsidized cigarettes a year.58 At long last, the 
soldier and the cigarette, a mainstay since WWI, finally came under the microscopic gaze 
of congressional appropriators, fiscal activists, and DoD programmers struggling to 
understand how soldiers, cigarettes, freedom, patriotism, and cradle-to-grave health care 
benefits should continue as a single policy issue. Soldiers, freedom, and patriotism would 
survive this fight; the cigarette would not. Further, unconditional cradle-to-grave health 
care benefits, to this point an industry and military standard, was never the same again.  
 
                                                          
58
 Maj. Gen. Dan Burkett USAF (Ret), “After the ALA and AFCOMS Meetings, Thoughts on 
‘Mental Paralysis’ of Gramm-Rudman... Standardization (And Cigarettes) in Commissaries.” Military 
Market April 1986, 56–57, accessed January 15, 2015, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kic36b00. In a 
journal article by commissary-exchange insider Burkett, he clearly links the Gramm-Rudman austerity 
measures to military smoking and cigarette subsidies on military bases, “It appears that the commissaries 
will soon get the opportunity to experience operating at reduced funding in this case with less non-
appropriated hinds (surcharge money).” 
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CHAPTER XI 
THE END OF THE SOLDIER AND THE CIGARETTE: 
SFA2000 INVADES THE DOD 
When Surgeon General C. Everett Koop announced his audacious plan to 
drastically reduce smoking in America, he did so with a supreme confidence in timing. 
Just four years before his momentous 1984 SFA2000 declaration, Americans had smoked 
a record number of cigarettes. What gave him the confidence to believe in his timing? 
Could the nation go from 620 billion to zero in just two decades? If the plan was a bit of a 
stretch, his confidence was found at the intersection of twenty years of science linking the 
physical costs of cigarette smoking and more recent articulation of the mountainous fiscal 
costs. Yet, to make such a declaration was one thing, to enact policy measures and 
legislation to bring it about was another.  
If Koop was to achieve his SFA2000 objectives, he required help from anti-
smoking’s most powerful and consistently anti-cigarette government executive: Secretary 
of Defense Casper Weinberger. Jesse Helms had sensed imminent doom when he and his 
protégé John Porter East had cast their votes against the anti-smoking California 
bureaucrat. Possibly, he saw the writing on the wall when the cigarette lobby pressured 
Carter to pull the plug on Califano. However, Califano’s firing and these two votes 
against Weinberger, in retrospect, were minor skirmishes in the cigarette war. What 
loomed on the horizon was a showdown threatening to end the enterprise’s decades’ long, 
deeply acculturated, state-supported access to their most faithful customers. To 
Califano’s campaign at Chrysler and Koop’s crusade at the Capitol, Weinberger now 
added his own front: a dislodging attack at Defense.  
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The Resolution Heard ‘Round the Pentagon 
 The end started as a minor continuing resolution issued by Congress as the 
members were hurrying to finish business so they could leave for their homes to enjoy 
Christmas recess. On December 19, 1985, they headed out to what would become one of 
the coldest winters in modern memory.1 However the continuing resolution they left 
behind would spark a flame that would grow to a full-scale fire for the enterprise by the 
time the winter of 1986 drew to a close. In order to grasp the importance of this 
resolution, one must go back a few months to October 1985. 
 On October 24, Senators Ted Stevens (R-AK) and David Boren (D-OK) 
exchanged letters with each other confirming their plans to introduce an amendment to 
the FY86 Defense appropriation that would call for an increase to the price of cigarettes 
on military posts so that they at least matched the prevailing per-pack cost off-post. In 
essence, they called for the end of military cigarette subsidies. They reasoned the 
precedent was already in place stemming from the VA’s 1978 decision, followed by the 
DoD’s 1982 guidance, that on-post alcohol prices be adjusted to reflect the off-post cost. 
In a personal letter to Stevens, Boren summed up his determination to end military 
cigarette subsidies saying, “Ted, I know you agree with me that there is no reason for the 
federal government to encourage or subsidize the detrimental smoking habit” anymore.2 
 The Stevens-Boren cigarette pricing amendment passed through the Defense 
Appropriation Subcommittee on October 29, and then sailed through the full committee. 
                                                          
1
 Kevin Ambrose, “Inauguration Weather: Record Cold for Reagan,” The Washington Post, July 
13, 2009, accessed January 15, 2015, 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/capitalweathergang/2009/01/reagans_1985_inauguration_cold.html. 
 
2
 David Boren, memo to Ted Stevens, October 24, 1985, accessed January 15, 2015, 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu.tid/dbt52e00/pdf.  
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By early November, their legislation appeared on the Senate floor as a resolution to 
amend the FY86 defense appropriation to remove cigarette subsidies and increase 
cigarette prices on all military instillations. Now on the floor for all to see, the 
amendment was quickly assailed by the enterprise, first from the inside, and then from 
the outside. On the inside, Senator John Warner from Virginia dashed off a memo to 
Stevens warning him that, though he understood Steven’s noble purpose was to end 
subsidized smoking, this is not how it would be perceived by the troops. He warned that 
they would see it as “yet another attempt to reduce the overall military compensation 
system.” Further, he warned Stevens that he was tampering with “the most successful 
aspect of DoD operations—people,” and that the only losers in Steven’s scheme were the 
good folks who put the uniform on every day.3 With these words, Warner instantly 
moved the conversation to a place it had already been, and would stay for years to come: 
from one focused on fiscal and physical liabilities to one re-focused on rights, patriotism, 
benefits, promises, compensation, and veteran’s issues.  
 On the outside, the issue was quickly picked up by enterprise lobbyists like Amy 
Millman who reported the emergence of the amendment to her industry client Phillip 
Morris. Though Millman was alarmed at the amendment, she was not worried because 
her contacts informed her that “the DoD is solidly in our corner as are the veterans 
groups” and that both had “promised to lobby against this amendment.” Further, she 
reported that groups friendly to tobacco were “carrying with them a paper which was 
prepared by the Tobacco Institute and the DoD,” and that both organizations (TI and 
DoD) were acting in concert with each other on this issue. Finally, she uncovered the 
                                                          
3
 John Warner, memo to Ted Stevens, November 4, 1985, accessed January 8, 2015, 
http://legacy.library.ucsf. edu/tid/jap35d00/pdf. 
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chief proponent of the anti-smoking agenda inside the DoD policy-making apparatus as 
Dr. William Mayer, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, and labeled 
him as a “friend” of Dr. Koop.4  
In her summation of the amendment event, Millman highlights two key factors 
that would become crucial in the months ahead: enterprise interference strategy and the 
irony of the TI and DoD working together to formulate military smoking policy. As it 
turns out, the situation was much more complex than meets the eye. The TI was 
interacting with certain inside elements at DoD and taking advantage of an internal 
breakdown at the Pentagon over smoking, cigarette policy, and cigarette subsidies.  
 In what may be shocking to any unfamiliar with the way politics and getting 
things done in the federal bureaucracy works, the main detractor of the Stevens-Boren 
legislation, other than the tobacco state politicians, appeared as none other than Casper 
Weinberger. How is it that Weinberger, who was such a thorn in the side of enterprise 
officials for so many years, appeared to come out as their ally in this initial fight? The old 
adage says that politics makes strange bedfellows; in this case, Weinberger’s desire for 
incremental change drove his choice of beds. He knew that the anti-cigarette moment had 
come, but he was also aware it would never be the slam dunk Koop had envisioned.  
Weinberger anticipated the enterprise would drive the discussion straight to the 
emotional, divisive issues like soldiers’ rights and benefits, and if he was to achieve any 
level of meaningful change to the smoking culture in the military, he had to do it in 
measured, incremental steps. As events unfolded over the next several months, it became 
clear that his strategy was to make changes in-house at DoD first through policy 
                                                          
4
 Amy Millman, memo to Phillip Morris Co., November 1, 1985, accessed January 31, 2015, 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ebt52e00/pdf. 
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implementation, and that these policies had to be in place before any outside measures 
like forced price increases should be attempted, if at all. Among organizational behavior 
parlance, this is described as a process of socializing change rather than legislating 
change.  
 With this incremental strategy in mind, Weinberger quickly sent off a note to 
Senator Mark Hatfield who was Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. In 
this letter, Weinberger, the old infantryman, essentially repeats Warren’s fears that the 
price increases might be perceived incorrectly by his soldiers, and asks the Senator to 
hold off on any price reductions or decreased appropriations. Considering Weinberger’s 
remonstration, and the enterprise’s swift interference, there was almost no chance that the 
amendment would move forward in the Senate, and it was tabled. Rather than kill the 
amendment completely, Stevens met Weinberger in the middle and requested a study on 
the impacts of the use and sale of tobacco within the military; this was a request that 
proved pivotal. This tabled amendment eventually made its way through the legislative 
process and emerged as Continuing Resolution 4657, which was the document drafted by 
those legislators anxious to leave town on December 19, 1985. This resolution, and the 
study it requested, was the proverbial spark that lit the fire, or in this case, burned the 
cigarette.5  
A Tent Divided 
 As Congress headed off for a cold winter break, in the bowels of the Pentagon the 
policy wonks were still hard at work. In late December, they were given this study 
directive from Senator Stevens demanding data regarding the impacts of the use and sale 
                                                          
5
 Casper Weinberger, memo Mark O. Hatfield, November 5, 1985, accessed January 15, 2015, 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/uhe44c00/pdf; Casper Weinberger, memo to Jamie L. Whitten, March 10, 
1986, accessed January 14, 2015, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kic36b00.  
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of cigarettes in the military. The visible hand of bureaucracy had determined that within 
the Pentagon, two offices would handle health care policy: the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (OSD/HA), led by the aforementioned Dr. 
William Mayer, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and 
Personnel (OSD/MPP), led by newcomer Chapman B. Cox. Within OSD/MPP, the 
civilian leader, Cox, had a military deputy, Lieutenant General Edmund Chavarrie. 
Mayer, Cox, and Chavarrie played prominent roles during the drama that unfolded within 
the Pentagon during 1986 over cigarette pricing and cigarette subsidies.6  
 When the staffs at OSD/HA and OSD/MPP began work on the Stevens 
Resolution, an internal riff quickly became apparent within the Pentagon regarding the 
cigarette issue. On one side were Mayer and Cox, who staunchly supported aggressive 
measures to reduce smoking in the military, including cessation programs, price 
increases, banning cigarette sales in commissaries, and caving to pressures to end 
cigarette subsidies. On the other side was General Chavarrie who aggressively supported 
the enterprise’s position. 7 It appears that Chavarrie was the insider that lobbyist Millman 
spoke of when she said, “the DoD is solidly in our corner.”8 Chavarrie played the part of 
                                                          
6
 Maze and Young, “Commissary Sales of Tobacco May End,” 1, 8; Pete Sparber, memo to Ed 
Battison, January 12, 1987, and attached cigarette news articles, accessed January 15, 2015, 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fxo38b00. A note on the Sparber-Battison document: the memo is merely 
a cover letter for a package of cigarette related articles; the article that is pertinent to the Mayer-Cox-
Chavarrie issue is contained therein. It is from an issue of Military Market News, and the article is titled 
“Cigarettes: DoD’s Decision,” which refers to issues pertinent to understanding the winter of 1985–1986.  
 
7
 Maze and Young, “Commissary Sales of Tobacco May End,” 1, 8. Note that at least one 
uniformed member among these groups stood aggressively opposed to Chavarrie and the enterprise. Newly 
appointed USAF Surgeon General Lt Gen Murphy A. Chesney (he arrived about the same time as Cox). 
Chesney commented he believed cigarette sales in the post-exchange “killed more (people) in Vietnam than 
Agent Orange.”  
 
8
 Amy Millman, memo to Phillip Morris Co., November 1, 1985, accessed January 31, 2015, 
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enterprise juggernaut in this policy struggle, consistently sticking to the position that any 
adjustment to the price or availability of cigarettes would be perceived as an attack on 
soldiers’ rights and freedoms.  
 In this way, the discourse on cigarette subsidies quickly became a discussion 
about commissary rights as opposed to cigarette subsidies or health issues, harkening 
back to the healthcare benefits discourse. The plan to remove the cigarette subsidy was 
touted as yet another example of a breach in trust and an infringement on an important 
part of the overall compensation package: commissary benefits.9 In the point papers 
Millman delivered to DoD, the enterprise highlighted this commissary benefit and the 
fact that Congress, not the DoD, managed appropriations in this area. DoD was advised 
to quickly wash their hands of the issue regarding pricing and subsidies and let the 
legislators (and lobbyists) handle those issues. In this way the enterprise hoped to wrench 
control of smoking policy out of the hands of the DoD anti-smoking cabal, and back into 
the hands of Congressional appropriators, many of whom were enterprise supporters from 
tobacco states.  
 As events unfolded, this commissary argument, and therefore the soldier-cigarette 
issue, increasingly fell under the purview of the powerful House Armed Services 
Committee (HASC) which was disproportionately represented by a number of tobacco 
state representatives. Specifically, the Chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee and 
                                                          
9
 This is where the discourse on eroding health benefits (from Chapter 9), oddly, meets the 
discourse on eroding commissary (i.e., smoking) benefits. Both issues were co-opted by the industry to 
support their real position—access to the lucrative military market. The co-opting of these issues served to 
take the spotlight away from what was an important policy debate regarding responsible stewardship of 
Americans’ tax dollars. This is where traditional conservative issues (rights and freedom of choice) meet 
traditional modern liberal issues (social welfare) in an ironic heap of intrigue, paradox, and simple 
manipulation. Modern and classic liberalism must be differentiated, as anyone versant in the topic would be 
quick to note that classic liberalism and modern conservatism are so similar, they are ironically almost 
indistinguishable.  
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Chairman of the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) Subcommittee Dan Daniel 
exerted considerable influence over the soldier-cigarette issue. Daniel was a former 
soldier and tobacco farmer and was then a Congressman from Virginia. As a cigarette 
booster alongside Helms, he went out of his way to ensure that soldiers who desired 
smokes would not come under what he termed the “brass nanny” supervision of the anti-
cigarette zealots in Congress or at DoD.10  
 As these DoD officials worked to hammer out a unified response to Steven’s 
inquiry, they struggled to develop a smoking policy that accounted for their boss’s 
(Weinberger’s) desire for compromise, and their own instincts as a staff ranging from 
support of cessation to insistence upon adhering to the enterprise’s freedom position. At 
one point, discussions were terse. One source said that Chavarrie refused to go along with 
his superior Cox’s insistence that the military revise manpower recommendations to the 
SECDEF regarding cigarette policy. In a back-and-forth bureaucratic battle within the 
cigarette war, Cox was said to have rejected several policy drafts that did not include his 
desire to shift DoD’s position on cigarette pricing and subsidies. This led to a tense 
environment in the OSD/MPP office and a situation “bordering on insubordination” as 
Chavarrie refused to provide a position paper that incorporated Cox’s 
recommendations.11 When the policy guidance was released in March 1986, and followed 
up by official DoD regulations, it became obvious whose position appeared to have won. 
 However, the March 1986 release of the DoD guidance was still in the distant 
future, and the struggle under the DoD tent continued. The enterprise soon discovered the 
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 Samuel D. Chilcote Jr., memo to the Members of the TI Executive Committee, January 13, 
1986, 2, accessed January 15, 2015, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zgq85e00/pdf.  
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 Pete Sparber, memo to Ed Battison, January 12, 1987, and attached cigarette news articles, 
accessed January 15, 2015, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fxo38b00.  
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internal disagreement at DoD; chiefly the Mayer-Cox plan to persuade Weinberger to go 
against the advice of his military staff (i.e. Chavarrie). When Congressman Stephen Neal 
of North Carolina found out about the struggle, and rumors that Weinberger was 
considering tampering with the cigarette benefit, he was quick to pen a response to the 
SECDEF.  
Neal’s message to Weinberger was succinct: of course soldiers smoke! After 
trying to shift the attention to alcohol, which Neal claimed had a much more detrimental 
effect on soldiers than cigarettes, Neal’s main line of argument focused on the historic 
link between soldiers and smoking. He wanted Weinberger to understand that “in times 
of war, tobacco has been a tremendous morale booster,” and his actions infringed upon 
this special relationship. He informed Weinberger, the old infantryman, that soldiers’ 
military training was incomplete if they did not know how to “police the area and field 
strip cigarette butts.” Not only does this argument speak to the pervasiveness of smoking 
among the troops, it uncovers the level of acculturation that the cigarette had gone 
through among the ranks as it had essentially become synonymous with “field stripping” 
a rifle—one cannot be done without the other.12  
Neal went on to exclaim that a 50 percent smoking rate was “astonishingly low” 
considering what it must have been 20 years ago. After all, are not soldiers just doing 
what they are supposed to do, “enjoy[ing] simple pleasures in situations and settings that 
are not always pleasurable?” When chain smokers from the 1950s and 60s hit the 
CHAMPUS system in the 1980s, many were not so quick to laugh off the whole affair as 
another case of soldiers will be soldiers. In an amazing piece of frankness, Neal ends his 
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 Steve Neal, letter to Casper Weinberger, March 4, 1986, accessed January 15, 2015, 
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note with a concession that his argument was not grounded in health and wellness, or 
even data for that matter, but in the morale of the force. Regarding the morale issue, Neal 
closes:  
I do not think, either, that the historic and traditional link between the services and tobacco can be 
ignored. In times of war, tobacco has been a tremendous morale booster to the soldier, and a 
source of great pleasure and satisfaction. Armies ceased fire to trade it during the Civil War (a 
most civil thing to do). In WWII, the soldier often extracted the cigarettes from a K-Ration packet 
and threw the ration away. In every war, cigarettes are a currency and are bartered for all sorts of 
booty.13  
 
 Though not as sentimental as Neal, and surely not quick to point out his rejection 
of science and data, TI President Sam Chilcote said much about the issue as well. In a 
memo to the TI executive board, Chilcote referred to the Mayer-Cox action during the 
Christmas recess as a “lightning strike” timed to take effect while all the enterprise’s 
Congressional friends were safely away on Christmas recess. On this point Chilcote was 
emphatic: if Mayer and Cox were able to end cut-rate cigarette sales in the military as a 
health measure, this would form the proverbial slippery slope upon which all would slide 
into Koop’s sea of complete cessation.  
 Regarding the Mayer-Cox end run, Chilcote felt the enterprise was in a position of 
strength since Weinberger had already made previous statements in the autumn against 
the aggressive Mayer-Cox policy position. He pointed out that “should [Weinberger] 
cave in to the anti-smoking forces in the Pentagon . . . [he] would be in the embarrassing 
position of doing a complete reversal on a position he has previously taken in writing.”14 
Chilcote was confident that the enterprise appeared to have Weinberger wedged in a 
corner. Weinberger was giving no indication that he was caving on his previous 
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 Steve Neal, letter to Casper Weinberger, March 4, 1986, accessed January 15, 2015, 
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commitment not to adjust prices or subsidies; he remained true to his plan to allow for 
internal DoD processes to work. As events unfolded, Weinberger appeared as one 
committed to changing the smoking culture in the military. However, he wanted to do it 
cautiously and incrementally−too cautious and incremental for some. With the tabling of 
the Stevens Amendment in December, the fizzling of the Mayer-Cox strike in January, 
the interference from General Chavarrie throughout, and Weinberger’s apparent desire to 
settle with a weak compromise, the enterprise was positive it had weathered yet another 
storm. 
 As the Pentagon staffers continued to work on developing a cigarette policy, 
General Chavarrie was invited to speak at a Commissary Round Table meeting in San 
Antonio, Texas, on February 13, 1986. Commissary stake holders were considerably 
alarmed over the cigarette pricing issue and how it would affect both commissary sales 
and commissary foot traffic, issues linked to one another. They were concerned that as 
cigarettes were the main draw at commissaries, no cigarettes would mean substantially 
less shoppers. If soldiers were not attracted by cut-rate cigarettes, not only would they 
lose the cigarette sales volume, they would forfeit the rest of the purchases these soldiers 
would have made as well. However, a PM representative who was at the roundtable 
discussion was pleased to report that it appeared the enterprise had a strong advocate at 
DoD in General Chavarrie. He described Chavarrie as squarely on the side of the industry 
and its position that cigarette prices remain free of nanny-state interference. Their fears 
were further alleviated when Chavarrie reported that despite Dr. Mayer’s efforts, the 
issue was and remained an issue of “service personnel rights and freedom of choice.”15 
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 Ted Costas, Phillip Morris interoffice correspondence to George Powell, “ALA Midwest 
Commissary Round Table,” February 13, 1986, accessed January 15, 2015, 
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 The enterprise was not the only group to pick up on the internal struggle at DoD 
over smoking policy. Before long, the issue had come to the attention of anti-smoking 
Senators who supported Stevens and Boren in their struggle to amend DoD funding to 
exclude cigarette subsidies and curb tobacco sales on military instillations. In a February 
memo from a select group of anti-smoking Senators addressed to Weinberger, the issues 
of smoker’s rights, commissary benefits, and quality of life were prominent:  
Raising the price of cigarettes would not take away a smoker's right to smoke. Nor would this 
provision deny a benefit to the military community, unless lung cancer and heart disease are 
benefits. We find the argument that raising tobacco prices would endanger the commissary system 
specious, for there must be better ways to keep commissaries open . . . Health promotion and 
disease prevention programs in the Department of Defense have the potential to improve the 
quality of life for hundreds of thousands of service members and their families. We strongly 
support the health initiatives already undertaken by the Department and encourage you to affirm 
and expand these initiatives by promptly issuing the health promotion directive, including the 
tobacco price increase provision. You have an historic opportunity to reverse the traditional role 
which the military services have played in promoting smoking in our society. We hope you will 
seize it.16  
 
 This was a straight-forward, clear statement from a powerful group of anti-
cigarette Senators urging Weinberger to listen to his subordinates’ advice (Mayer and 
Cox) and take historic action on the soldier-cigarette issue now. They were frustrated that 
Weinberger seemed intent to compromise and delay issuance of the DoD health 
promotion directive his staffers labored over—even if under a tent divided. The Senators, 
as well as the enterprise, would have to wait another month to find out Weinberger’s 
decision.  
The DoD Report on Smoking and DoD 1010.10 
                                                                                                                                                                             
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fct52e00/pdf. This PM representative reported, “tobacco companies 
dominated the issues discussed” at this meeting.  
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 John Chafee, et al., memo to Casper Weinberger, February 5, 1986, accessed January 31, 2015, 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/nmj78b00. The anti-smoking Senators who signed this document are: John 
Chafee (R-RI), Richard Lugar (R-IN), Mark Hatfield (R-OR), John Heinz (R-PA), Jeff Bingaman (D-NM), 
David Boren (D-OK), William Proxmire (D-WI), and Edward Kennedy (D-MA).  
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 The DoD issued its extensive Department of Defense Report on Smoking and 
Health in the Military on March 10, 1986, followed the next day by the Department of 
Defense Health Promotion Directive 1010.10. These two documents represent a major 
step in the history of the soldier and the cigarette. Initially, it appeared the enterprise had 
won this latest round of the cigarette war. However, the documents require close scrutiny 
in order to understand who the winners and losers were and what the documents meant to 
the future of smoking in the military.  
 The first document, the DoD Report on Smoking, consisted of Weinberger’s 
response to the December 19, 1985, continuing resolution that included a request for the 
DoD to provide a study on the pervasiveness and effects of the military smoking culture. 
Weinberger acknowledged that the report: 
concludes that smoking rates are high for active duty personnel, that smoking is a major health 
hazard, that increasing the price of cigarettes could result in an 8 to 10 percent reduction in 
consumption, but that a formalized and structured anti-smoking campaign with no increase in 
prices would also result in significant reduced consumption.17 
 
In this sentence, Weinberger is acknowledging that, behind the scenes, his policy staff at 
DoD is at loggerheads on the issue. In general terms, one side wanted to stop funding the 
smoking habit by slashing subsidies and price breaks; the other wanted to hold the line on 
commissary benefits and simply afford soldiers educational opportunities and then let 
them make their own choice. In reality, the Chavarrie side wanted the enterprise 
standard—status quo—and provided the reasoning that the smoking rate in the military 
was on a four percent per year downward trend, thus the military was better served by 
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letting the soldier-cigarette bond fizzle out on its own without giving the perception they 
were cutting into benefits. 
The 93 pages of reports, analysis, graphs, and appendices confirmed what was 
essentially already known: soldiers and retirees smoked copious amounts of cigarettes 
that were injurious to health and a huge burden on the military health care system and the 
defense medical budget. The study goes on to provide four options to address the 
smoking problem in the military. The first was to seek status quo—do nothing. The other 
two involved some version of price hikes, and the last option was to ban the sale of all 
tobacco in commissaries.  
These basic options were followed by a conclusion that is a tortured piece of logic 
obviously written by a tent divided. It darts from one position to another, and then to no 
position at all; it is disjointed at best, preposterous at worst. At one point, the study says 
that price hikes would definitely work to achieve smoking reduction targets, and then 
casts off such hikes as a drastic infringement on soldiers’ rights that would have profound 
effects on morale and retention. Then it maintains such price hikes will have only 
negligible impacts on soldier finances, to the tune of about $100 a year on average. Next 
it backs completely away and places the military smoking problem squarely in the lap of 
the federal government: “Smoking is a behavior that has the appearance of being 
officially sanctioned by a number of policies including federal programs subsidizing the 
tobacco growing industry and the sale of low-cost cigarettes at military installations.”18  
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How could Weinberger’s DoD staffers who authored this report extol low-cost 
cigarettes as a virtue, right, and indeed an important part of retention, and then reason that 
a price hike is a negligible inconvenience . . . that would work to reduce smoking? 
Finally, how could they place blame for the whole situation on federal cigarette subsidies 
when the report previously lauded such cut-rate cigarettes as vital to retention? The 
pretzel logic found in the conclusion of this report, and indeed the entire soldier-cigarette 
issue, is yet another symptom of a much greater theme in modern American history: the 
warp and woof of a modern corporatocracy which attempts to weave together various, oft 
opposing interests in the name of good business.  
Thus in these bureaucratic trenches, where policy meets politics, one finds the 
modern economic arrangements that fuel American political-economy. Taxable 
transactions, in the government’s eyes, fuel this arrangement. In these trenches, actors 
with varying motivations work tirelessly to create, or block, policies as informed by their 
constituencies. In this way, similar to a sausage grinder, the needs of big business, 
taxpayers, industry, and the military-industrial complex are ground together with the end 
product a mixed bag of industry-friendly incentives and taxpayer-friendly efficiencies.19 
As with all such transactions, there are winners and losers, and there are inherent 
paradoxes. The art is to maximize the winning, minimize the losing, and, like Thomas 
Jefferson, develop the “capacity to rest comfortably with contradictions.”20  
In Weinberger’s report, he acknowledges the paradoxical warp and woof 
phenomenon as he explains his selected course of action to Congressman Jamie Whitten, 
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Chairman of the Appropriations Committee. Weinberger concedes “the tobacco issue has 
presented the government (federal, state and local) with a paradoxical situation 
attempting to balance the negative health impacts against the positive economic impacts 
(Italics mine).”21 With the paradox duly registered, he further explains the nuances of the 
line he is forced to walk between inconsistency and expediency, stating:  
There are some understandable inconsistencies in the Government directly or indirectly making 
available for purchase at lower prices than could be obtained elsewhere, products that we know are 
injurious to the individual’s health. Therefore, at the end of a period of time reasonable to measure 
the effectiveness of our aggressive anti-smoking campaign in decreasing use of tobacco by the 
troops, I will review our progress and consider whether it would be appropriate, in addition, to 
make changes in the present policies of tobacco sales in commissaries and post exchanges.22 
 
And finally, he informed Congress, the enterprise, and the soldiers that his chosen course 
of action was to “direct that an intense anti-smoking campaign be conducted at all levels 
of all Services and that it become a major responsibility of all commanders and 
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 Office of the Asst. Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), “Department of Defense Report on Smoking and Health in 
the Military,” March 1986, 24, accessed January 15, 2015, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kic36b00; 
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have been very familiar with Weinberger’s comments regarding the “positive economic impacts” of 
cigarettes, tobacco, and smoking. 
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 Casper Weinberger, memo to Jamie L. Whitten, March 10, 1986, accessed January 15, 2015, 
http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/nkvy0034. 
 
298 
 
 
commanding officers, up to and including the highest levels of each Service and the 
Department.23” 
In the end, Weinberger did not choose any of the options he was offered by the 
staff. Instead of status quo, price hikes, or ending cigarette sales, he chose an aggressive 
program of education, with a wait and see fallback option. This was essentially a hedging 
strategy that pursued compromise in the short term, yet opened the door to further action 
in the long term. Words are important, especially regarding crucial policy issues pertinent 
to the war room, the boardroom, and the American living room. It is important to note 
that Weinberger ordered an intense anti-smoking campaign as a major policy issue 
Services must pursue with utmost vigor at the highest levels. In essence, the Secretary of 
Defense ordered the Army Chief of Staff to make anti-smoking one of his top policy 
issues. Through a cascading set of ordered effects, some anticipated, others not, these 
were the words that eventually sounded the death knell of the smoking culture in the 
Army.  
The very next day, March 11, 1986, Weinberger and the DoD released regulatory 
guidance to implement the policy options he had chosen based on (and in some ways not 
based on) the DoD’s own report on smoking released the day before. Health Promotions 
Directive 1010.10 was essentially just that—a directive to the Services to promote 
healthy lifestyles. Tobacco use was just one of many healthy lifestyle issues addressed in 
this directive. At first glance, it appears non-committal, offering little substance to the 
anti-smoking lobby. Using classic status quo language, for example, it asks military 
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commanders to “coordinate and monitor” the “use of tobacco products in DoD occupied 
facilities.”24  
However, in the same section it tells commanders to coordinate and monitor just 
about everything else health related. It invites them to monitor and reduce stress, fat, 
hypertension, and to coordinate calisthenics programs. The regulation addresses smoking 
in general terms and waters down the smoking issue by lumping cigarettes in with other 
vague, ill-defined topics such as positive work environment and stress. Further diluting 
the issue, it calls for the formation of “coordinating committees” to monitor smoking 
policy and health. In most bureaucracies, “coordinating committees,” in reality, are 
formed to work hard to achieve status quo.25  
However, peering deeper into the document, there are parts of the guidance that 
directly address smoking as a separate, distinct issue. Yet these are attenuated as well, or 
even offer clear loopholes. The regulation does call for plans to address “smoking 
prevention and cessation,” only to admonish leaders not to, under any circumstance, 
coerce or pressure soldiers to actually enter smoking cessation programs. Leaders were to 
only provide information and education if they are asked. The soldier would have ample 
opportunity to ask for help with cessation at yearly physicals, dental exams, or feedback 
sessions.26  
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 Department of Defense, Directive 1010.10: Health Promotion, March 11, 1986, 1–5, accessed 
January 15, 2015, http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/slkf0030. For more on this issue 
of direct marketing to soldiers as well as the commissary issue in general, see Elizabeth A. Smith, Virginia 
S. Blackman, and Ruth E Malone, “Death at a discount: how the tobacco industry thwarted tobacco control 
policies in US military commissaries,” Tobacco Control, 16, no. 1 (February 2007): 38–46. 
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 Department of Defense, Directive 1010.10, 1–5. 
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In terms of direct smoking policy and workspace management, the directive 
allowed smoking in buildings as long as it did not “impair non-smokers.” It also gave 
provisions to restrict smoking to designated areas outside buildings, yet at the same time 
allowed smoking inside if there were well ventilated areas that could accommodate 
smokers. It allowed for smoking in private offices, and encouraged supervisors, where 
space permitted, to allow for smokers to have their own work stations. Finally it 
encouraged supervisors and commanders to consider billeting smokers and non-smokers 
in ways that consider smoking preferences, and it banned cigarette companies from 
marketing directly to military personnel.27  
  The reaction to Weinberger’s report and follow-on guidance ranged from cautious 
optimism from the enterprise to disgust from certain anti-smoking legislators. The 
enterprise initially saw the rather demure, weak sounding guidance as a victory. Tobacco 
Institute President Sam Chilcote said, “despite intense lobbying by the Coalition on 
Smoking or Health and the support of two key Pentagon officials (Mayer and Cox) . . . 
there will be no change in status quo” regarding the DoD cigarette policy.28 Ironically, 
the TI was happy to join Weinberger and his military staff in blocking Congress’ attempt 
to erode soldier benefits even further. The TI attributed the entire 1010.10 fiasco to an 
internal power struggle among certain DoD staffers rather than an honest attempt to 
address health promotion in the military. In a statement provided to the Washington Post, 
a TI spokesman said, “What is going on is a Pentagon staff dispute, with the health affairs 
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people and other anti-smoking forces on one side and a number of other people looking at 
the broader issue of commissary rights.”29  
Enterprise booster Daniel swung into action as well, describing the whole 
cigarette affair as a kneejerk reaction by certain overzealous DoD officials (Mayer and 
Cox) who had made a carnival out of the whole affair. Later he would comment the 
1010.10 matter not only threatened soldiers’ benefits, it threatened combat readiness. 
“Scientists agreed that in the stressful environment of war ‘the positive effects [of 
smoking] offset the negative.’”30 Daniel does not say which scientists; although it is 
possible he is referring to the enterprise-backed St. Martins meeting where cigarette 
scientists gathered to find out why people smoked—to allow the industry to market more 
effectively.31 
If the enterprise was cautiously optimistic, the more aggressive members of the 
anti-smoking lobby were seething. On Capitol Hill, Senator Bingaman was particularly 
disappointed in Weinberger’s weak 1010.10 guidance. In the Congressional Record for 
March 13, 1986, the Senator comments: 
By omitting from this directive positive and substantive provisions which would have discounted 
the DoD subsidies for tobacco products sold on military instillations, the Secretary missed a 
significant opportunity to improve the quality of life of those who serve in the armed forces . . . 
This directive guarantees that the DoD will continue to subsidize disease and premature death 
among its personnel and their families. Additional service members and their families will suffer 
from lung cancer, heart disease, and other smoking related maladies as a result of this directive. 
These individuals will seek medical care for their diseases in military hospitals and in VA medical 
centers.32 
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Bingaman further lamented, “the taxpayers are the biggest losers,” in Weinberger’s 
decision not to adjust prices or cut cigarette subsidies. He reiterated that he and other 
concerned Senators had urged the Secretary to take action on this matter, however he 
“has chosen not to do so.”33 He accused Weinberger of caving to the enterprise he had 
spent most of his federal career fighting, saying that he believed Weinberger “would have 
liked to have included an end to the military tobacco subsidy in his directive” were it not 
for pressure from “supporters of the tobacco industry, both in Congress and in the 
administration” that are both “many and vocal” and have “persuaded the Secretary to put 
off any increase in tobacco prices.” Finally, he characterized the newly established DoD 
policy on cigarette smoking as found 1010.10 as “absurd” and “schizophrenic.”34  
Chilcote felt he summed up the whole episode best with his assessment that “We 
have won the battle, but not the war . . . the issue remains.”35 Another lobbyist felt the 
battle was “far from being over.”36 With such strong words against the enterprise 
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becoming a normal part Senate floor discussion, and debate often followed by strongly 
worded amendments and legislative proposals against the tobacco enterprise, how long 
could the enterprise stave off the onslaught? Chilcote did not realize at the time how 
correct he was in his other assessment that the enterprise had to “respond to the adverse 
findings in the report” in the very near future.37 Notice that he emphasized the report and 
not the DoD 1010.10 guidance. In the end, the report, with the 1010.10 guidance playing 
only a secondary role, was the document that brought about the final unraveling of the 
enterprise’s tight grip on the soldier-cigarette bond.  
The Army Executes the Dislodging Maneuver  
Whether Weinberger recognized it or not may never be known, but his actions on 
March 10 and 11 set in motion a sequence of events that ensured the final demise of the 
soldier and the cigarette. After nearly a decade debating back and forth about the special 
soldier-cigarette relationship, the industry’s targeting of young soldiers, and the mounting 
costs of health care in America and a cigarette-smoking military, the Army shocked all 
involved with the release of their April 17, 1986, US Army Tobacco Cessation Plan.  
The 1010.10 language was so weak it was open to interpretation in any number of 
ways by commanders responsible for implementation. However Weinberger’s report, 
with its guidance that “an intense anti-smoking campaign . . . become a major 
responsibility of all commanders . . . up to and including the highest levels of each 
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Service,” proved almost binding.38 Moreover, it was supported by nearly a hundred pages 
of evidence documenting the irrefutable dangers, both physically and fiscally, of soldier 
smokers, and these two elements, the binding order and the data, proved intensely 
problematic for an enterprise intent to keep Army soldiers smoking at the rate they had 
for decades.39 For in the Army, an old adage governs all orders from higher commands: 
the subordinate commander can be more restrictive, but they cannot be less restrictive. In 
this case, the Army chose the former as opposed to the latter. 
April 17, 1986, was the day the Army took matters into its own hands. Issuing its 
own supplement to the DoD 1010.10 directive, the Army’s Tobacco Cessation Program, 
in true Army fashion, was blunt, direct, and to the point. There was no mention of stress, 
calories, hypertension, workspace rights, or exercise programs. However the document 
had much to say about the vice of excessive cigarette smoking, a vice the Army now 
determined was neither conducive nor acceptable any longer in the military profession. 
Rather than establish committees or work groups, the Army established timelines, tasks, 
clear objectives, and offices of primary responsibility (OPR).  
In cover letters that accompanied the Army’s guidance, the Army gave tobacco 
cessation the highest priority and the highest level of support, both of which were after all 
demanded by Weinberger in his DoD smoking report. Signed by the Secretary of the 
Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the 
top brass stressed the fact that service in Army is a “profession unique in many respects, 
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requiring physical fitness and stamina to get the job done,” and that every member was 
charged with the responsibility to make the smoking cessation goal a reality. Lieutenant 
General Robert M. Elton, who was the OPR for the entire Army program, made the goal 
quite lucid, stating that the goal was “elimination of tobacco products usage in the 
Army.”40 These were very strong words, especially considering the weak language in the 
DoD guidance.  
In designing their cessation program, the Army took the tradition of assuming 
HHQ allowed more, rather than less restriction, to nearly its most extreme conclusion.41 
The program included a set of milestones and OPRs, and a goal of meeting stated 
cessation objectives within five years. The overarching goal of the entire Army program 
was to achieve a level of smoking in the Army that, at minimum, matched the national 
goal of reducing smoking levels by 1990 to a point where only one in four Americans 
were still smoking. In order to flip digits and drop from the 52 to the 25 percent level, 
half the soldiers in the Army who smoked would have to quit smoking in the next four 
years. Moreover, at least half that entered the service during this time would have to quit 
as well, or not start. With plans to join the “Great American Smoke-out,” the Army’s 
“Great Army Smoke-out” was scheduled for November 1986.42  
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However the Army was not dragging its feet on this issue. Commanders were 
directed to boldly implement the Army smoking cessation plan by July 7, 1986, giving 
them just three months from the time the order was published to implement tobacco 
cessation. After this date, they were held accountable for their actions regarding the 
strong, clear guidance from the Army Chief of Staff. After outlining smoking and non-
smoking space management issues in a similar manner to DoD 1010.10, with the Army 
adding emphasis on secondhand smoke, the Army document takes it one step further and 
prescribes a punishment section for non-compliance. Punishment for violating the 
provisions of the Army cessation program included prosecution under the UCMJ, but not 
normally, unless the “smoking behavior clearly . . . involved either direct threat to safety 
or security, or evidences a willful disregard for the health and comfort of a non-
smoker.”43  
With that, the official Army culture changed in an instant. From then on, if a 
soldier smoked a cigarette in a non-designated area and was asked to remove to a proper 
location, and if that soldier blew smoke in a hostile manner, they now had to prepare for 
UCMJ action and possible jail time. This is light years away from the smoke ‘em if 
you’ve got ‘em and field strip the area for butts culture that dominated the Army during 
the six previous decades. It would take years for the informal Army culture to change and 
even more years to officially end subsidized smokes for the soldiers and subsidized 
tobacco crops for the farmers. April 1986 was not the end of the state-sponsored 
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sanctioning of cigarette smoking in the Army; however it was the end of the Army’s 
cultural sponsorship of the soldier and the cigarette.  
When the Army ordered a change to the soldierly cult of smoking, obedience soon 
followed. To those in the enterprise who complained the Army’s draconian policy on 
smoking was unenforceable and that it was “unimaginable the number of military 
policemen . . . required to enforce the regulation,” one Congressional panel commented 
“when the Army wants to enforce anything, anything is enforceable.”44 In the end, when 
an organization such as the Army chooses to change the culture, either through issuing 
billions of cigarettes during WWI or snuffing cigarettes in 1986, the rest is simply history 
. . . and a matter of statistical accounting. To discover the veracity of this statement, 
simply review the numbers of cigarettes smoked by soldiers and Americans from 1918 to 
1986 . . . and then light a cigarette at the Pentagon welcome center next time you visit.  
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CHAPTER XII 
EPILOGUE 
Casper Weinberger  
A year after releasing DoD 1010.10 guidance, Weinberger decided to leave his 
post at Defense in order to properly care for his ailing wife. After nearly 40 years rotating 
as a federal and corporate executive and sparring with the cigarette enterprise, 
Weinberger bowed out of the cigarette war. Despite the criticism he received from anti-
smoking Congressmen, and the laud he received from the enterprise over his weak 
1010.10 guidance, it appears Weinberger had the last laugh after all. The guidance was so 
ambiguous, and was backed by such strong language in the DoD study that preceded it, 
that the door was left wide open for the Army to enact strong smoking cessation 
measures. The Army stepped through that door just one month after Weinberger’s DoD 
report and follow-on guidance were released. This was a short lived victory for the 
enterprise in this case.  
Though Weinberger left federal service, he did not leave the corporate service. In 
what can only be described as ironic, President Reagan appointed Weinberger to the 
National Economic Council, whose mission was to “look for ways to reduce the federal 
budget deficit,” in 1988. The paradox of one of the federal government’s most legendary 
spenders appointed to lead federal cost-cutting drills is an interesting selection to say the 
least. To credit Weinberger though, he stuck to his guns. His input to the committee was 
to slash taxes and spend even more on defense. He reasoned “substantial defense 
spending” was the best “social program” because it kept people alive and healthy (as 
opposed to nuked or invaded).  
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In another spate of irony, Weinberger, like Califano, was invited to the Waldorf-
Astoria for a high-stakes power lunch in the fall of 1988. Instead of Iacocca telling 
Califano that he had authored much of the Chrysler health care problem and then inviting 
him to join his Chrysler board, this time it was billionaire Malcolm Forbes Sr., who had 
consistently criticized Weinberger in his magazine for Weinberger’s budget-busting 
defense programs, inviting Weinberger to be Forbes’s new publisher. Weinberger was 
eventually named Chairman of Forbes.1 
Chapman B. Cox 
Similar to Mayer, Cox left the Pentagon when Reagan left the White House and 
became the CEO of the USO and later the Senior Vice President of Lockheed Martin 
Information Management Systems.  
Charles Bennett 
As a debt-averse fiscal conservative, Bennett was a throwback to the Jeffersonian 
tradition in American political history. Bennett’s 2003 obituary in the Florida Times-
Union recounts his life of public service:  
First and foremost, Bennett had integrity. In fact, a lot of people called him ‘Mr. Clean’—a 
moniker that made him stand out during the scandal-plagued eras in which he served. He also tried 
his best to clean up Capitol Hill, sponsoring legislation that created the House Ethics Committee 
and serving as its first chairman. That didn't always endear him to his colleagues. The Almanac of 
American Politics 1980 reported, ‘He opposes unofficial office accounts, outside income for 
members and congressional pay raises, which led one colleague to call him ‘a bit too pious.’ . . . 
Bennett made many personal sacrifices. He refused his paycheck during his early tenure on 
Capitol Hill, saying he had simple tastes, and often returned raises in later years. Excess campaign 
funds were donated to the National Park Service. Often, he would drive from Washington to 
Jacksonville, rather than flying, to save tax money . . . House records indicate he never missed a 
legislative roll call . . . When dealing with Bennett, it was difficult to become cynical about 
government . . . It was his legislation that put ‘In God We Trust’ on the nation's currency and 
coins, and he was always proud of that. Bennett personally triumphed over adversity, having 
contracted polio while overseas in the Army during WWII and spending his last 16 months of  
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active duty in a hospital. Although slowed for the rest of his life, he didn't allow the affliction to 
ruin his career. 2 
 
Dan Daniels  
After working hard to oppose limitations to soldiers’ access to cigarettes during 
the 1984 to 1986 period, Daniels elevated his game in 1987. In order to prevent further 
DoD cigarette pricing activism, Daniels worked with the TI to quietly pass an obscure 
amendment that essentially forbade the DoD from adjusting cigarette prices or 
availability without the express consent of Congress. With strong tobacco state 
representation on the House Armed Services Committee, this measure worked for a time 
to halt efforts to end cigarette subsidies. Daniels also chose to directly take a stand 
against further activism by the Services. Falling in line with the Helms-Kornegay 
carnival of rhetoric, when Strategic Air Command’s General John Chain instituted 
smoking restrictions even more aggressive than the Army 1986 cessation plan, Daniel 
was quick to fire back. In December 1987, Daniel sent Chain a letter where he accused 
him of using “fascist tactics.” Daniel also bristled at Chain’s apparent determination to: 
impose the current fad of ‘wellness’ on this group of individuals who have volunteered to serve 
their country despite the fact that those who served before them managed to do so without 
excessive nannyism . . . it is frightening as we observe the 200th Anniversary of our Constitution 
that a denial of freedom by a branch of our Armed Services is permitted.3 
  
With this statement, Daniel joined a host of tobaccoland politicians who became very 
comfortable applying industry strategy developed in the 1970s calling for a unification of 
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issues related to smokers’ rights, freedom, patriotism, veterans’ benefits, and Red State 
politics.  
Dr. C. Everett Koop  
After the Army issued their Smoking Cessation Plan, a plan that was much 
stronger than Weinberger’s guidance, during Senate testimony Dr. Koop later referred to 
the Army’s plan as “a courageous stand.” Koop later released his “landmark” 1986 
Surgeon General Report which was the first government report to link second hand 
smoke to lung cancer.4  
Dr. William A. Mayer  
Mayer left the Pentagon in 1989 when President Reagan left the White House.  
Horace Kornegay 
After two decades at the Tobacco Institute providing some of the most vociferous, 
memorable, and divisive quotes of the entire cigarette struggle, Kornegay retired as the 
TI’s chairman in 1986, quietly quit smoking, and returned to private law practice.  
Jeff Bingaman (D-OK) 
Bingaman tried to introduce an amendment to the FY87 Defense Authorization 
Act, similar to the Stevens-Boren legislation the previous year. In a floor debate he 
argued “what sort of signal is sent to a service member . . . if on one hand he is told not to 
smoke and on the other hand, he is encouraged to smoke through DoD pricing.” Further, 
he added that his amendment was not an erosion of benefits, unless “a lifetime of poor 
health and premature death be regarded as a benefit” or “unless lung cancer and heart 
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 Irvin Molotsky, “Tobacco Trade Assails Army Smoking Curb,” New York Times, June 13, 1986; 
Mark Schoifet, “C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General Who Took on Tobacco, Dies at 96,” Bloomberg 
(February 25, 2013), accessed January 18, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-25/c-everett-
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disease are benefits.” Further, Bingaman advanced the idea that soldiers “should pay the 
same for these products as the civilian citizens of this country have to pay.” He further 
questioned the notion that soldier are recruited, retained, and motivated to serve based on 
cheap access to cigarettes.  
Bingaman’s amendment was met with sharp objection from tobaccoland 
politicians. Most notably, Senator Ford from Kentucky who said such tinkering with 
cigarette pricing and availability was “social engineering” that would force soldiers to 
buy unhealthy, unregulated cigarettes off-post. Ford accessed the recruitment and 
sustainment argument with his assertion that before soldiers “count the cost of service” 
they consider commissary benefits . . . “shopping and saving” are rights guaranteed to the 
uniformed service member. Senator Mitch McConnell from Kentucky joined in with his 
contention that soldiers might miss out on “high-quality American cigarettes” if such 
legislation was allowed to pass. With strong opposition registered from the powerful 
tobacco coalition, the Bingaman Amendment was tabled in similar fashion to the Boren-
Stevens Amendment the previous year and additional studies on cigarette pricing were 
ordered.5 
Jesse Helms 
Helms was a powerful force in the Senate for 30 years. If he was anything, he was 
consistent. Be it tobacco, defense spending, or his scorn of welfare, Helms remained true 
to his conservative, North Carolina roots. In many ways, he is an archetype of the 
Jacksonian tradition in American politics: strong on defense, quick to a fight, fond of a 
                                                          
5
 99 Cong. Rec. S10529. August 5–6, 1986. Accessed January 28, 2015, 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/eld92b00. 
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hammer-and-nail foreign policy orientation, averse to free rides, and accepting of vice, to 
some degree or another.6  
Joseph A. Califano 
At the same time Weinberger released his DoD 1010.10 Health Promotion 
guidance in 1986, Califano published his book America’s Health Care Revolution: Who 
Lives? Who Dies? Who Pays? In the end, Weinberger and Califano’s 1986 releases were 
works of solidarity because both were oriented in preventative health care as physically 
and fiscally prudent. Further, both point out the dangers and costs of excessive cigarette 
smoking. In another irony, Califano cites RJR in his book as a prime exemplar of a 
company that was taking giant strides toward controlling health care costs. Reynolds was 
cited a leader in providing in-house medical and dental on site for their employees and 
emphasizing preventative health care in all areas but one. Of this one area, Califano 
commented, “Just think what RJR could achieve if they mounted a campaign to get its 
employees to quit smoking!”7  
Lt Gen Edgar Chavarrie 
General Chavarrie retired from the USAF in September 1986. The Tobacco 
Institute provided Chavarrie with a lavish retirement ceremony through their PR firm 
Flieshman-Hillard. Ironically, guests listed at this reception included Weinberger, Mayer, 
and Cox. Chavarrie later formed a lobbying firm with noted Congressional staffer and 
                                                          
6
 For more on the Jacksonian tradition, see Walter Russell Meade, “The Jacksonian Tradition and 
American Foreign Diplomacy,” The National Interest (Winter 1999/2000), 5–29. 
 
7
 Joseph Califano, America’s Health Care Revolution: Who Lives? Who Dies? Who Pays? (New 
York: Random House, 1986), 32.  
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enterprise lobbyist Will Cofer, and he worked on the enterprise’s Project Breakthrough 
Campaign, which was a formal effort to link smoking, soldiering, veterans, and freedom.8  
Peyton March  
March continued as the Army Chief of Staff until 1921 when he retired. He lived 
a long life and died in 1955, possibly never realizing the part he played in linking the 
soldier to the cigarette. Interestingly, March Air Force Base in California was not named 
for General Peyton March, but for his son, Peyton March Jr., who died in a plane crash 
while training for service with the Army Air Corps in WWI.  
Sam Chilcote 
Chilcote was president of the Tobacco Institute from 1981 to 1987. Once the 
Army cessation plan became a reality in July 1986, Chilcote drafted a plan of action 
involving a multi-front offensive for the enterprise to fight back. On the international 
front, he called the Army plan dangerous, as it would encourage foreign armies to 
implement smoking cessation. On the domestic, he suggested a focused effort to recruit 
scholars to write about the historic link between tobacco and national defense. On the 
science front, he suggested articles that express the importance of cigarettes to soldiers’ 
                                                          
8
 Paul Johnson, memo to Fred Panzer, “Chavarrie Reception,” September 12, 1986, accessed 
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overall psychological health. However he does comment, “Actual science does not seem 
to me to be very important in this aspect of the overall tobacco issue.”9  
Regarding the Congressional front, Chilcote suggested the enterprise leverage the 
fact that “Congressman of vast seniority (Mendel Rivers, Rayburn, Byrd, John 
McClellan, and two score more) dipped deeply in the barrel of pork to load their states 
with eternally flowing defense dollars. Most of the instillations happen to be where most 
tobacco is grown.”10 Therefore, he suggested an intense lobbying campaign to influence 
what he saw as pliable legislators bound to and wrapped up in the modern economic 
arrangements that form the heart of America’s modern political-economy.  
Finally, on the soldier front, Chilcote suggested the enterprise retain a cartoonist 
to develop a stable of sketches to poke fun at the whole Army cessation campaign. He 
recommended slogans and quips such as, “The Soviet development of a new weapon—a 
parachute bomb which releases cartons of cigarettes behind the lines” or “Who ever 
heard of an army without tobacco?” or “The beer goes next” or “Toward a defenseless 
society by the year 2000” or “Disarmament at Geneva gets a new twist . . . two more 
ICBM’s (allowed) per 50,000 soldiers deprived of cigarettes.”11 Chilcote remained 
President of the Tobacco Institute until 1997. 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 Sam Chilcote, memo to Martin R. Haley, “The Army Anti-Smoking Order,” July 11, 1986, 
TI10790543–TI10790549. 
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 Chilcote, “The Army Anti-Smoking Order,” TI10790548. 
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 Chilcote, “The Army Anti-Smoking Order,” TI10790543–TI10790549; SourceWatch, “Samuel 
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Tobacco Institute response to Army’s 1986 smoking cessation guidance  
The official TI response to the Army’s smoking cessation directive and the DoD’s 
flirting with cigarette price adjustments are found in sample statements from TI point 
papers developed in April and May 1986. One said: 
The attitude which this will convey to the serviceman, the potential recruit, and the public is that 
“Army brass” in their infinite wisdom have decided that they are going to see to it that Army 
personnel do what they think is good for them, because the “brass” do not believe that Army 
personnel have the capability to make proper personal decisions on their own. It is obvious that 
this perception will have a significant adverse effect upon recruitment and retention and that it will 
adversely affect Army morale.12 
 
The TI commissioned the marketing firm Savarese and Associates to present data linking 
the commissary and soldiers’ rights issues in May 1986. This report argued that adjusting 
prices upwards is a “breach of contract” between the soldier and the conditions under 
which they enlisted and is essentially an “arbitrary pay cut.” The reasoning stated that 
any “reduction of any element of the total compensation package represents a breach of 
this implicit contract.”13  
Further, the report argued there is a working class discrimination element to the 
cessation and price adjustment proposals. Savarese argued that blue collar laborers, 
enlisted soldiers, and low-income workers have high smoking prevalence both in and out 
of uniform. Joining the military is not an inducement to smoke; they already smoke. So if 
the Army increases the price of cigarettes, it is only punishing the blue collar backbone of 
the Army and the American workforce—the enlisted soldier and the blue collar worker.14 
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 Tobacco Institute, “Discussion Paper: Tobacco Cessation Program US Army,” (Apr. 17, 1986), 
accessed January 15, 2015, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zrd40c00. 
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 James Savarese and Associates, Inc., “Economic Impact of Proposal to Raise Cigarette Prices in 
Military Commissaries” (April 1986) accessed February 1, 2015, 
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 Savarese and Associates, Inc., “Economic Impact of Proposal to Raise Cigarette Prices in 
Military Commissaries.”  
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All these points regarding soldiers’ smoking rights and the commissary benefit became a 
major element of the enterprise’s strategy between 1986 and 2001 as it continued to fight 
cessation programs and the reduction in cigarette subsidies.  
Tobaccoland’s Congressional response to Army’s smoking cessation guidance  
In a letter to Weinberger’s replacement Les Aspin, Walter B. Jones, Congressman 
from North Carolina and Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, commented 
on behalf of a group of concerned Congressmen, all from North Carolina, said: 
We have serious concerns that the army’s “game plan” exceeds the parameters established by the 
DoD directive (1010.10) and that the stated objective is not supported by conclusive scientific 
evidence. We are unaware of any conclusive study . . . which substantiates the Army’s declaration 
that use of tobacco products impairs “critical military skills.”15 
 
The document further claims that Weinberger and the Army took their abrupt action 
without considering the long term impact on “recruitment, retention, and morale.” 
Finally, Jones described smoking cessation plans in the Army not as a “health initiative” 
but an attempt “to mandate certain personal habits of not only active duty personnel, but 
civilian employees, retirees, and their families.” In essence, Jones called the Army’s 
program social engineering, a bumper sticker slogan used extensively by the enterprise 
for the remainder of the twentieth century. The members of Congress who signed this 
remonstrance to Secretary Aspin include Charles O. Whitley (NC), W.G. “Bill” Hefner 
(NC), Stephen L. Neal (NC), Tim Valentine (NC), James T. Broyhill, William M. 
Hendon (NC), Howard Coble (NC), J. Alex McMillan (NC), and William M. Cobey, Jr. 
(NC).16  
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And finally . . .Military Smoking Rates post-1986  
The 1986 Army Smoking Cessation program forever changed the military 
smoking culture; however it did not change the state sponsorship of cigarette subsidies 
for uniformed personnel. The enterprise was able to hold the line against several more 
attempts to amend defense appropriations bills throughout the 1990s to remove funding 
that supported cut-rate cigarettes in the military resale system. Nearly four decades after 
the 1964 Surgeon General’s Report, fiscally conservative Congressmen were finally able 
to remove military cigarette subsidies in 2001.17 
Since 1986, cigarette smoking among the ranks has slowly dwindled to the point 
where soldiers smoke at about the rate of civilians. If one goes on a military installation 
today, he or she would be hard pressed to find a single uniformed officer smoking a 
cigarette. If you find any smokers at all, they would likely only be a few diehard junior to 
mid-grade enlisted huddled around a tree or a can far from buildings.18 For example, on a 
recent trip to Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, the author observed a smoking area 
fifty meters from the main buildings of the Air University Campus over a several day 
period. The smoking gaggle over this period was comprised of a large group of foreign 
military officers who were chain smoking one after the other—no Americans anywhere.  
On a personal note, the starkest example of this tobacco-free cultural phenomenon 
that has invaded the military since 1986 came when I took my recent military physical. 
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 Elizabeth A. Smith, Virginia S. Blackman, and Ruth E Malone, “Death at a discount: how the 
tobacco industry thwarted tobacco control policies in US military commissaries,” Tobacco Control, 16, no. 
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 However, from personal experience, it must be noted that smoking rates among military officers 
and enlisted deployed to combat zones such as Iraq or Afghanistan increase dramatically. Whether combat 
in WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Operation Iraqi Freedom, or Operation Enduring 
Freedom, or far-flung battle fields in-between, when it comes to the soldier and the cigarette (or pipe, or 
cigarillo, or cigar), some things never change.  
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Out of curiosity, I selected “yes” to the question, “have you smoked more than 20 
cigarettes in your entire lifetime.” With my “yes” selection registered, all manner of 
chaos occurred as the questionnaire directed me to a host of other diagnostics, referrals, 
further tests, and cessation programs that I would have to step through in order to 
complete the exam. Then, with bravado that Jesse Helms and Dan Daniel surely would 
have labeled social engineering, the survey finished by asking, “When do you plan to quit 
smoking?”  
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